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Anent the Phenomenology of Sense

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The following text is the result of a deconstructive reading of two rather concrete works of E. Husserl that is «The Beginning of Geometry» and Chapter One of the second part of «Logical Researches», which is titled «Expression and Meaning». Thereat, one can understand that the given work is not possible without some general presentation of Phenomenology as a philosophical «method of original obviousness production from pre-scientific entities of the cultural world»². In other words, we shall positively speak about metaphysical (and first of all about ontological) status of ideal objects, about their production in the acts of intentionality and identification of the «very same», and about some invariants of thought [“même”]³, or still wider – about seeing the One in multiple. In this sense, geometrical and logical objects of identities are considered by E. Husserl only as examples of «the ideal objectness» on the whole, and the phenomenologist should spend all his intellectual efforts in order to detect and to describe them.

If we are courageous enough to follow the thread of an argument by E. Husserl himself, who, in his turn (at least, originally and to a large extent), repeats the famous meditations of Descartes, and then, if we methodically doubt everything, what can be doubt about at least theoretically⁴, we shall quite soon come to the apodictic authenticity of the only Cogito, and consequently, to a radically solipsistic point of view. Even upon the most strict and thorough phenomenological reflection, and though, the very structure of Cogito still turns out to be exceedingly filled by content, we cannot yet help avoiding epistemological solipsism, in case we consistently (and, we may say, quite justifiably) stick to the principle of cogitatum qua cogitatum. That is why in «The Beginning of Geometry» E. Husserl rather fairly raises the question of, how it has become possible, that the image, which having been constituted by the subject and belonging to the psychological sphere, acquires objective, or, at any case, inter-subjective being as some ideal objectness, which, having become geometrical, is already real not only psychically, though it has psychically come into being?

Keywords: algorithm, consciousness, contextualism, difference, cultural evolution, force, meme, mimesis, sense, repetition, replication.

«Neither world, nor its part, but its “sense” is revealed».

E. Husserl: Phenomenology.

(British Encyclopedia Article

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² «It is clear that the method of original obviousness production from pre-scientific entities of the cultural world must be written down and expressed in set sentences yet before the appearance of geometry, and further that the ability of transferring these sentences from the vague linguistic understanding into the clarity of reactivation of its obvious meaning, must be constantly delivered and deliver itself». E. Husserl. “The Beginning of Geometry”. P.227-228.

³ J.Derrida. Introduction. Ib.P.9 (même Fr. – the same, very same, identical; philosophic. thought invariant).

⁴ I.e. in everything; nevertheless, one can think negation/ non-existence of whatever without any contradictions. It is interesting, that already Leibniz notes that to think one’s existence is possible without any cogito: the consideration «I do not think, consequently I exist» does not oppose cogito ergo sum by Descartes. Though, it is also true that in the first case I can know nothing about it.

The kind of effect, which was made over Descartes by the phenomenological reduction, is similar to that one, which we have just hurriedly performed, and is today's general place in the history of philosophy: as it is known, for a score of reasons Descartes could not keep inside the phenomenological setting of conscious and had to rebuild the world, wherein not only all the things went to their «natural» places, but the Creator himself turned out to be incapable to deceive. Though, already in the works of Descartes we find out one authentically phenomenological principal, which is excessively efficient for our further research work. Here is a quotation from «The Third Consideration»: «But, it becomes clear thanks to the natural light of the mind, that in the cumulative producing reason there must be at least as much reality, as there is in the action of this very reason»¹. Working successively with the ideas of material things, animals, angels, and other people, of himself, and, finally, of the God, Descartes finds more reality in the idea of the latter, than in him himself. And other ideas, whatever complex their structure is, Descartes brilliantly decomposes into finest moduses of his own cogito (cumulative aesthesis, or apperception), thus reducing them to the final number of *archetypes* - primary ideas, wherein all the rest of reality is «formally» contained². It seems quite natural for Descartes, that he does not need anybody else, in order to produce such categories (ideas) as extension, density, form, movement, number and substance (i.e. practically everything, with which help we usually estimate the outer world or the inner world of others). Moreover, Descartes considers the mentioned above categories in a

maximum detail and a mistake is possible only in respect of colour, sound, taste, smell, warmth and cold, but it does not concern the authorship question. It is rather curious, that Descartes produces all the ideas by analogy. For example, to think a stone as a thing, or a substance, being able of an independent being (compare with «to exist means to exist separately» Aristotle), means only to grant the stone just the same attribute, which has been already set in the process of transcendental reduction in relation to Ego: the only difference is the following: «I» is a thinking object, and «the stone» is an extended thing. In one word, there is really what to become afraid of ...

E. Husserl seems to move much more thoroughly and much more courageously. Having collected the outer world «in parentheses», he thoroughly researches the subjective world of feelings, which exact record takes into account methodological limitations (phenomenological epoch and phenomenological reduction), placed on the language and on the point of view. This record is appealed to provide the most authentic «phenomena» knowledge, which has been gained in such a way, and to assure that the knowledge has not any preconditions. Thus, knowledge turns out to be possible only in relation to the subjective experience of an object (to that, what has been experienced) or to the feeling of the experience of an object (to the way it has been experienced), as far as «the unit of sense», which I testify about (I am always supposed to do it seriously and with full responsibility), is the only real thing (at any rate, for me) independently on the fact, if the object is real or not . It turns out to be extremely important that the feelings do not

¹ R. Descartes. 2 volumes set, volume 2 p.33.

² «Since, as much this objective modus of being corresponds to the ideas of their own nature, so much the formal modus of being corresponds to the reasons of the ideas also of their own nature – at least, primary and basic reasons». Ib. P.35. We should remind that the notions «objective» and «formal» are used by Descartes in accordance with the scholastic tradition, and precisely, as «existing in idea» and «existing in being» correspondingly. Sometimes, he also uses the notion of “eminenter” as «existing in some principal», whereof the given existence acquires its being. In Russian editions this notion is translated as «jeminentno» or «po preimushhestvu».

happen to me chaotically, but they have an open structure, for example, in time. The structure of every feeling is intentional, and different moduses of intentionality form rather different *sub-types*. Imagination, recollection, perception, judgment, estimation, striving – this is far non-exhaustive list of feelings, and each of them has its own and a rather steady scheme. These are so called «domains of reality», or regions of the Existing, each of them requires to be seized in its own way in the field of phenomenological experience and to be expressed with due consideration of their peculiar axiomatic pattern, which we are just to discover. In fact, we experience number and pain in as different moduses, as the senses of numerical and social inequality. The number of examples is unlimited, but here it is important, that each of them has its own intentional horizon and its own aprioristic transcendental structure¹. And in spite of the fact that E. Husserl seems to allege as of non-reducible peculiarity of types and forms of intentional feelings, so of their historicity (that would make it much closer to «symbolical forms» or «values» of Neo-Kantianism), in his texts we also find an indispensable requirement to ascend from establishing of any historical fact to some invariant, absolute A priori². It means that my psychological experience, perception, and imagination and etc. remain the same, what they have been before by their form and content, but now I consider them as structures, which are as

well transcendental structures of any conscious on the whole³.

So, strictly following the rule of apodictic obviousness, we face the problem of sense formation as it is, of its production as a *generally significant* sense, and also the problem of its translation, i.e. we find ourselves in a strictly anthropological domain, wherein, finally, utterance is reigning, which first of all has been taken from the point of view of expression and what has been expressed⁴. Let us firstly have a look at those decisions, which E. Husserl suggests to us. He supposes that on the whole sense would not be possible without some «original and actual self-presence of the first product in its original obviousness»⁵. Strictly speaking, it is not quite clear, what such «self-presence of the product» means. Moreover, such merging of notions of «presence» as of entity (when «the given» is *perceived* more or less passively) and of «product» (as a process or a result of some vigorous activity) is typical for most works of E. Husserl. This ascending to Descartes dualism is already overcome by Kant in «The First Criticism». There he says that the objects are given to us by means of feelings, and by means of notions we can think them. But finally, he is known to adjust the discrepancies only by means of a radical thesis introducing into his philosophy: laws do not at all exist in phenomena, but only in relation to a subject.⁶ And to be more precise, even Kant does not adjust the mentioned discrepancy.

¹ «Essences and interrelations, which find their bases right in those essences, and directly perceived in essential intuition, and it (phenomenology – my comment) descriptively expresses them in essential notions and essential utterances, subordinated to certain laws. Each of such utterances is aprioristic in the highest sense of this word». See E. Husserl. Logical Researches. V.2.Introduction.

² Vide supra Descartes' archetype.

³ «The infinite task of description of the universe aprioristic structures is fulfilled by means of bringing of all the pieces of objectiveness about their transcendental "source" and may be considered as one of the functions of the universal science building. Any branch of the universal science, including the positive one, must be formed on its aprioristic bases». E. Husserl. Phenomenology. The British Encyclopedia Article.

⁴ «All the theoretical researches, though they are surely and in no way conducted in the acts of expressing or even in full utterances, nevertheless are finally finished in utterances». E. Husserl. Logical Researches. V.2.Introduction.

⁵ E. Husserl. The Beginning of Geometry P.219

⁶ «Categories are the essence of notion, a priori prescribing laws to phenomena, that is to the nature as the summation of all the phenomena». I.Kant. Criticism of the Clear Mind. P.116(my comments in cursive)

We suppose that it cannot be solved at all, and the main thing is that there is no necessity in it. We simply need, like Kant, to have enough courage to go up to the very end, having taken one of the sides of this seeming discrepancy, and precisely, as Kant calls it, the side of «imagination productive ability», or «power», which will be much later conceptualized by G. Deleuze. Precisely this is not done by E. Husserl, as it was not done by Descartes sometime.

Taking into account the mentioned observations, the work of E. Husserl acquires much more radical, and at the same time, most finished sight. Being first produced by the subject, the objectiveness of what-has-just-happened is nothing without the persistent *work of repeating*, for example, as a recollection. And if the past feeling is actively re-experienced in the result of the produced recollection, so thus, as E. Husserl says, for the first time there appears the objectiveness of identity in original «covering» [Deckung] [même]. «Besides, the ability of formation voluntary repetition turns out to be set in the chain of repetitions upon the obviousness of its equality (the equality covering)»¹. (Here introduced by Husserl, the term Deckung appears to be a big success. It should be understood as in the sense of some material security, or guarantee of covering the bill, so in the sense of some power to discharge the pledge, or to keep the given word.) Then, from the point of view of E. Husserl, the linguistic community comes into action, Others, who are capable of understanding². So, having originally belonged to the sphere of the psychical, the product of some equality [même] becomes obvious for others as well, who, though, have not at all got rid of the necessity of their own actual

performing of the objectivizing activity. On the contrary, «we obviously perceive the pure law and learn that it is based on the pure forms of thinking. Though, this obviousness is connected to the meaning of words in a true and actual performance of the judgment, expressing the law»³. Thus, not losing their original equality, productions can be spread with no limit, moreover, numerous reproduced images will be not perceived as similar ones, but as one common in the given chain of such understanding repetitions. On the other hand, E. Husserl insists that ontological status of such ideal entities cannot be the result of some concrete epoch: then in such a case any outstanding thinker, like the notorious «geometer - founder», could be understood only by the people, who share the understanding conditions, being pre-described by the epoch, with him. And though, to Husserl's mind, history on the whole «is nothing else, but a living movement of integrity and mutual inbuiltness of original sense formation and sense setting»⁴. Nevertheless, we should differentiate authentically invariant senses [même] from associatively appearing falsifications, having been lost in tradition or growing in the condition of constant logical construction and reproduction. Though, these falsifications pretend to be the remnants of some true sense, they still do not possess it at all, or need thorough working in order to be brought to originally obvious source.

To Husserl's mind, this is the only way to realize his announced requirement of preconditionlessness. And philosophy, as a rigorous science, must be organized in accordance with this requirement. Nevertheless, it is quite easy to find out, that such a requirement is unreal and exuberant. Whatever limitations we impose

¹ E. Husserl. The Beginning of Geometry. P.219

² «In the mutual linguistic perception contact the original production and the product of the same subject will be actively post-understood (nachverstanden) by others». Ibid.

³ E. Husserl. Logical Researches. V.2.Introduction.

⁴ E. Husserl. The Beginning of Geometry. p.235.

on the methods of phenomenological descriptions and expressions, our «productive capability of imagination» will inevitably and helpfully suggest us *to choose* these or those «schemes» (images) of closed, though, possibly, and whatever large (then we are inclined to speak about infinity) volume, wherein we «obviously» or «vaguely» see something, or point at something («announcing»): then we should hardly be wondered that «the idea» of such a volume is paced in the same volume. This is the way, how the self-contradictory concept of «conscious» is formed, the concept which is a direct analogy of «the set of all sets», and which is axiomatically prohibited inside the theory of sets itself, i.e. really preconditionlessly¹. The given paradox seems to be unsurpassable, only if we fail to stop thinking «vertically», and it does not matter, whether we ascend to the source or, vice versa, descend into the obscure kingdom of archetypes. Here, we need a radical and clinical gesture of refusal from the event depth and release. And then there is no more any implicit or highest sense, there are simply various senses and they are given «with evidence» all together, on one and the same surface². In the linguistic analytical philosophy, the given point of view is called deductive contextualism (inferential contextualism). Its main idea is the following: communicative sphere represents not a strict hierarchy, but a variety of mutually non-reducible contexts, differing by their deductive structure: what can be formulated and substantiated in one context that can be a basic assumption in another

one. In this sense, the rigid requirements, raised by philosophers- skeptics to our knowledge, very often turn out to be simply irrelevant. In his «Logic-Philosophical Tractate» Wittgenstein wittily points at the following circumstance: «Skepticism is not unanswerable, but is obviously senseless, as far as it doubts there, where one cannot put questions»³. On the whole, he is sure that we make one and the same mistake, supposing, that there is something, what we cannot see from the outside, and where we cannot peep inside either, and that there are some new facts. In reality, all the facts, which we are interested in, are just before us. And moreover: «no part of our experience is aprioristic. Everything, what we see, could be different. Everything we are able to describe, could be different either. There is no aprioristic order. Here, one can see that strictly drawn solipsism coincides with the pure realism. Solipsistic «I» collapses up to a non-extended point, and there remains only the reality, being associated with it»⁴. In other words, epistemological solipsism cannot be overcome theoretically, as Husserl wants it to be. It is a very existential event, some other «international horizon»⁵. This is not by chance, that Heidegger considers presence (Dasein) to be its own insignificant foundation and, at the same time, to be self-insignificant and that is why it is *guilty of* [causa] being by foundation of its own insignificance. To accept or not to accept this really catastrophic fact depends only upon me, only I turn out to be the reason [causa] of the sense, which comes to fruition for me this way,

¹ See any of axiomatic theories of sets, for example ZFC.

² «We may say that what has earlier been depth, after having been extended, it has become width. Unlimited becoming is fully kept inside this inverted width. Depth is no more an advantage». G. Deleuze. The Logic of Meaning. P. 23

³ L. Wittgenstein. Logic-Philosophical Tractate. Moscow, 1994. P.72

⁴ L. Wittgenstein. Logic-Philosophical Tractate. Moscow, 1994. P.57

⁵ Ontology of Martin Heidegger in the highest degree successively realizes the phenomenological setting and phenomenological method, and at the same time, it is well-known, what an enormous shock it was for Husserl that his own work was published and dedicated to him by his «talented assistant». Such a continuation of phenomenology seemed to Husserl to be an annoying mistake. In one of his letters he wrote «it is a real misfortune, that I have delayed the development of my (what a pity, I have to say so) transcendental phenomenology so much. And here a new generation, immersed to the lips in prejudice and captured by a devastating psychosis, is, the generation which won't hear anything about the scientific philosophy».

and not the other. I have *nothing and no means* to inform the other (what he would not be informed of, so to say, in other moduses), the same as he has *no means and no reasons* to understand me. «Monads do not have windows» is a brilliant move of Leibnitz in salvation of the problem of two substances¹.

So, Husserl seriously supposes: «We say: such is the case. It goes without saying, that we would not do it, we would not be able to express it, if it did not appear before us this way; in other words, if we did not consider it. Acts of consideration are different depending on circumstances. Though, what the utterance means and what these acts consider is always the same, it is equal, in a strict sense of the word, it is just the same geometrical truth»². But we shall still take the risk to invert the given thesis and state the following: *I say – such is the case, and the circumstances of the case seem to be the same to me, until my expression is the same, equal in its strict sense*. Thereat, «the utterance» must be perceived, firstly, in its broadest sense (if I have kept silence, then it does not mean that I have failed to express myself), and secondly – as one of *my* points of view (thereat, quite a certain one), of things (the state of things). I am the one, who produces and reproduces the sense, and this sense is always established as the only one, which is worth and deserves repeating and affirmation as «identical». Here, of course, we feel allusions to the famous Eternal Returning by Nietzsche, though this idea has been so many

times and so variously interpreted by different commentators, that it requires additional and detailed explanations. So, what is returning after all? Our answer tunes in the answer of G. Deleuze: the difference is returning³. Thus, Difference, or selectiveness is an ontological attribute of Existence⁴. But at the same time, this attribute is also an ontological attribute of thinking. The statement - to think on the whole means to be able to differ – is also true. (It is not by chance that Hegel in his «Phenomenology of Spirit» defines self-conscious, or «pure «I» not only as a desire, but, first of all, as a differentiation of the undifferentiated⁵.) And only the Eternal Returning gives the thought a law of a truly independent will, being free from any sort of moral⁶: whatever I want, I must want it in such a way, that to avail against the irretrievability of the Eternal Returning of precisely this one, and not any other «something», i.e. against its incompleteness, or its selective eternity. Thus, we exclude any kinds of asthenic half-wills, for example, to make or to try something «at least once». Confirming some difference, some sense, which is worth of being, I establish myself as the Being⁷. That is why I need force, much force in order to be. Any utterance is a production and keeping of sense. Consequently, sense appears from relation of some forces, within which some forces act, and others counter-act. Following Nietzsche, G. Deleuze himself differentiates vital, active forces, – the forces of conquest and fascination (robbery and gift), and

¹ Jacques Lacan also connected the ending of psycho-analytical process with the moment, when the patient «perceives his own being as not requiring any justification by the Alter in capital letter». Quotation from S. Zizek. *Elevated Object of Ideology*. Moscow, 1999, p.119.

² E. Husserl. *Logical Researches*. V.2, Research 1, Paragraph 11.

³ «...it is quite obvious, that repetition is an inevitable and substantiated action only in relation to that, what cannot be replaced». G. Deleuze. *Differentiation and Repeating*. St. Petersburg, 1998. P. 12

⁴ L. Wittgenstein wrote just the same: «Two objects of identical logical form, if we distract from their outer features, differ from each other only as far as they are different». L. Wittgenstein. *Logic-Philosophical Tractate*. Moscow, 1994. P. 7.

⁵ G.W.F Hegel. *Phenomenology of Science*. St. Petersburg 2002. P.91.

⁶ «If exchange is a criterion of commonness, then robbery or gift are criteria of repetition». G. Deleuze. *Differentiation and Repeating*. St. Petersburg, 1998. P. 12.

⁷ In fact, in the result of the fight, being led by two, to the last drop of one's blood, that one becomes the lord, who chooses «to be», as far as he knows for sure, who he is. The slave is ready «not to be», in order to live – whatever his «I» is, but it is not worth of laying down his life for it. Thus, «the animal, who dares to promise» is given birth to.

reactive forces (adjustment and ordering). In any case, any force is inevitably correlated with other forces and only within this relation it acquires its essence and its quality.

We should note, that E. Husserl himself repeatedly «gives away» the same. For example, here is a quotation from «Logical Researches»: «All the objects and objective relations exist for us only because of the sense setting acts (*Vermeinen*), being essentially different from them, within which they (objects and objective relations) can be presented to us, and within which they oppose us precisely as set integrities»¹. Though, in his striving for transcendental expansion (let it be within the limits, which are immanent to transcendental Ego), E. Husserl does not notice, or may be, does not want to notice a row of contradictions, which inevitably appear on the chosen way. The last of the contradictions, we would like to pay attention to in the given article, is the problem of renderableness, and to be precise, - of sense unrenderableness. And it can be solved both radically, and simply: with the help of re-denoting, i.e. with the help of introducing of the notion of «replication» instead of the notion of «rendering» into the discussion. In his time, Richard Dawkins, a modern English biologist-evolutionist and the author of the famous book «Selfish gene», presented such a non-traditional point of view of the «sense units» nature and also of units expansion principals and objective laws (1976), where for the first time he used the word «meme» [*même*] for denoting of one rather productive abstraction – certain «molecules of informational transmission». The term, invented by Dawkins, was constructed by analogy with the word «gene», first of all, for pointing at the resemblance of their functioning,

and, simultaneously, for holding of connotation senses of *memoria* and *mimesis*. The most revolutionary point of Dawkins' conception was and still is his fundamental conviction in the following: evolutionary process does not depend on a certain special chemical substance, which study prerogative was assumed by geneticists in their time, but in the basis of the process there lies *any* transmission unit, able to self-reproduction [replication], and in this sense, gene is just an individual case, having its own place and fixed in biological evolution. *Même* is qualitatively different, but structurally and functionally equal to the gene of self-replicating unit of cultural sense transmission. Human conscious turns out to be its privileged carrier, and its multiplication field is language, semiotic systems, media, artefacts and etc. As examples of *mêmes* they usually give the ideas of number, wheel, counting, chess, calendar, and alphabet. Here, they can also include idioms, proverbs, jingles and sound-tags (for example, the first four notes of Beethoven's symphony 5), cake recipes, cupola construction technologies and fashion. There are also such monsters as religion, the unconscious, freedom of word and the theory of conspiracy. But, they also include philosophical conceptions on the whole, prejudice, ideas of red and cold, love and pain². In one word, they include senses (and also the idea of sense itself).

This conception has been given its further development in the fundamental work of D. Dennett, an American philosopher-cognitivist. In «Consciousness Explained» (1992) *même* is used for building of a well-developed philosophical theory of conscious, in which basis there also has been laid the idea of evolution as the utmost formal (i.e. neutral towards its carrier) algorithmic

¹ E. Husserl. Logical Researches. V.2, research 1.

² We should note that not all the protagonists of the *mémétique* theory agree with the possibilities of such an arbitrarily small division of *même*, which elements will be also *mêmes*. As a rule, we consider only those, to which the notion of copyright can be applied to.

process. Dennett also refers the following qualities of algorithms to the most important ones: firstly, utmost possible simplicity of every algorithmic component and links between them [skeleton differentiation], and secondly, the result, being reproduced in all the cases [repetition]¹. On any stage of cognition, nothing and nobody keeps me from considering of some revealed multitude as a solus and it's every element – as a multitude². As far as, staying inside the given paradigm, I am not limited by any substantial minimum, I can consider any natural and cultural situation on the whole as *même*, and any process - algorithmically, if only I think it methodically justified³. But, it is often far from it. For example, I can arbitrarily long and thoroughly «ascend» from my own feelings of the event of the given article writing, which has a unique sense for me, to the physics of the process, providing the finest algorithms of the computer, which I use for this work, but this very concrete event, which is very significant for me, I shall never find there. Though, it does not at all matter, that I shall fail to find there any other significant events – something like the event of «tunnel transition»⁴. It goes without saying that all the rest laws of natural selection also continue their action. As far as the number of conscious pieces is finite, and each of them is able to contain only a limited number of *mêmes*. That is why the main task of *même* is to occupy the maximal

number of conscious pieces⁵. Thus, because of the competition, *mêmes* multiply, mutate, spread around and can be inherited. Their extremely important quality is their ability to exhaust and to neutralize any alternative *mêmes*, thus influencing on the *même*-competitors' reproduction success. It is rather intriguing that those *mêmes*, which seem to be most perspective for their carriers, do not always manage to survive. And vice versa, those of them, which are able to outspread with higher speed, turn out to be more successful and numerous and finally they can be destructive for their carriers⁶.

From the point of view of evolutionary approach to conscious, the need in somebody's behavior expressed presentation appears only there and then, when there appears the possibility of communication, which is potentially mutual and simultaneously providing self-preservation. And absolute honesty cannot be the best tactics in the given circumstances, as far as it can be used by competitors. Consequently, one needs be as much sincere, that not to lose the confidence of others, and at the same time – deceitful enough, in order to have one's own free choice. Further, any part of the organism carries in itself certain information and it should not at all be presented in the form of data structures in some part of the nervous system. By their essence, these or those preferences have *already* organized the body according to a certain

¹ See in detail: D. C. Dennett. *Consciousness explained*. N. Y. 1991 and D. C. Dennett. *Darwin's dangerous idea*. N. Y., 2003.

² In his «Being and Event», Alain Badiou convincingly demonstrates the possibility of building of ontology, i.e. of all that, what is thinkable, from that singular originally-made assumption of some emptiness existence, the emptiness, which is unthinkable, and which name is an empty multitude. All the further building is an algorithmic process, having been formalized in Zermelo-Frenkel set theory. See Badiou A. *Being and Event*. London, 2005.

³ Such a point of view remarkably coincides with the way, Leibnitz defined the monad, and precisely, as a metaphysical centre, allotted with perception and striving. Perception [percipio] is a seizing of the single in much [repetition], but there are no two identical perceptions, as far as each monad strives for a better perception, which is strictly defined by its own, unique aspiration [conatus] to be this way and not the other [difference]. And in this sense, monad is *causa sui*.

⁴ For the levels of description and computer systems in detail, see D. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, and Bach. Samara, 2000.

⁵ In order to win in this «informational» war it is significant that there must be some sort of immunity in the *v* phenotype of *même*. For example, the conception of belief is in highest degree insensitive to any rational and critical consideration, which could think this concept to be dangerous or false. The same is true in reference to the theory of conspiracy, the unconscious, medicine, knowledge and etc.

⁶ See in detail: Sheehan E.L. *The Mocking Memes: A Basis for Automated Intelligence*.

pattern. And these body's old systems can make the nervous system, more or less abruptly, do necessary actions. It means that, if precisely the communication demands make the subject make his *categorical chose*, than it (chose) would cause some discrepancies with the necessity. These discrepancies' origin is identical to those, which we may observe while choosing an answer in a badly-composed test, when we are to choose the lesser evil. The subject solves the problem of taxonomy of those spheres, where the nature has not drawn any visible division lines with the help of approximating fantasizing [productive ability of imagination]. He gives names and predicates to his rather vaguely realized inclinations so, as if they are governed by precisely and categorically expressed targets and a certain plan of actions. It means that, understanding turns out to be problematic not only on the level of expression (understanding of others and by others), but already on the level of imagination (understanding of oneself), or, in other words, both in speech and in thinking.

So, I am closed again, but this time the truth and any utmost bases of my existence cannot become known by their definition. I can really know nothing. On the other hand, nobody keeps me from acting, i.e. *from making effects*. Moreover, I am free to make any action and freely estimate [call] the produced effect¹. In fact, with necessity it would be always a surface effect. And it will be already not an announcing, but a testing action. I may insist and continue my action (if I do not die of course, or feel any other kind of discomfort, which will not do for me), but at any further stage I can alter it by means of making it just a little different from the previous variant, or radically changing my behavior or the way of thinking. In the last variant we may say that it has been a revelation or a sudden clarification, intuition – or whatever. Even such a chaotic strategy can become an algorithm and «grow into a habit». As Bergson said, the form of a habit or the habit to fall into habits is ethical by its essence and is good by its form². Moreover, it is quite clear that life on the whole will strive for realizing of all its possible strategies³. As far as none of the possibilities must

¹ The year of publishing of Leibnitz's «Combinatory Art» (1666) is considered by the modern mathematical logic to be the year of its birth, though, it could have been as well 1308 – the year of creation of «Ars magna» - the most fundamental work of Raimondus Lullius. He suggested the method, which consisted of purely mechanic combining of notions. Actually, Lullius expressed the idea of a logical machine, which later would be spoken about by Leibnitz and which would be reconstructed by W. S. Jevons in XIX century. Lullius's «logical machine» is a mechanism, consisting of four concentric circles and three inscribed triangles - all of them rotating round one common centre. Alphabet is written on the circles and each letter has six meanings, notions, definitions, and features, thus, while circles and triangles rotate, notions, being taken at random, combine with each other and form various combinations. All this happen purely mechanically and later we are only to show the meaning or meaninglessness of the obtained combinations. Thus, in his method Raimondus Lullius saw a general guidance for disclosing of everything, what could be researched, defined, differentiated and proved in any object.

² i.e. it possesses the formal necessity of categorical imperative. (Quotations from G. Deleuze. *Differentiation and Repeating*. St. Petersburg, 1998. P. 16).

³ It is well known that at present time there has been left none of any utopia projects, having been created by humanists of the Renaissance epoch and which have failed to be this or that way realized or checked.

Slavoj Žižek presents a curious illustration of such a «machinery» generation of possible truths. In his article «Cyberspace, or Unbearable Closure of Being» he writes: «if we say: “forget about the other world, catch your time, enjoy yourself here and now, this is your single life!” – It will sound profoundly. If we say right the opposite (“do not let them catch yourself in the trap of earthian, illusory pleasures of this life; money, power, passions – all this will return to dust – think about eternity!”) -- It will also sound profoundly. If we combine these both maxims (“Get into eternity, live the way, as if there an entire eternity before you!”), we shall get one more piece of wisdom. And the opposite sounds not lesser wise: “do not try to combine the earthian and the eternal, humbly put up with the fact that it is impossible to combine the earthian and the celestial!” and finally, when we are tired of all these rearrangements, we come to the conclusion: “life is an enigma, do not try to find out its secrets, enjoy the beauty of this incomprehensible mystery!” and this summary will be not at all wiser, than the opposite one: “do not let them deceive yourself by false secrets, life is very simple – life is that, what it is, and nothing else”. Besides, we may combine its incomprehensibility with simplicity: “the last impenetrable mystery of life is in its utmost simplicity, in that simple fact, that it exists...»

be lost in the best of all the possible worlds, and this is exactly the reason why to live in such a world is far from being the best piece of luck.

But it is not the problem of Raimondus Lullius's machine.