

УДК 94(470)

Cossacks in the Interethnic Conflicts in Central Asia in the Early XX century “Kyrgyz” Rebellion in 1916

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Received 08.02.2013, received in revised form 15.02.2013, accepted 22.02.2013

The article describes the history of the Cossacks interaction with indigenous Muslim peoples of Central Asia in the early XX century. It pays attention mainly to participation of the Cossacks in the suppression of “Kyrgyz” rebellion in 1916. This paper discusses the role of the Cossacks in the conquest and exploitation of the territory of Kazakhstan and Central Asia in the XVI – XIX centuries as well as the nature of their relationship with the indigenous people and the prerequisites of the rebellion of Muslim population of the region in 1916. The paper attempts to show that the main reasons of the 1916 rebellion were underestimation of the role of the Cossacks in maintaining control over the territory of Russia in Central Asia by central and regional authorities and artificial restraint of Cossack colonization. Disastrous consequences of these actions led to a complete revision of the policy of the Cossacks and attempts to force the Cossacks colonization of the region, which was interrupted by the Russian Revolution in 1917.

Keywords: cossacks, colonization, interethnic relations, ethnic conflict, World War I, the Russian Empire, Turkestan, Muslim peoples.

Point

The role of the Cossacks in the conquest and exploitation of the territory of the Kazakh steppes and Central Asia was initially decisive. Firstly Ural (Yaik) Cossacks and then the Siberian Cossacks started the incorporation of these territories into the Russian state from the middle of the XVI century. In the middle of the XVIII century Orenburg Cossack Army is formed by the Government of the Russian Empire in the north-west of the Kazakh steppes, and in 1867 Semirechensky Cossack Army is formed in Semirechye. By the early 80's of XIX century the

whole territory of the Kazakh steppes and Central Asia became a part of Russia. Cossacks took an active part in the conquest of these territories and provided powerful cover of the process of their development. The role of Cossacks in these processes has recently received increasing attention, both by native and foreign researchers. Among the recent publications on this subject we should mention Glushchenko's works “Russia in Central Asia” (Glushchenko, 2010), G. Nedbay “Siberian Cossack Host” (Nedbay, 2001, 2004), A.P. Yarkov “Cossacks in Kyrgyzstan” (Yarkov, 2002), M.J. Abdirrov “Kazakhstan Conquest by

the Tsarist Russia and struggle for independence by the Kazakh people”(Abdirov, 2000), D.A. Sapunov “The participation of the Cossacks of the Urals and Siberia in joining Central Asia to Russia” (Sapunov , 2001), N. Abdurakhimova “The colonial system of power in Turkestan” (Abdurakhimova, 2002), M. Khodorkovsky “Russian steppe frontier” (Khodorkovsky, 2001).

Cossacks did not only play a crucial role in the annexation of territories of the Kazakh steppes and Central Asia to Russia, but also one of the major forces in the colonization of space and integration into the economic, political and social life of the empire. In addition, the Cossacks were guarantors that these lands belong to Russia. Underestimation of the role of the Cossacks in maintaining control of the steppe region (Kazakhstan) and Central Asia and the economic development of these areas, typical for both central and local authorities, led to serious consequences in the early XX century. In particular, due to the underestimation of the fundamental role of the Cossacks in the region there was the “Kyrgyz rebellion” in 1916.

Example

Initially the government admitted the crucial role of the Cossacks in the conquest, control and development of the Kazakh steppes and Central Asia. Both central and local governments supported the Cossacks strongly. Families of Siberian Cossacks, peasants and soldiers, who were shifted to the Cossack class, were made to move in, often with the use of force. It was done in order to ensure the consolidation of the newly conquered territories of Russia in Central Asia and to organize their economic development here in the XVIII – XIX centuries. In order to secure the region of the Cossacks, the families of settlers were provided with money and natural sources from the Government and were given large plots of arable land. Also, the government allowed all-

comers to settle in the region on condition that the settlers would become the Cossacks. The authorities paid much attention to ensure the land was given to the Cossacks (Dempsey, 2010). Stanitsa plots of land were often taken from the indigenous population. Thus, in 1867, with the establishment of Semirechensky Cossack troops, Cossacks seized the best lands, including the best arable land and meadows that were given to them in favor of the possession of land that the local Kazakh and Kyrgyz population used to have. Such plots of arable land given to the Cossacks were often huge (Central Asia as part of the Russian Empire, 2008: 416). Semirechinsky and Ural Cossacks had 95.3 and 94.4 acres of land per male respectively in the early XX century. (History Cossacks Asiatic Russia, 1996: 37 p.).

By 1916, Cossack population in the Kazakh steppes and Central Asia was quite numerous thanks to governmental measures. Thus, the population of Semirechensky Cossacks was 45 307 people, living in 19 villages and 15 “Settlements”, Orenburg Cossacks – 533 thousand people in 61 village, 446 towns and 533 villages, Siberian Cossacks – 172 thousand people in 53 villages and 118 towns and Ural Cossacks – 166 thousand people living in 30 villages and 450 towns (Cossacks Asiatic Russia, 1996: 15 p.).

However, the final entry of the Kazakh steppes and Central Asia to Russia, and stabilization, as well as the beginnings of large peasant migration to the region, has greatly changed the role of the Cossacks, and in particular, its place in the colonization process. In 1868 a Military Governor of Semirechye G.A. Kolpakovsky wrote that “A Cossack does not have an opportunity to manage a farm in a proper way as from time to time he leaves it in favour of military service”. (Fomchenko, 1983: 34 – 35pp.) . A Governor-General of Turkestan K.P. von Kaufman believed that the Cossacks are less valuable element of colonization rather than peasants, who are able

to farm more effectively on much smaller plots of land (Sapunov, 2001: 192 p.). Such attitude of the major military leaders in the region led to the fact that Cossacks no longer continued getting the land. Moreover, the Cossacks started having bad experience of the land being taken away from them. So with the approval of Kaufman in 1870 – 1880-s, some authorities in Semirechye began to return some of the Cossack lands to Kazakhs or cities in order to clear the air in the area. Despite the fact that the reduction of the Cossack's lands was declared illegal and the local authorities were asked to return the Cossacks 213 thousand acres of land having been seized from them and handed over to the Kazakhs, it was not done. In general, Cossack colonization rates fell sharply after 1880 and before the end of XIX century. (Sapunov, 2001: 195 p.).

They continued to violate Cossacks' land rights further either in Semirechye, or in the steppe regions. So, it is mentioned in the "Explanatory Notes" of "Steppe position" in 1891 that in Semirechenskaya, Akmola and Semipalatinsk oblasts (regions) the land having been previously given to the Cossacks for temporary farming and pastures, would be confiscated and given back to the city if public administration started to exist there. (Central Asia in the Russian Empire, 2008: 416 p.).

In unfolded heated debate about the place of the Cossacks in the colonization process in the late XIX – early XX centuries, it was called into question not as a military force, but as colonization and agricultural one (Bachner, 2001). G.F. Chirkin, the representative of Main Department of Agriculture and Land, who visited Semirechye in 1908, wrote that "peasant colonization should be placed above the Cossack one ..." (Chirkin, 1908: 103 p.).

Indeed, being overloaded with official duties and having almost a lifetime military service, Cossacks cultivated about 5% of

their land despite the use of cheap labor of Kazakhs and migrants. Thus, in terms of the economy, a Cossack settlement was formally less effective than the peasant colonization. However, a military and police factor, which was a key one for the region, was completely ignored with such an assessment. Colonization of newly annexed territories inhabited with a large number of different ethnic and potentially hostile population, could not be effectively implemented by peasants only.

Over a long period of residence in the Central Asia Cossacks did not only manage to adjust to the extreme climatic conditions of the region, but also learned how to interact with the indigenous population and got to know their mentality. Thus, almost all the Siberian Cossacks knew Kazakh language and adopted some domestic Kazakh customs (Krasnov, 1878: 265 – 266 p.).

Cossacks, who had large land holdings, used Kazakh poverty extensively as cheap and available labor force. In turn, such recruitment to the Cossacks was often the only way to survive for poor Kazakhs (East of Russia, 2011: 96 p.).

At the beginning of XX century Cossacks lived in most of the Kazakh steppe and in Semirechye, however, despite the considerable number of Cossacks and their families, and their share in the population of the region was very low. Due to the outbreak of the First World War, a large number of Cossacks were called into service. Thus, on December 2, 1916 320 officers and 13,175 Cossacks of Ural Cossack troops, 697 officers and 31,623 Cossacks of Orenburg Cossack Army, 303 officers and 13,833 Cossacks of Siberian troops, 46 officers and 1,296 Cossacks of Life Consolidated Guards of Cossack Regiment were drafted in to service. Mass mobilization led to a sharp reduction of combat-ready Semirechye Cossacks in the steppe region, which negatively affected the situation in the region and became one of the main causes of mass anti-Russian

rebellion of the Muslim population in summer 1916.

According to the Governor-General of Turkestan A.N. Kuropatkin, besides insufficient numbers of troops in the region, other causes of the rebellion were a lack of a strict “definite governmental program of the regional management”, the removal of the indigenous lands for Russian settlers, lack of awareness of the mood of the local population to the Russian authorities, an active anti-Russian propaganda of the Muslim clergy and German agents and abuse of the local “native” authorities (Rebellion of 1916, 1960: 81 – 82 p.).

According to Folbaum, the Military General Governor of Semirechenskaya oblast, other reasons of the rebellion were a significant weakening of the Russian population in the region as a result of a large number of the men of the Russian population being called up for active military service, “while the non-Russian men remained in the area” and also the fact that Russian population was taken away the arms and ammunition for the war (Red Archives, 1926.: 73 p.).

Contemporaries consider the main reason for the rebellion to be the confrontation of Russian settlers and the indigenous people over the land. It should be noted that the land that was given back to the indigenous people of the region was definitely the case, however, “the return of the land that had previously been occupied by the Russian and Ukrainian settlers led to its abandonment, as indigenous people did not have the skills and desire to cultivate the land”, when it was given back to Kazakhs and Kirghiz in 1931.

The immediate cause of the rebellion was the decree of 25 June 1916, which required “during the on-going war in requisition order to attract non-ethnic population of the Empire at the age of 19 to 43 to work on fortifications

and military posts in the army, as well as for any other necessary for national defense work ...” It is supposed to call up for military service 250 000 people from the steppe regions (provinces) and Central Asia (Morrison, 2009).

It should be noted that representatives of the indigenous peoples of this region had not traditionally served in the Russian Army, but because of the acute need in the people the government wanted to replace the soldiers in the rear works with “non-Russians”. (Moiseyev, 2002: 513 – 514 p.).

Indigenous rebellion spread over almost all the Steppe region and Turkestan. Representatives of the major part of the Muslim peoples of the region (Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Uighur, Dungan and others) took part in the rebellion. They were mostly nomadic and predominantly rural population of the region, as well as working-Muslims. By the end of 1916 the number of rebels had reached 50 thousand people (Lund, 1995: 177 p.).

It should be noted that the administration, foreseeing the possibility of anti-Russian statements on the basis of recruitment of workers, requested military assistance in July 1916 (Red Archives, 1926: 71 p.). However, the central government did not allocate it, because on the one hand, they did not consider the situation in the region particularly dangerous, and on the other hand, they did not have free military contingents in terms of on-going bloody war.

The first disorders occurred in Turkestan province in July, 1916. In July, 1916, there were 86 disorders in the Fergana region, 25 – in Samarkand and 20 – in the Syrdarya. Such disturbances of the local population took many forms, from simple leaving the enterprise to fleeing to the mountains or abroad. However, even on this stage there were armed attacks on officials, military, police, and the Russian-speaking population (Lund, 1995: 176 p.).

Residents of the least developed areas were particularly active against the Russian people. Thus, the center of the rebellion in the Samarkand region was Dzhizak, the most backward district. On July 13, instigated by religious preachers a crowd that consisted of Dzhizak's dekhan and urban inhabitants tore to pieces a district Chief Colonel P. Rukin, police inspector P.D. Zotoglov, rural municipality, the translator and the two police officers who tried to persuade the rebels to disperse. Almost all the district (uyezd) joined the residents of Dzhizak. The rebels destroyed the bridges, railroad tracks, and station and telegraph facilities; they killed railway and postal workers, Russian settlers and took Russian women with children to the mountains (Rebellion of 1916, 1960: 94; Red Archives, 1933: 62 p.).

In Semirechye the first rebellious act was an armed attack on August 3 when Kazakhs in Kyzylburgovskoy volost of Vernensky uyezd attacked Kazakh representatives of and Russian government officials. As a result, one person was killed and three wounded (Red Archives, 1926: 70 p.).

The population of Kyrgyz territory took the most active part in the rebellion in 1916. On 9 August rebellious acts started in Przhevalsky uyezd, where simultaneously there were attacks in the village Grigorievka (lake Issyk-Kul) and villages Stolypin and Belotsarskoe, located in the valley of Kechkorki and Dzhumgola Rivers. As a result, almost all the male population of Belotsarsk was killed and the women carried off into captivity.

Later the attacks were carried out on all the settlements located at the northern and southern shores of Lake Issyk-Kul and along the post road from Przhevalsk to Ohotnichy. The rebels burned the Russian towns, robbed and killed people. Thus, 11 villages and 16 hamlets along the south shore of Lake Issyk-Kul, 8 settlements on the north bank, and 9 villages and 11 hamlets

along the highway at Karkar were destroyed. Russian population (mainly women, children and old people) while trying to flee from the rebels, forsook their houses and property and fled into large population centers, where the administration was able to establish self-defense. Such centers were the town Przhevalsk and the villages Teploklyuchevskoe and Preobrazhenskoe. Russian population of Przewalsky uyezd suffered the heaviest losses during the rebellion. About two thousand people were killed there.

On 11 –12 August, in Atekinskay and Sarybagishevskay volosts of Pishpek uyezd there were armed attacks on the stanitsa Samsonievskay (Cossack village) and Bystroretskoe, Orel, Novorossiyskand other villages located along the river Chu near Tokmak. On 13 August, Tokmak was besieged by a crowd of five thousand Kyrgyz from surrounding volosts. At this point, Turkestan authorities feared a complete destruction of the Russian population of Semirechye (Red Archives, 1926: 70 p.).

Turgay region was one of the main centers of the rebellion in the steppe region in 1916. Amangeldy Imanov and Alibis Dzhangeldin formed a detachment of over 20 thousand people there. The detachment consisted mainly of the nomadic Kazakhs from Tugai, Syrdarya, Akmola and Semipalatinsk regions, as well as Kazakh workers of local enterprises and cities (Central Asia into the Russian Empire, 2008: 290p). The rebels fought a partisan warfare in the region between Irgiz, Thurgau, and Karabutak. They destroyed the post and telegraph station, attacked Russian-speaking settlers and military units, including the Cossacks ones, that were located in the steppe regions. In late October 1916 Imanov's detachment, which had more than 15 thousand people, besieged Turgay (Central Asia into the Russian Empire, 2008: 290 – 291 p.).

In an effort to reduce the scale of the rebellion, the government reduced the quota of Turkestan

to 220 thousand workers and excluded some categories of indigenous people for mobilization. However, it did not bring any significant results and they counted on force methods. Cossacks were thought to be the most appropriate force.

Even before the rebellion Cossacks had actively been involved in the conduct of the mobilization of the indigenous population in the rear works. Cossack units were attached to the district chief, who helped local “non-Russian” administration to draw up lists of conscripts. In cases of resistance from the local population, the Cossacks often used weapons (Red Archives, 1926: 66 p.).

Foreseeing the impact of the decree on conscription of the “non-Russians” to the rear in the steppe region and Central Asia, in July 1916 local authorities placed few military units in the key points of the region, in order to suppress quickly any possible disturbances. Thus, Sokolov, a military governor of Semirechenskaya oblast, wrote to Zemsky department manager in his telegram in June 25, 1916 that three platoons Cossacks had been sent there in order to suppress the campaign in the steppes (Red Archives, 1926: 57 p.).

During the rebellion, these measures played an important role. After some of the representatives of the Kazakh government were killed in mobilization in the steppe regions, Cossack detachments were placed in the most problematic areas in steppe provinces – “in Chingirlauskay volost and aouls 75 Cossacks were quartered..., in Kustanai uyezd within Arakaragayskoy volost 125 Cossacks were quartered..., and within Kinaralskoy and Mindilgarinskoy volosts- 125 Cossacks were quartered”. (Red Archives, 1926: 60 p.). In addition, groups of Cossacks were posted in some counties in the Akmolinskaya region and in Bukeyev horde (Astrakhan region – M.T.).

Liberal Kazakh intelligentsia made an attempt to officially achieve the withdrawal

of military units and the Cossacks above all. It was stated that “the appearance of the steppe Cossack intimidated the civilians in the vast area. Kirghizs, (Kazakhs – M.T.) who had quietly expected the workers, became agitated: leaving all their possessions they migrated to the south”. In this regard, “it required immediate measures in calming down the population by calling back the steppe Cossack units ... (Red Archives, 1926: 60p.). However, the government wisely chose to ignore this request. Subsequent events proved this position to be right.

On receipt of information concerning the start of armed actions, the Cossacks were immediately involved to save the Russian population and to fight against rebels. So, by the start of the revolt in Semirechenskaya oblast on Karkar there had been located a company under the command of narynkolskocharynsky captain Kravchenko. After the arrival of hundreds of Cossacks from Dzharkent to help, the detachment of Cossacks and vigilantes began actively to restore the order in the Issyk-Kul and Tekes. On 12 – 14 August the detachments of Cossacks brought the local Russian-speaking population into Przhevalsk, which became the center of defense (Red Archives, 1926: 72 p.).

In the beginning of the rebellion, Semirechenskye corps of Cossack Army were called in the service and all non-combatant commands were used. Military units were supplemented by volunteers from among the residents and lower ranks. Sometimes the performances could be attacked preemptively. Thus, after the action of Kazakhs in Kyzylburgovskoy and Semirechenskaya oblasts, Cossack squadron came from Assa and within a few days the population of municipality was “exemplary punished”. (Red Archives, 1926: 70 p.).

However, in other regions the situation was much more serious. Thus, Tokmak in Pishpek uyezd was besieged by the rebels. To remove the

siege from Tokmak and uprising, a detachment of podesaula Bakurevicha was sent there, it passed Russian settlements of Kasekskoy group and moved to Chuiskaya valley to protect Tokmak and nearby Russian settlements (Red Archives, 1926: 67 p.).

To fight the rebels, the areas of the rebellion were under martial law. Declaring the mobilization of older Cossacks in the Ural, Orenburg, and Siberian Semirechye troops, the government was able to fill up the available units and build new units to suppress the uprising (Central Asia in the Russian Empire, 2008: 290 – 291 p.).

Military units, including the Cossacks, were sent to the main centers of the uprising – Dzharkentskiy uyezd of Semirechye, district of Naryn, Pishpek and Tokmak. It made possible to start the defeat of insurgent groups and to allow the civilians to return to their homes. However, the rebels, showed stubborn resistance, and in October 1916 were forced to withdraw in China under the blows of the Russian armed troops (Red Archives, 1926: 72 p.).

Widespread rebellion required considerable force for its suppression. In particular, to fight the rebels in Turgay region under the command of Lieutenant General Lavrentiev there were involved 18 Cossack squadrons, 11 cavalry squadrons, 17 infantry companies, about four thousand bayonets and three thousand sabers. Irgiz was released by this detachment, the rebels were defeated and Turgay was besieged (Abdirov, 1994: 61; Central Asia in the Russian Empire, 2008: 290 – 291 p.).

On 13 August in Semirechye in Dzhailmyshevskay volost on Ush Coonoor a rebel detachment of up to 500 people was dispersed by the Cossack detachment led by vernensky district chief lieutenant Basilewsky ... (Red Archives, 1926: 70 p.).

One of the main centers of the uprising was Dzhizaksky uyezd in Samarkand volost. A

detachment of government troops under Colonel Pyotr Ivanov was sent there to fight the rebels (Glushchenko, 2010: 547 – 548 pp.).

Colonel P. Ivanov, a Siberian Cossack, was one of the leaders of the rebellion in 1916 that is why it is necessary to pay special attention to him.

Pavel P. Ivanov was born on July 26, 1869 in Semipalatinskaya oblast and descended from the nobility of Siberian Cossacks. In 1888 he graduated from the Siberian Omsk Cadet Corps and in 1890 he finished the 1st Pavlovsk Military School in St. Petersburg. Ivanov began his career as a cornet in the 3rd Siberian Cossack regiment in Zaisanskiy uyezd on the border with China. From 1900 to 1904 he served in the Army cavalry unit of the Turkestan Military District, where he earned the rank of captain. From 1904 to 1906 Ivanov served again as a Cossack in the 7th Siberian Cossack regiment. From 1906 to 1914 he served as the district chief of Przewalsky, Vernensky and Khojentsky uyezds in the Turkestan Military District. There he received a rank of lieutenant colonel. With the outbreak of World War P.P. Ivanov became an assistant of the commander of the 2nd Regiment of the Kuban Cossack, who was fighting in the Carpathians. There he was given the rank of a colonel and appointed as a commander of the 2nd Brigade of the Kuban Cossacks. On 16 February, 1916 P.P. Ivanov became the commander of the 8th Regiment of the Siberian Cossack Division.

In the beginning of “Kyrgyz” rebellion, Colonel P.P. Ivanov was withdrawn from the front and was appointed a commandant Verny city, as an Assistant of Military Governor of Turkestan, Semirechensky vice-governor and commander of all forces to suppress the rebellion. He led the suppression of the uprising in one of its main centers – Dzhizaksky uyezd. In July 1916 Ivanov managed to throw the rebels from Dzhizak, which was made his operational base. Hence

Ivanov made a series of raids aimed at the defeat of the rebels in different parts of Turkestan province. He acts decisively and firmly and did not stop at destructing the rebel villages with artillery completely. Captured leaders of the rebellion are executed. All this led to a rapid suppression of the rebellion and order-restoring in the region. After the February Revolution Ivanov was dismissed and forced to leave Turkistan. In 1917, he commanded a separate Siberian Cossack Brigade on the Caucasian front. Due to the high authority of the Cossacks, in July 16, 1918 Ivanov was elected as ataman (Cossack chieftain) of the Siberian Cossack troop (Volkov, Egorov, Kuptsov, 2003: 100 – 101 pp.; Klaving, 2003: 448 – 449 p.).

Because of the acute shortage of forces on the spots to suppress the rebellion, the government had to bring out some parts and send them to the rebel areas. Cossack units were thought to be the most suitable for it. Thus, to suppress the rebellion in the Semirechye, 7th Orenburg and 9th Siberian Cossack regiments with artillery and machine gun teams were transferred there from the front (Sapargaliyev, 1966: 156 p.).

That time two regiments of Semirechensky Cossack troops were sent from the front in Semirechye. After the uprising, they were left to maintain the order in the region (Leshchev, 2004: 142 p.).

In late July 1916 the Governor-General of Turkestan was appointed one of his immediate conquest, a friend and colleague M. Skobelev, Alexei Kuropatkin. In his reports to the tsar and the minister of war, A.N. Kuropatkin called punitive expeditions against the rebels ‘military action’, which indicated their scale. According to him, to suppress the rebellion there were involved 14.5 infantry battalions, 33 hundreds (Cossacks), 42 guns and 69 machine guns, and military action against the rebels took place in different areas from 13 July, 1916 to 25 January,

1917 (Morrison, in 2009, the 1916 rebellion, 1960: 97 p.).

The rebellion in 1916 gave the tsarist government the idea of increasing the number of Cossack in Steppe area and Turkistan and the creation of new villages in the lands that had been taken from nomads. On 16 October, 1916 on the meeting with Turkestan Governor-General, the tsarist government decided to create 5 new Cossack villages for 60 yards in Semirechye, which had been affected the worst by the uprising. On 22 February, 1917 A.N. Kuropatkin sent a report to the king with a request to approve the plans of colonization of the Cossack in the Przhivalsky and Naryn uyezds, giving each of them 150 thousand acres of land. He particularly stated the need for the two villages in the fertile land Toguz Toro in order to protect paths in Fergana. Orenburg, Siberian and Semirechensk Cossacks were suggested to move to these places. It was also intended to expand Zanarynsky settlement (village Belotsarskaya), and “either to make a Cossack post on the Atayka or to offer migrants become the Cossacks” (Yarkov, 2002: 53). February Revolution ended the future plans of Cossack colonization.

The result of the uprising was the destruction of Russian villages and hamlets, especially in the southern part of Semirechye, where the population had been killed by the rebels. Przewalsky and southern Dzarkentsky uyezds were particularly affected. More than 9,000 farms of Russian settlers were destroyed, part of the railway, bridges, agricultural schools, several churches and hospitals were burned. The total amount of private damages was about 10 million rubles, not including state-owned loss.

During the uprising, 2325 Russian people were killed, 1384 people went missing, that is killed or died in captivity. As for the military involved in the suppression of the uprising, 79 soldiers and four officers were killed, 77 private

soldiers went missing and 67 soldiers were wounded (Rebellion in 1916, 1960: 549 p).

It's impossible to establish the number of deaths of local residents because a large number of rebels and their families went to China and Persia and lived there for a long time in the process of suppressing the rebellion. In addition, a Muslim custom to bury the dead on the day of their death should be taken into account.

During the suppression of the uprising about 300 thousand rebels and their families went to China. Having lost all the cattle there, they had to go back. Those who came back from Chinese were allowed to live in the old place and use their former land. However, those, who participated in the murder of the Cossacks, their families and the Russian settlers, were deprived of their lands, which were given to Cossack villages and peasant settlements (Moiseyev, 2002: 503 p.).

More than 3 thousand people were detained on suspicion of involvement in the riots; however, only 933 people were given on trial. 346 people were acquitted and 587 were convicted. 201 people were given a death sentence, but only 20 convicts were hanged (1916 Rebellion 1960: 74 p.). It was the lowest number considering the dead Russian settlers and the military.

Conclusion

“Kyrgyz” rebellion in 1916 showed the failure of estimates of Cossack colonization in the steppe regions and Central Asia in the late XIX–early XX centuries. Only the economic component of the process was taken into account and the military-

police component was completely ignored. As a result, in 1870s. Russian government in the region began to constrain artificially the Cossack colonization up to the seizure of farmland from the Cossacks and their transfer to the indigenous population. The consequence of this policy was a sharp slowdown in the Cossack colonization of the region. Incentives of peasant colonization did not make it possible to create a serious barrier of potential threat of anti-Russian actions. Cossacks, who had experience with the indigenous Muslim population, were adapted to the difficult climatic conditions of the region and combined the features of both the peasants and soldiers, were in general much more effective element of colonization. As a result, in a difficult socio-economic situation caused by the protracted course of the First World War, the indigenous people of the steppe regions of Central Asia raised anti-Russian rebellion. One of the main factors that contributed to the beginning of the rebellion was a lack of a significant part of the male population of the Cossack regions, who had been drafted to army. A small number of Cossacks and the inability of Russian peasant and urban population to confront the rebels effectively caused such harsh consequences of the rebellion. Despite the difficult environment, Cossacks became the main force that ensured the location and then the suppression of the uprising. Assessing the role of Cossacks on its merits, the government took active steps to increase its size in the region and to intensify the process of Cossack colonization but the process was interrupted by the revolution of 1917 and the Civil War.

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Казачество в межэтнических конфликтах на территории Центральной Азии в начале XX в. «Киргизское» восстание 1916 г.

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Статья посвящена истории взаимодействия казачества с коренными мусульманскими народами Центральной Азии в начале XX в. Основное внимание в статье уделяется участию казаков в подавлении «Киргизского» восстания 1916 г. В работе анализируется роль казаков в завоевании и освоении территории Казахстана и Средней Азии в XVI – XIX вв., характер их взаимоотношений с местным коренным народами, предпосылки восстания мусульманского населения региона в 1916 г. В статье предпринята попытка доказать, что недооценка центральными и региональными властями роли казачества в сохранении контроля России над территорией Центральной Азии и искусственное сдерживание казачьей колонизации стали основными причинами восстания 1916 г. Катастрофические последствия этих действий привели к полному пересмотру политики в отношении казачества и попыткам форсировать казачью колонизацию региона, которая была прервана революцией 1917 г.

Ключевые слова: казачество, колонизация, межэтнические отношения, этнический конфликт, Первая мировая война, Российская империя, Туркестан, мусульманские народы.
