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Integrated Concepts of Archetypal Structures as a Relevant Political Technology in Russia

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The article provides a brief situational analysis of the processes of representation of political images in the Russian public consciousness. The author formulates the essence of the integrated concept technology in the field of political technology and considers it in the paradigm “archetype-concept-constant”. The article suggests that this technology is a relevant mechanism of political control; it determines conditions for the effective representation of concepts and their transformation into constants of the public consciousness. The author believes that the technology of integrated concepts can be developed further in the field of control of the public consciousness in Russia.

Keywords: archetype, mental image, public consciousness, concepts and constants of public consciousness, integrated concept, political technologies.

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Introduction

The modern images of the Russian political space continue to appeal to archetypal symbols and actualize them in the public consciousness in new forms. A promising mechanism of influence on the Russian public consciousness is synthesized formats of archetypal structures that are represented in the public consciousness very effectively.

Circumstances of the present political situation in Russia produce a new integrated version of a model object of the national heroic leader-defender. In the modern semantic interpretation an image of the heroic leader

consists of several archetypal and stereotypical components: it is a traditional “people’s defender” who, at the same time, is an official organizer of mankind as a society, an establisher of moral systems, a creator of cultural and social values; it is a righteous father-tsar who takes care of his people and strictly supervising the “negligent boyars”; it is an official sovereign leader who has the higher power solely for the purpose of protecting his people and the country from external and internal enemies. Under favourable ideological and social conditions such integrated concepts can be transformed into constants of the national public consciousness.

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Concept Grounds and Methodology

The basis for the study involves fundamental theories of the public consciousness and sub-consciousness of Francis Bacon (theory of idols of the Tribe, Marketplace and Theatre), G. Le Bon and G. Tarde (theory of crowd psychology), S. Freud, F. Nietzsche, C.G. Jung (theory of archetypes of the collective unconscious).

In the study, the author also addresses the theories and concepts of cultural universals and metalanguages of D. Likhachev, R. Jakobson, Iu. Lotman, N. Luhmann. The article's methodology lies in scientific logic of modern concepts of the paradigm "archetype-concept-constant". In particular, A.N. Prikhod'ko and Iu.S. Stepanov consider the concept as a synthesis of a name and an idea, as a multidimensional mental formation. The studies of A.Iu. Bolshakova interpret the archetype as a highly flexible structural principle that is able to obtain "additional meanings by actualizing certain notional facets through additional lexical and semantic formations creating its unique nominal areal" (Bolshakova, 2012).

The article considers the concept as an extensional, integrated concept at the interface of cultural linguistics, semiotics, ethnic culture and concepts of mental structures of the national consciousness. The archetype is referred to as the basis for integrated concepts, which can include not only linguistically formalized names and predicates, but also other signs that reveal the essence of a name in symbols synthesizing tribal images with additional meanings. Such integrated concepts can become constants of a meta-language of a national culture for a certain period depending on a socio-cultural situation. In the field of political science and sociology such concepts and constants can be effective mechanisms for the formation and control of the public consciousness.

The study of aspects of the essence of the Russian spirit and Russian identity is based on the classical theories of the Russian national idea and Russian patriotism developed by N.A. Berdiaev, S.N. Bulgakov, A.I. Herzen, N.Ia. Danilevskii, I.A. Il'in, L.P. Karsavin, B.S. Solov'ev, L.N. Tolstoi, N.S. Trubetskoi, N.G. Chernyshevskii and others.

Scientific assumptions of the article (under the hypothetical-deductive method) on the continuity and the current state of the Russian political consciousness are based, in particular, on the theory of Byzantism created by Konstantin Leontiev; Sergei Uvarov's theory of official nationality; on the modern concept of national-cultural identity (in particular, the concept of ethno-cultural identity by N.P. Koptseva) and the mythological consciousness theory (the theory of the construction of the myth by O.A. Karlova).

Opinions and Discussions

As is known, the basic archetypal structures of the Russian collective unconscious include images of the leader/father-tsar, the archetypes of the hero and the enemy, archetypes of conciliarity, the Absolute and the Homeland.

The archetypal image of the hero in the Russian tradition often has a predetermined polarization. Cultural creativity extends through the struggle of a creative principle of a cultural hero and a destroying principle – a trickster. As a rule, the Russian hero is endowed with an internal or external content of opposition to the official authorities (such as: Nikon, Stepan Razin, Emelyan Pugachev, Grigori Rasputin, Vladimir Lenin). With a certain degree of error, it can also be attributed to the Revolutionaries of the 80-90's of the last century who carried out the overthrow of the Soviet regime. The contraposition of the law in these cases is seen in a positive light: as a heroic act in the name of the "free homeland" and

as a way to protect “oppressed people”, and not as disobedience to the sacred hierarchies of being.

The image of the leader in the historical paradigm of the Russian mentality can both counter the image of the hero and have much in common with him, which, in fact, clearly demonstrates a sociological section of the modern Russian public consciousness. Functions of the archetypal image of the leader are associated with preservation of those norms that were developed by the ancestor-hero. Therefore, the leader in the Russian national consciousness is associated primarily with the image of a maker-guardian-father who has the authority to punish disobedient “children” and bears personal responsibility for the “fair” ruling over the people entrusted to him.

Today’s attitudes and expectations of the Russian public quite meet the tenets of the theory of official nationality developed by Sergei Uvarov, a minister of education and ideologist of Nicholas I, which again confirms the unified figurative field and continuity of constants of the Russian mentality in different historical epochs. The motto of the supporters of this ideological school “Orthodoxy. Autocracy. Nationalism” is different from the current political slogans only with terms, and the substantial essence is reduced to a common denominator: in order to unify the Russian nation there is a need for a strong sole and unquestioned ruler – a monarch. During the monarchy a tsar in a spiritual Russian context was not just a ruler, but a God’s chosen man obliged to serve as a support and protection of the Christian faith, to answer for his actions and deeds of his people before the Lord (Uvarov, 1864). The tsars, besides the tsar’s majesty, symbolized the highest moral authority in Russia.

Another famous philosopher of the time, Konstantin Leontiev, the ideologist of Byzantium, the proponent of ecclesiasticism and monarchy, also advocated the unity of command and rejected any democracy as harmful for Russia.

Interestingly, K. Leontiev attributed the salvation of Russia from the revolutionary upheavals to the alliance with the eastern countries, which, in fact, we are now observing as a strategy of Russian foreign policy. Konstantin Leontiev said that the Russian people is subject to the authorities because this nation is composed of tsar servants. “Everything would go down the drain if there was no Emperor”, he remarked (Leontiev, 1876).

The attraction of modern Russian collective consciousness to adequate and reasonable, but still a “strong hand” was already noticed at the turn of the century, when the country saw an official change of power and the beginning of a new political way: “It seems that today’s society instinctively leans to moderate authoritarianism. It feels that a breakthrough towards true democracy did not succeed and it will require long focused efforts. It is sick and tired of selfish oligarchy. It does not want to lose hard-won rights and freedoms. It needs a ‘strong hand’, ‘a strong man’, but not so strong to warp human lives” (Sysoeva, 2001).

The image of the current President of Russia is represented in the mass consciousness also in the symbols of the Russian Orthodox royal dynasties. According to most of the leading analysts and data from the respected sociological research centers, today the image of the Russian President is undoubtedly the image of the country’s defender, the national hero.

The political technologists blend seamlessly the archetypal symbols of the Russian nation’s unity, the Absolute and the Homeland into the created image of the heroic leader. Russian philosopher I.A. Ilyin wrote as such: “The Russian soul, first of all, is the child of feeling and intuition. Russian culture is built on feeling and heart, on contemplation, on freedom of conscience and freedom of prayer. These are the primary forces and intentions of the Russian soul, which directs their mighty temperament”

(Ilyin, 1993). It is this nature of the Russian soul which determines Russian people's specific belief in Jesus Christ; this faith being a constant component of the Russian consciousness becomes dominant in times of crisis. "Among the foundations of the Russian character values there are commitment to the Absolute (ideal), the infinite, the sublime and holy, with what, in fact, Russian people weigh their minds and their lives" (Andreev, 2010). For centuries the identity of the Russian people was nurtured in the bosom of the Orthodox faith; the tsar was constantly deified – in time of war, in times of deep state crises. Today this mental "engine" is still in use, as it imparts feelings of hope and peace to public mood, shows the firmness and the highest value of the government.

Statement of the Problem

Modern political consultants propagate a new interpretation of the archetypal structure of the hero very successfully, increasingly integrating leaderism constituents in the current model of the Russian people's defender in the era of global political turmoil of the first decades of the 21st century. Russian President's Power in the country has not been officially challenged for the past fifteen years, since in today's realities of Russian political situation he has no peers, or leaders-competitors. Some pre-election slogans of the right parties on the change of power are nothing but slogans, they cannot be considered adequate opposition to the current government.

Integrative image of the leader-hero-defender has been systematically instilled in the Russian mass consciousness for fifteen years; it gained intense and compelling character during 2014-2015, so to speak, in the "Victory Period" of Russia and the President: the accession of the Crimea; the triumph of the Sochi Olympics; demonstration of military-patriotic power during celebration of the Great Victory 70th anniversary.

One can say that in this period, the image of the heroic leader, based on the generic mental image of the Russian consciousness, experienced a qualitative change, moving from a quantitative symbolic set to the qualitative level becoming a sustainable concept of modern Russian mass consciousness.

During the current President's reign the Russians have formed quite obvious requirements concerning the President's personality. Leader's qualities of the country's President came to the level, which is quite unusual for the Russian public consciousness. This implies diplomacy and rigidity at the same time; openness to dialogue with the people about all the issues from world politics to the family values; great powerfulness and authority of the country's leader on the world political stage; independence and willingness to act decisively; the perfect balance of cool-headed and operational decisions.

Despite the obvious censorship, the Russian media monitoring demonstrates the effective representation of "great power" and "fatherly" associations of the Russian collective unconscious with the current President, who repeatedly shows his independence and fearlessness, self-confidence against Western politicians and the media. Many Russian President's statements made in the interview or during the dialogue are very radical. Sometimes he can make quite a bold statement and tell jokes on the verge of improper sayings, but all this demonstrates the "closeness to the people" and provides this image with stable support in the Russian mass consciousness.

The processes of representing archetypal structures in Russian collective consciousness involve all information channels and methods to introduce a new integrated concept of the heroic leader. These means include propaganda, rumours, political advertising, media policy of the leading TV channels (talk shows, news programmes, documentaries, journalism, etc.); the ever-

broadening censorship in social networks and other Internet portals. Traditional PR methods are actively used: live broadcast nationwide phone-in with the President concerning the vital issues; interviews with influential journalists; the effect of emotional discharge; anonymous announcement; the effect of “smoke screen”; leaking of positive information; hidden advertisement; focus on topical national problems; information screening and so on.

Leaking positive information about the President is a quite often used strategy. Often on the Internet there appear “unofficial” reports about how the President chastises officials at a closed session of the government, uses the obscene words and threatens the “negligent boyars”. Likewise, in the imperial Russia the “Tsar-Father” administered his power firmly and unconditionally, so today the President’s image is actualized in the mass consciousness as a leader-defender with a strong, unbreakable charisma. Such an interpretation undoubtedly finds an echo in the Russian mentality, which at different stages of history has tended to blame “negligent boyars” or “corrupt officials” and call for a “strong, punishing arm”.

Personal oratorical talents and communication abilities of the country’s head are widely used in the most common PR techniques, namely, interviews or his public appearances. One of the most effective techniques of influence is live broadcast nationwide phone-in with the President. Despite the prescribed scenario of these meetings, the overall impression of this event is always positive, leaving the audience strong believing in the highest level of competence, efficiency and personal involvement demonstrated by the national leader. This technology can be called a “petition”, as an appeal to the tsar (president) is made directly, without mediators; and solution of the problem and obtaining the answer happens “here and now”.

The political consultants do not allow long breaks in the mass consciousness agitation; they skillfully throw provocative information in “calm” periods. So the topic of divorce of the first person of the country with his wife appeared in the calm period. This fact was perceived ambiguously, which exactly was the PR purpose. Journalists gave summary, which was required by political consultants: The President broke a taboo by showing that he is a man like all the rest; the President also has the right to privacy. The President himself has repeatedly stated that public issues do not leave him time to spend with his family. Thus, public opinion logically comes to the conclusion that the President has been so committed to his people and public affairs that he has got actually “married” to the country. This opinion fully meets the mental representations of Russian self-consciousness about the tsar as a messenger from above, whose hard lot is a self-denial for the sake of the state service.

The synthesized image of the heroic leader in its modern version increasingly incorporates archetypal foundations of unity in the Russian collective unconscious.

The archetypal structure of *leader* in the Russian collective unconscious in different periods of history one way or another (in different simulated forms and ways) recognizes a component of intimacy of power and *the blessing of the Lord for the throne*. For example, some researchers believe that Stalin during the era of his power also intended to restore the historical paradigm, giving the king in the name of himself and the God in the face of Lenin to the people (Markov, 2005). Numerous studies have shown that the Bolsheviks deliberately created a new pagan cult, in which “a mummy of the deified ancestor was the source of faith and the object of worship, while the secretary general was the high priest.” (Markov, 2005).

The faith in Christ was relevant throughout the long history of the Russian state, at different stages of the history the church and the state in one way or another did not lose the intercommunication, despite the external forms of the conflict in the Bolshevik and Soviet periods. The divine meaning of the power and the archetype of catholicity are in demand in government and politics even today, differing only in the new frame of the represented traditional symbols in the mass consciousness and more relevant socio-cultural semantics.

In the process of introducing the image of *the protege of the Lord* into the mass consciousness the Russian Orthodox Church acts as an effective channel of influence, based on the stable archetypal structures of the Russian mentality, namely the image of the Orthodox unity, catholicity, striving for the ideal (Absolute). The Russian Orthodox Church is actively involved in the socio-political sphere of public life today. Since 2012, almost all Russian regions have started to introduce an experimental school course of *Fundamentals of religious cultures and secular ethics*. This initiative today is partly implemented and suits most people with traditional views in the Russian Federation (the courses of *Fundamentals of secular ethics* and *Foundations of Orthodox culture* annually attract almost the same number of students). The Russian Orthodox Patriarchate and other denominations (the Russian Muslim community actively manifests in that as well) openly support the head of the country and bless his activities to defend the Homeland and the multinational people. The mass media of the Russian Orthodox Church regularly discusses spiritual security in the current political environment and promotes a cathedral prayer for the ruler of the country that refers the mass consciousness to mental signs of *the God's deputy on earth*. The church serves as a channel of influence in military, government, educational and other spheres deepening the communion of public awareness to the values of

Orthodoxy and patriarchal forms of statehood. The forms of support and blessing of the President and the Government on political issues, which are a little bit subtle but clear for the analytical view, manifest. It also concerns the issues in the field of foreign policy. The Church takes an active part in the life of large public and private corporations and projects. In big business religion became part of corporate ethics (for example, RusHydro regularly participates in the construction of churches and chapels, including within their own businesses). In response, the Russian Orthodox Church gets a quite serious support from the state, political and public organizations; activities of the Russian Orthodox Church are actively covered by the media.

The Church more than any other modern organization owns all the techniques of influence, shaping public opinion, introducing behavioural programmes into the collective subconscious, including in relation to the government, to its domestic and foreign policy. In this sense, the ideology of the church is not inferior to the media in its effect on people's minds.

As a traditional institution, the Church successfully masters new technologies and means of mass communication. All Church activities in Russia are widely reported in the open spaces of communication, the Patriarchate has its own Internet portals and accounts in social networks. The presence of the President and other government representatives at all prominent religious ceremonies and celebrations logically combines the sovereign scepter and the overshadowing cross in the social consciousness, integrating the archetypal symbols and signs of catholicity and blessed power in the concept of the heroic leader.

The modern image of the Russian Orthodox Church is well correlated with the general state policy of Russia, the ideology of which, on the one hand, seeks to establish traditional norms

and values in the country, and on the other hand, is directed towards progress and expanding its influence, conquering new horizons and lands. The Russian Orthodox Church is actively involved in shaping and introducing an integrated image of the heroic leader-defender to the public consciousness, giving it the divine disposal and blessing to heroic deeds in the name of the Orthodox people.

The archetypal symbols of the image of Homeland are a natural conclusion of the synthesized image of the Hero of the New Age. It is possible to say they crown a technological integration of the archetypal elements of the Russian mentality in one concept. Russian philosophers have always attached a special, innermost importance to the content of the concept of Homeland. Some modern researchers believe that “this concept is characterized not so much by quantitative-empirical *collegiality* as by qualitative and spiritual one. The term *domestic* is applicable to the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and modern Russia” (Khazagerov, 2002).

The archetype of Homeland is a basic foundation of forming a picture of social reality in the public consciousness. The image of Homeland includes many factors, each of which in different periods can be dominant. They are value and religious-spiritual characteristics of the country, political and socio-cultural meanings, social and historical reality of Russia. The semantic idea of Homeland lines up all historical events in a continuous national culture, so that Homeland is the determining factor of national consensus, unity and people’s universal value, maintaining their individual traits in any specific manifestation.

Today, the Russian people are not, for example, an exact replica of the people of the Soviet Union period, but they clearly have some peculiarities of the patriotic consciousness of the Soviet era. Despite the active processes of

disintegration of the 90s of the last century, the sense of Homeland as a big and strong land still remains relevant in the Russian mass consciousness. A characteristic feature of the Russian identity of the last ten years is a desire *to restore the lost*. Focusing on these sentiments, the current government systematically restores a sense of continuity with the pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union, actively implements the idea of the formation of Russia as a self-sufficient and authoritative power. “In President Putin’s rhetoric the idea of the millennial Russian nationhood as a basis on which the new modern Russia is build has persisted for several years successively” (Malinova, 2015).

The social meaning of Homeland is represented in modern influence technologies, first of all, in the symbols of unity and communion of Russian people: equality, fraternity, collectivism, integration, patriotism, universal responsibility and overall victories. Large-scale international and domestic events have become the common heritage of the citizens of Russia, their common achievements and victories. “When the Olympic games started in Sochi, Russia, the sense of pride among Russians for their homeland outweighed any protest moods, and the opposition called not to combine great sports festival with the problems of the state”, wrote “The Guardian” correspondent Shaun Walker. In the period of preparation for the 2014 sports festival a lot of public scandals took place: from the government accusations of corruption to the problem of Russian gay minorities’ oppression. Russian athletes triumph at the Sochi Olympics and the rave reviews from the other countries about the highest level of the competitions organization not only distracted Russian public opinion from specific social problems, but radically changed it.

The President of Russia himself stated, in particular, that one of the tasks of the Olympics was to influence the public opinion in Russia

and other countries, and that such a major event was able to strengthen the spirit of pride for their Homeland among Russians. According to the Public Opinion Foundation study dated 17 December, 2014 the Olympic Games in Sochi have become the second most important event of the year in Russia after the annexation of Crimea. 70% of the respondents claimed that the level of the Olympic Games was of importance to them, “it is necessary to prove to the world that we are the best”, “we are still the patriots of our country” (The Public Opinion Foundation, 2014).

The Russians’ perception of their country as a great power is still determined by the events associated with the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The grand parade, memory rallies and celebrations across the country in 2015, devoted to the anniversary of the Great Victory made an impression not only on Russian citizens but also on the entire international community. “Is Victory Parade a tradition or a demonstration of force? Rather it is a tribute to those who defeated fascism 70 years ago freeing Europe from it, most of which was no longer able to fight against fascism at the time”, the correspondent of Channel One noted.

Let us add within the framework of this study that it is also a powerful mechanism for maintaining national pride and unity. “We are a great nation and as long as we remember our history – we are invincible” the sovereign motto of winners sounded for thousands times out of the mouths of thousands of people. The President of the country took personal charge of the monumental march of “Immortal Regiment”, which symbolized his inextricable link with the homeland and unity with the people, “I am very happy that thousands of ordinary people with the portraits of soldiers and home front workers can walk today on Red Square as well as and I with a portrait of my father” (Channel One, May 9, 2015).

Representation of the generic image of homeland in the Russian mass consciousness in the recent years is of continuous and even increasing nature. Not a single moment the country could be proud of is overlooked by PR-technologists, successfully used and replicated. High-profile events associated with the Olympics were politically logically replaced by the sensational events in Ukraine. After the annexation of Crimea large number of people who went through the collapse of the Soviet Union, suddenly received the actual expression of their aspirations for the restoration of the country’s greatness. When the interest in the situation in Ukraine started to wane, another dramatic event irradiated the country – the 70th anniversary of the Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War. After that we entered the active phase of the event for the protection of the country’s national identity and independence from the American “gendarme” and “aggressor”; neutralization of European sanctions by “import substitution” and the war against international terrorism in the East.

Thus, integrated concept (in the field of political technologies) is an organic synthesis of several archetypal structures of the collective unconscious, individual generic mental images of national identity that are represented a particular political image. The concept can also integrate additional relevant symbols and meanings of a social situation, social stereotypes, the quality and the characteristics of a chosen image itself. The effectiveness of the formed integrated concept representation and its transformation into a constant of mass consciousness is possible under several conditions. Firstly, archetypes and mental images included in the concept must be professionally adapted to the current state of mass consciousness and to socio-economic conditions of the country. Secondly, the image itself, in which the concept is represented, should have essential and formalized (in this

case, for example, the official symbols of power) analogues with the historic gallery of archetypal images of national consciousness. Thirdly, the impact on the mass consciousness should be of massive and ongoing nature: the image transmission must be on all the communication channels, one way or another related to the components of an integrated concept. For example, in this case the symbols of catholicity and Absolute of the concept of “heroic leader” must necessarily be transmitted by the church as well, and the image of Homeland and the image of the hero by educational, pedagogical and other social institutions of the society.

It is crucially important to note that some archetypes, not being included into the integrated concept can serve as a logical and effective background for its representation. Thus, in this example this background is the image of the enemy, which in the modern political communicative field of Russia has, perhaps, the highest degree of representativeness.

Historically, the image of the enemy for the Russian people mainly has had general informative content in accordance with the cultural and historical periods of the country’s development. At that, Russian mental image of the enemy has a stable set of attributes, which, nowadays is effectively framed by the new content. The enemy of Russia is always an invader, a barbarian, an aggressor and a stranger who opposes everything that is holy in order to oppress the sacred Russian land. The image of the enemy is primarily manifested in the political sphere and the channels and mechanisms of the image projection to the public consciousness, and the level of its intensity varies depending on specific tasks. The image of the enemy looks especially convincing in the concepts of war propaganda, since the formation of the clear image of the enemy in time of war is the most important official task of the state.

It should be noted that the features and the main characteristics of the enemy are, in fact, common to the collective unconscious of different nations and epochs. In most cultures, war propaganda is based upon such definitions of the enemy as “alien”, “aggressor”, “barbarian”, “criminal”, “the enemy of God”, “rapist”, “torturer” or “executioner” (Amirov, 2008). However, the Russian propaganda surely has its own unique essential and external qualities of this image.

The image of the enemy of Russia is formed during centuries-long history of the country; propaganda of different epochs creates quite a specific gallery of images. One of the most distinct and sustainable images was the image of the Mongol invasion. Historical research confirms that the “Tatars as the image of the enemy for the Russian people were quite relevant for a long time Cultural, religious and linguistic attribute of differences is more than obvious. It is not a secret that for the successful unity of any nation there is nothing better than the mythical image of the enemy, the opponent. At one time it was quite deterministic” (Amirov, 2008).

During the period of the Russian-Japanese War, military press promoted the idea of racial and religious confrontation between Russia and Japan. At the same time Russia was represented as a country that fulfills certain “superfunctions” protecting the world from the barbarian, aggressive nation: “The old hatred of the white race and Christianity and suppressed anger against the domineering Europe were manifested with renewed vigour” (Vozhin, 1904). The propaganda of that time, in addition to the image of the “barbarian”, highlights another particular feature of the enemy of specific culture: “Japanese do not horrify us by their desperate courage, this is not a surprise to us, they horrify by their damned accuracy”, said Russian military and

statesman, adjutant general M.I. Dragomirov (Amirov, 2008).

The Second World War actualizes in the Russian consciousness the image of the Japanese enemy as an evil and treacherous “samurai”. Generally, during the period of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet propaganda rose to the level of art, bringing patriotic feelings of the citizens to catharsis, turning black and white propaganda antithesis into powerful weapon to defeat the enemy. The military discourse of the Great Patriotic War cultivated hatred to the enemy in laconic and tough rhetoric: “the fascist locusts”, “monsters”, “animals”, “unpeople”, “The Germans must be destroyed! Beat as you can and where you can! Stop and beat! Beat and stop!” (Erenburg, 2004).

In the post-war period in the USSR the image of the enemy was expressed in the content of “American imperialism” that embodied the horrors of the capitalist system. The image included brief and simple components: corruption of American culture, inferiority of their lifestyle, “decaying” American economy, the working class poverty and racial discrimination.

The image of “American imperialism” with clear outlines and characteristics of the “world policeman” and aggressor become more and more topical in modern interpretations.

The image of the enemy has always served to unite the Russian people in times of crisis or military action. Moreover, bright and powerful images of the enemy reinforce the image of the hero that is able to resist the aggressor and the alien and protect the people and the state. Such was the image of Stalin in the Great Patriotic War; such is the image of the Russian President today on the background of America’s President and European leaders that have joined him. In today’s technological version the “enemy” looks rather not terrible, but insignificant. The images of Obama, his key assistants and

European leaders are shown in the Russian mass media, for the most part, miserable and confused as they do not control the situation, do not know how to speak properly; they present pitiful and unsubstantiated claims to Russia and its President. Such a pattern is formed by the most common PR techniques of information screening and filtering of materials of speeches and interviews; methods of omitting information and making a “smokescreen”. The result is an interpreted television picture representing miserable “pug-dogs” yapping maliciously from the street. In some cases, the broadcast images are demonstrated in a grotesque and caricature style of Mayakovsky satire.

Against this background, the figure of the independent, confident, calm and generous President of Russia, which can sometimes friendly “scold” his colleagues in Europe and overseas, and when necessary fight back and take drastic measures, including military actions, looks even more favourable. It is obvious that the image of the “pathetic” and “dependent” enemy even brighter highlights the image of the brave and independent hero-defender, strong in its tranquility leader-father of the nation. The mass consciousness trusts such image, relies entirely on him, concentrates all its hopes in him. In addition, the image of the enemy serves as an effective catalyst in the processes of civil society building around the leader of the country and uniting to address common challenges; it distracts the public from private and social problems and causes new outbursts of patriotism and collectivism.

Therefore, in general we can say that the modern Russian political technologies have moved from the notorious “search of a national idea” to its modeling and concentration on the heroic leader. The generated image quite corresponds to the hopes of the Russian collective consciousness for the revival of patriotism, traditions and national

values, the formation of a powerful sovereign state (to a certain extent - a superpower).

The unprecedented outburst of patriotism, union of the nation around the President, strong public support of his initiatives and decisions are caused also, in our opinion, by the professional approach of political strategists to the formation of a new integrated concept of the "heroic leader". Transformation of this concept into a constant of the mass consciousness requires, in our opinion, more favourable socio-economic conditions within the country. In this case, the stable constant of the national mass consciousness based on the integration of archetypal structures can become an effective mechanism of political influence, and the technology of integrated concepts will be developed.

Conclusion

The archetypal structures of the Russian collective unconscious are relevant and effective basis for the technology of mass consciousness control, in particular - in the sphere of strengthening government institutions. Generic images are interpreted into ideological settings and value system that defines the worldview and public opinion of Russian citizens. Political PR-technologies relate all the major events, phenomena and facts of reality connected with Russia, with the mental representations of the Russian identity and synthesize them in new images.

The formation and implementation in the Russian mass consciousness of a new integrated model of the heroic leader is at the present stage of

Russian history not just an effective mechanism of political propaganda, but, in our opinion, it is the trend of modern Russian political advertising. This is clearly confirmed by the election battles in 2016. Almost all parties, regardless of political orientation - whether centrists, right or left – took as the basis for their advertising the images of the Homeland, hero-defender and unity of the Russian people in the struggle against internal and external enemies. Commercials, speeches in the debates, slogans - all rhetoric was focused on the archetypal structures and mental images of the Russian mass consciousness. However, the effectiveness of the advertising forms proposed by political parties is in the field of discussion, because, in our view, the symbols and meanings of underlying archetypes were mostly touched upon lightly, and they are not adapted to the realities of the civic consciousness of this crisis period.

Thus, the technology of developing and implementing integrated concepts of archetypal structures of the collective unconscious may be, in our opinion, the actual mechanism and even the trend of modern Russian political PR and the whole sphere of mass consciousness control. However, the efficiency of this technology in today's political history of Russia can be seen so far only in the case of the described synthesized image of the heroic leader-defender, blessed by Divine Providence, which is artfully re-presented in the modern Russian mass consciousness in the image of the country's President.

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Интегрированные концепты архетипических структур как актуальная политтехнология в России

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В статье приведен краткий ситуационный анализ процессов репрезентации политических имиджей в российском массовом сознании. Автор формулирует сущность технологии интегрированного концепта в сфере политтехнологий и рассматривает ее в парадигме «архетип-концепт-константа». В статье высказывается предположение о том, что данная технология является актуальным механизмом политического управления; определяются условия эффективной репрезентации концептов и их трансформации в константы массового сознания. Автор полагает, что технология интегрированных концептов может получить свое развитие в области управления массовым сознанием в России.

Ключевые слова: архетип, ментальный образ, массовое сознание, концепты и константы массового сознания, интегрированный концепт, политтехнологии.

Научная специальность: 24.00.00 – культурология.
