

DISCUSSIONS ON CURRENT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES*

*All researchers interested in this subject are encouraged
to continue the substantive discussion*

* Opinions of the authors of articles and commentaries in this column may not reflect the view of the publisher.

УДК 009

China's Grand Strategy, Kashmir and Pakistan: Transformation of Islamabad from a Spoiler State to Frontline State for Beijing

Dr. Suneel Kumar*

*Department of Strategic and Regional Studies,
University of Jammu
Jammu-180006-Jammu and Kashmir, India ¹*

Received 4.11.2011, received in revised form 11.11.2011, accepted 16.07.2012

China in collaboration with Pakistan has integrated Kashmir in its grand strategy to contain India. Beijing's involvement in various mega projects related to construction and development of strategic infrastructure in the Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (PoK), influx of People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, adoption of visa-related controversial policies and invitation to India's Kashmiri separatist leader, are being seen in the India's official and strategic circles, as the encirclement of India by China through Kashmir. During the Cold War era, Beijing had bestowed Pakistan with the status of 'spoiler state' in order to weaken the natural predominance of India in the South Asian region. Nevertheless, now, it is being viewed that China has transformed Pakistan into a 'frontline state' to contain the increasing Indian influence at regional and global levels. In this context, Kashmir is being used as an instrument by the Beijing and in this strategy; Beijing Administration is being complemented equally by the Islamabad Administration. Gilgit-Baltistan, where an anti-Pakistan movement for Balawaristan is simmering, has become the epic centre of Chinese activities. In the emerging scenario, Sino-Pakistan nexus has emerged as a gainer and, India, the US and even people of Gilgit-Baltistan have become the prime losers. The Sino-Pakistan nexus in Kashmir has put strategically India at a disadvantageous position while people of Gilgit-Baltistan are to be the victims of suppression of both Pak army as well as the PLA. In long-term perspective, mega projects, and large scale human activities in PoK especially in Gilgit-Baltistan, are going to be disastrous for the local, regional and extra-regional-environment. India is taking counter-measures from developing strategic infrastructure to enhancement of its military capabilities to thwart any prospective threat.

Keywords: China, Pakistan, Kashmir, PoK, Gilgit-Baltistan, People's Liberation Army, Visa, Strategy.

Introduction

China's relative power and influence vis-à-vis other global powers particularly the United States have grown more extensively in recent times even than expectations of the Beijing Administration (Jisi, 2011: 68). It has attained

impressive economic and military capabilities as it is the world's second largest economy, largest exporter and a major creditor nation (Blanchard, 2011: 32). Due to its improved position, Beijing Administration's conduct has turned out increasingly to be assertive in international relations. This has

* Corresponding author E-mail address: kumar_narottum@yahoo.com

¹ © Siberian Federal University. All rights reserved

been observed even by the Chinese scholars like Wang Jisi, from Beijing's sturdy reactions to a chain of events in 2010 espousing Washington's decision to sell arms to Taiwan, US-South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea, and Japan's detention of a Chinese sailor found in disputed waters (Jisi, 2011: 68). In this assertive behaviour of China, Pakistan is not remained a 'spoiler state', but in turn, gradually has transformed to a 'frontline state' of Beijing's grand strategy in the global, Asian and Indian contexts. On the one hand, China wants to be a dominant the power in global affairs while curtaining and replacing the US influence in the Asian continent especially and on the other, it is ambitious to prevent India from becoming powerful enough to challenge its evolving hegemony in the region. A wide range of factors including the US presence in Afghanistan, and the Indian role in China's diverse global and regional interests are influencing the Beijing's strategy in the South Asia especially in relations to Kashmir. Thus, it is imperative to understand China's grand strategy in the global, Asian and Indian context and also to view how and why China has transformed Pakistan from a 'spoiler state' into a 'frontline state' vis-à-vis India in the context of Kashmir. Ultimately, as a result of Sino-Pak nexus on Kashmir what type of gainer-looser syndrome has emerged for the concerned parties and moreover, which way the Indian state has counteracted the situation?

China's Grand Strategy:

Diverse Contexts

Grand strategy of any country contains its defined core national interests, identified real or perceived threats to them and vision, strategy and modus operandi of the national leadership to advance those interests and counter the threats to them (Jisi, 2011: 68). Amidst its consistent foreign and defence policies that have enough coordination with the country's domestic

priorities, the Chinese government has yet to disclose any document which comprehensively explains Beijing's strategic goals and methods to achieve the same. However, like any country, generally, it is said that, China defines its core national interests to territorial integrity, sovereignty, security and national independence. It, further, encompasses regime preservation, a role and prestige commensurate with China's power rank and economic capabilities (Wang, 2005: 669-694). China, though officially denies, also defines its national interest to revision the international system or hegemony in the Asian continent in general and South Asian region in particular. Beijing perceives the United States as primary threat to its enumerated interests. It is because of the latter's backing of Taiwan, strategic partnerships with India, Japan and South Korea, military might, human rights pressure, and dominance in global institutions (Wang, 2006: 4-9). The secondary but crucial hurdle for Beijing's designs in South Asian and even in the South East Asian context, as it is perceived by China, is India, an emerging Asian power and global player which has close ties with Russia, and in recent years, has emerged as an important strategic partner of United States at global level and of South East Asian Countries especially of Vietnam at regional level. China has not cordial relations with India due to its disputes on territorial borders, Tibet and Dalai Lama and thus even had invaded and defeated India in 1962. The rise of India, as an economic and military power, its nuclear power status and its claim and lobbying for permanent seat in the UN Security Council, deepening strategic partnership with the US and South East Asia and East Asian countries and overall, its increasing reputation at the global level and its recognition at various international forums, is perceived as threat to the Chinese interests. Though, Beijing, officially, does not acknowledge so but even then, it is responding

to its perceptions. It has adopted diverse range of strategies to put off the US and Indian challenge. These strategies involve the development of asymmetric military capabilities, construction of soft alliances with Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and Pakistan, encouragement of multilateralism and support for multipolarity against the US unipolarity, reassurance and promulgation of friendly foreign doctrine and soft power projection (Goldstein, 2002: 842:858). Therefore, overall scenario is that, China in its grand strategy, apart from keeping away the internal and external threats to its sovereignty, is ambitious enough to replace the US unipolarity and contain the rise of Indian influence so that Beijing may be able to establish itself as hegemonic at regional and global levels.

China-Pakistan Relations: Convergence of Strategic Interests

Since China perceives US and India as hurdles to achieve its agenda at global and regional levels, as it is also being discussed in the US and Indian strategic circles, Beijing has adopted above said strategies to contain these countries. The international environment is also looking favourable for Beijing particularly in case of Pakistan's souring relations with the US and Islamabad's increasing dependence on Beijing.

Historically, China and India have divergent views on the regional stability in South Asia, South East Asia and the Middle East. Beijing has given primacy to its own strategic interests while pursuing a non-accommodative approach towards others' especially of India (Kapila, 2003: NP). In this context, Beijing has never recognized the natural predominance of India in South Asia. Infact, China along with the US and Britain brought the term 'South Asia' into usage in lieu of the 'Indian sub-continent' to de-emphasize India's natural predominance in the sub-continent and to soothe their protégé Pakistan. Responding

to the hostile security environment in South Asia, India built a sizable conventional military force as a part of its defensive strategy and, created a nuclear deterrent. Amid the Cold War politics, at frequent intervals, the US bestowed a "spoiler state" status to Pakistan. Since 1962, China also dealt Pakistan identically vis-à-vis India to disturb the natural power structure in South Asia (Kapila, 2002: NP). After the entry of Soviets into Afghanistan in 1979, the US used Pakistan as 'frontline state' first to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan, then to throw out the Taliban from Kabul, and also to fight against their resurgence. However, as it has been observed, since 2008 onwards a chain of events have soured the relations of US-Pakistan. The US cooperation with India, signing of nuclear deal with New Delhi while denying for the same to Islamabad, US officials' statements regarding the Pakistani links and support to terrorist outfits, and then so-called unilateral US military actions in Pakistan territory against the Islamic militants, killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by the US led NATO forces and thereby, violations of Pakistan's sovereignty, and more recently, the freeze of \$700 million US aid by the US Congress to Islamabad have a role in the decline of US-Pakistan friendship. This, wedge between US and Pakistan, has given an opportunity to China to be more close to Islamabad and also Islamabad to be dependent on China (Chellaney, 2011: NP). China has entered into nuclear deal with Pakistan, appreciated Pakistan's role as 'frontline state' in the global war against terrorism, and asked the US to respect the sovereignty of Pakistan. This Chinese support to Islamabad have lauded by the Islamabad administration. China is called as an 'all-weather friend' of Pakistan, a strategic partner, a reliable source of trade and aid and closest military ally. If China has extended its "unconditional support" to Pakistan's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, then Pakistan has given

“unwavering support” to China on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang related issues which concern China's core interests (Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2011b: NP).

China's relationship with Pakistan is driven by its own national interests. Pakistan was only reliable diplomatic partner of China during the years of Beijing's international isolation and, even at present, it remains a useful gateway for Chinese penetration in the energy-rich Islamic Middle East (Wirsing, 2003: 1). In early 1970s, Pakistan served as a bridge for the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations and helped to end the diplomatic isolation of China once suffered.

Pakistan has also been benefited from the friendship with China. Unlike others, Beijing does not expect or even insists on Islamabad to surrender or subjugates its own national interests to the Chinese interests. Moreover, as Pakistan feels, China does not interfere in Islamabad's internal affairs as its “much touted” friend, the US generally does. (Editorial, Frontier Post, 26 August, 2011). Indeed, China has given aid to Pakistan with no “strings attached” (Xiaoqiang, 2011: NP). After the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, on the request of Pakistan, China exercised its veto first time to install the move of Bangladesh to be the member of the United Nations. As a result of that, Pakistan succeeded in bargaining with India to release the prisoners of war (PoWs) and return the troops to pre-war positions. Again after the India's nuclear explosion in 1974, China assisted Pakistan to build its two defence related mega projects – the Heavy Rebuild Factory for T-59 tanks and the F-16 Aircraft Rebuild Factory – to make Pakistan self-reliant in the production of conventional weapons. China not only extended its political support to Pakistan on the question of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, but also covertly provided military supplies of worth \$200 million annually to the Afghan rebels fighting

against the Soviets. When Pakistan was under the US sanctions for its secret nuclear weapons' programme, China served as a primary source of Pakistan's military hardware and assisted its nuclear and missile programmes (Rahman, 2011: 214). Hence, both countries supported each other whenever it was required and, therefore, they came closer. Apart from historical Sino-Pak closeness, their common enmity with India also strengthened the ties of Beijing and Islamabad. Most important common strategic interest of Beijing and Islamabad is the containment of India, and therefore, both have given reciprocal support for this cause. As Kanwal Sibal writes:

Pakistan wants to have parity with us [India]; China wants to be the dominant power in the region. Pakistan wants to limit India's regional as well as global role by blocking us [India] westwards so that we [India] don't have easy access to Afghanistan and Central Asia; China wants to confine us [India] to South Asia, keep us entangled in the sub-continent so that we [India] are unable to fully exert our [Indian] influence in the rest of Asia and beyond, giving China space and time to entrench its influence there without having to face competition from India. Pakistan is determined to confront India and China is intent on giving Pakistan the means and the confidence to continue this confrontation (2011a: NP).

Thus, it establishes the above given argument that, for the common strategic interest vis-à-vis India, Beijing and Islamabad have served one another as a “counterweight” to India and hedge against the “Indian adventurism” (Wirsing, 2003: 2). Now, amidst the Islamabad's souring relations with Washington, the Sino-Pak closeness is being considered a positive trend in Pakistan's international relations. Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousuf Raja Gilani describes the Islamabad's

recent close friendship with Beijing as "...higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey" (Feigenbaum, 2011: NP). During his visit to China on 27th September, 2011, Pakistan's Prime Minister Gilani even told the Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu that:

Your (China's) friends are our (Pakistan's) friends. Your (China's) enemies are our (Pakistan's) enemies, and your (China's) security is our (Pakistan's) security (Feigenbaum, 2011: NP).

In the current scenario, Pakistani analyst Ashraf Javed also views Sino-Pakistan closeness in an optimistic way. He writes:

As relations between Washington and Islamabad continue to slide down from bad to worse followed by a spat of suggestions, warnings and ultimatums by the high-ranking US officials, the supportive statements by China in favour of Pakistan's sovereignty gave some respite to the current dispensation in this country(2011: NP).

In other words, it can be argued that recent decisions of Washington and New Delhi have brought more depth to the Sino-Pak strategic partnership (Wirsing, 2003: 4). However, in this situation, if Pakistan has become less reliant on the US and more close to China, then its closeness has made India 'extremely' nervous. India might be holding the US ever-closer, but it can't make New Delhi pleasant as it is being encircled by China. China stands as a clear rival to the Indian influence in Nepal, where it has built major cross-border highways from Tibet, and is in the process of extending its rail network to Kathmandu. Same is in case of Bangladesh, where Beijing is assisting in the development of a deep-sea port at Chittagong. In the other Indian backyard, i.e. Sri Lanka, China is now the country's largest aid donor, and is helping to build a major new port terminal at Hambantota.

Beijing has even enjoyed free rein with the military junta in Burma (Watters, 2011: NP). Encirclement of India can be observed from a variety of developments which have been occurred in the Sino-Pakistan relationship in the context of Kashmir.

China's Grand Strategy's Kashmir Connection

The emerging trends in Sino-Pakistan relationship and China's activities, in recent years, both unilateral and joint with Pakistan in the context of Kashmir especially Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) clearly point out that Beijing has integrated Kashmir in its grand strategy while making Pakistan as 'frontline state' against India and that, it has clear-cut ambitions to exploit the bi-lateral dispute to bottle up India in the sub-continent.

As it is known to all, Kashmir is a disputed issue between India and Pakistan. Kashmir is broken into pieces. One piece is an integral part of India. Other one is PoK which is administratively divided into two parts – 'Azad Kashmir' and Gilgit-Baltistan which are known as 'Northern Areas' in Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan is situated between the Hindu Kush and Karakoram range of mountains in the north and western Himalayas in the south. It encompasses seven districts namely Gilgit, Skardu, Diamir, Ghizer, Astore, Ghanchi and Hunza Nagar, bordering Xinjiang in China, the Afghan Pamirs in the north and a 480 kilometers long Line of Control (LoC) in the south(Raina, 2009: NP). Pakistan had ceded a part of Hunza-Gilgit called Raskam and the Shaksgam Valley of Baltistan to China in 1963 to seek nuclear know-how from that country. Gilgit-Baltistan region's strategic location is important for India, Pakistan, China and United States. The area is very important to China as many trade tracks from China to Pakistan are situated in this territory (Zahra, 2010: NP). While pointing out

the strategic importance of the Gilgit-Baltistan region from Pakistani perspective, Sajjad Shaukat writes that:

...strategic location of the Northern Areas is of a greater geo-political importance for Pakistan, linking major parts of South Asia, Central Asia and South East Asia. Besides India, Pakistan's clandestine rivals, America and Afghanistan on one hand and its close friend, China on the other also consider it as strategically important. In the present era of economic wars, the region is the backbone of our country's economy, and trade with China entailing future partnership with the Central Asian states. Pakistan imports almost all kind of items from China via Karakorum Highway. These areas are significant in respect of natural resources containing precious minerals such as gold, ruby, emerald, iron ore and uranium. Water is another major source. Pakistan's major source of water is River Indus which flows through this region. It was also due to its ideal strategic location of this region that India had occupied the Siachen Glacier, deputing its forces below 50 and 60 degree freezing point peaks, and compelled Pakistan to defend its Northern Areas (2011: NP).

In addition to strategic importance of the region, in Gilgit-Baltistan, there is a widespread nationalist movement for an independent Balawaristan consisting of Gilgit-Baltistan. Local nationalist groups such as Gilgit-Baltistan Democratic Alliance (GBDA), Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) and Balawaristan National Front (BNF) are struggling for independent Balawaristan. The BNF is playing a leading role which claims Chitral and Kohistan as inseparable parts of Gilgit-Baltistan, the region to which this organization calls 'Balawaristan'. Leaders of the Balawaristan

movement especially Abdul Hammed Khan, Chairman of Balawaristan, considers Pakistan as source for many problems of the local people and therefore there is a demand for independent state of Balawaristan. Nevertheless, Pakistan blames India, Afghanistan and the US for instigating the national uprisings in the area. As the Pakistani writer Sajjad Shaukat views:

New Delhi and Kabul with the covert support of Washington have already been creating lawlessness in various regions of Pakistan by fuelling sectarianism – are also converting our Northern Areas into another volatile place where they have been manipulating anti-Pakistan sentiments to achieve their secret strategic goals (2011: NP).

In spite of the allegations against India, Afghanistan and the US, Pakistani writer accepts the existence of "anti-Pakistan sentiments" among the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Nevertheless, Islamabad has done little to understand and address the grievances and subsequently, pacify the anti-Pakistani feelings of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Instead of soothing such sentiments, Pakistan has attempted to suppress them by using military means through deployment of huge number of military forces in the region.

Since China perceives India as a key player that it needs to engage with to fulfill its grand strategy, Kashmir has evoked great interest of China in this context. Though, China is eager to access the rich natural resources of Central Asia through the expansion of its trading interests, constant conflict over Kashmir between India and Pakistan has provided an opportunity to China to make Kashmir instrumental in its grand strategy. In the 1990s China had shifted its hard stances of self-determination for Kashmir to one of Kashmir as a de-facto part of India. Analysts in India visualize that Beijing has signalled to change its earlier stance towards Kashmir policy

by considering the Indian part of Kashmir as a 'disputed territory', intentionally to integrate in its geo-political strategy in Central Asia, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas (Kapila, 2010: NP). Pakistan is compliant to Beijing's strategy in the context of Kashmir. Following developments reveal that Pakistan has not only facilitated the intrusion of China in Kashmir especially in Gilgit-Baltistan area to give it defacto control over the region but has also attempted to make China a party to the dispute:-

A) Construction and Development Strategic Infrastructure: Beijing is involved in various construction and development projects in PoK particularly in the Gilgit-Baltistan. It has been estimated that China is funding at least 767 development projects related to strategic infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. Reportedly, at least 122 Chinese companies are funding 14 mega projects related to strategic infrastructure (Times Now, 19 September, 2010: NP). This includes construction of dams, bridges and roads especially construction, maintenance and expansion of the Karakoram Highway (KKH).

The KKH connects Gilgit-Baltistan with Kashgar in China's Xingjiang province 1,300 kilometer long distance. This Highway is significant as it cuts through the zone between Asia and the Indian sub-continent, where China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan come within 250 kilometer of each other. For China and Pakistan, the KKH is significant for dual civil and military purposes. It is channel of bilateral trade between China and Pakistan, and adding to this, from Beijing's perspective, it is integral to keep Pakistan's military strength sustained against India. Therefore, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in June 2006 between China's state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and the National Highway Authority of Pakistan (NHAP)

to expand the KKH from 10 metres to 30 metres with its operational capacity going up three-fold. Agreement was also signed between the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and the NHAP for upgradation and widening of the KKH Phase-2 which links the Thakot Bridge to Sazin. This was to accommodate the heavy vehicles in extreme weather conditions and is supposed to be completed in 2012. The MoU was also signed by the NHAP with the China Gezhouba Group International Engineering Company Limited to widen the Jaglot-Skardu road (Chansoria, 2010: 3). Apart from roads, other strategic infrastructure related projects of Beijing in PoK includes the construction of a dry port at Sost, water-diversion channels and telecommunication facilities. The port at Sost, on the Sino-Pak border, is connected by the KKH to Karimabad, Gilgit and Chilas in the south and the Chinese cities of Tashkurgan, Upal and Kashgar in the north. The port of Sost holds the potential to serve as a key channel of trading activity for the Central Asia (Chansoria, 2010: 3).

China has also focussed on the power sector to exploit the huge hydro-electric power potential of the region. Construction of a hydro-power station at Bunji, in the Astore district of the Gilgit-Baltistan region was also decided through the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Pakistan and China in August 2009 when Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari had visited to China. The cost of proposed Bunji Dam is \$7 billion with a purported capacity to generate 7,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity (Raman, 2009: NP). The deal has been undertaken on a build-operate-transfer basis, with the entire investment made available by China. Significantly, the Bunji project is just one of the eight hydel projects that are to be constructed (Chansoria, 2010: 3 and; Ghosh, 2011: NP).

China is also associated with the construction of a \$12.6 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam on the Indus

River – 165 kilometers downstream of Gilgit and 40 kilometers downstream of Chilas. This project is aimed at to generate 4,500 MW of electricity per day. This project is on its way for completion in 2016. Beijing had agreed to grant Pakistan \$121 million supplier credit to establish a link line between Karakoram Highway and the Bhasha Dam site to facilitate the transportation of heavy machinery which is required for its construction of Dam. In August, 2011, China's biggest state-owned hydropower firm, Sinohydro has discussed the project of this Dam with Pakistan's Federal Minister for Water and Power, Syed Naveed Qamar, and Qamar had even invited the Sinohydro's support for the construction of other two dams, the Gomal Zam and Darawat projects. Besides, China's Gezhouba Hydropower Group has signed a deal to work on the Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project (Krishnan, 2011: NP).

Chinese companies have agreed to construct bridges in PoK. A Chinese firm, CWE, has signed agreement to build a bridge on the Jhelum river in Mirpur. Cost of this project is \$22 million. The Xinjiang Road and Bridge Construction Company is indulged in the construction of five permanent bridges. Adding to this, the Xinjiang Surpass Mining Company Limited has undertaken the mineral exploration in the Satpara district of PoK and this company has also submitted another mining proposal of \$6 million. Moreover, Chinese companies are also working on a proposal of the construction of a railway line in Gilgit-Baltistan region that would connect Xinjiang and the Arabian Sea. Chinese companies have, even, completed a pre-feasibility study on the engineering and financial aspects of the project (Chansoria, 2010: 3).

China is also putting in an 85 percent investment in the construction of 165 kilometer long Jaglot-Skardu road and 135 kilometer long Thakot-Sazin road in the Gilgit-Baltistan region (Chansoria, 2010: 3). Beijing also plans a pipeline

to connect Xinjiang to Gwadar for transport of oil from the Gulf. As China is indulged in such activities in PoK with the consent of Pakistan, in Indian circles, it is observed that, by and large, Islamabad's strategy is to cede de facto control of Gilgit-Baltistan to Beijing to make it a 'stakeholder' in the Kashmir issue (Kapila, 2010: NP). Pursuing such strategy, Pakistan is, thereby, willing to convert a bilateral issue to trilateral issue giving a boost to China's grand strategy. After receiving the reports of Chinese companies' involvement in PoK, India, ahead of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao in Hanoi, had decided to 'blacklist' the China's companies indulged in the strategic infrastructural development in the PoK. New Delhi felt that such Chinese companies should not allowed to work in India (Times Now, 25 October, 2010: NP).

B) Influx of Chinese Troops: Apart from the Chinese involvement in construction and development projects, the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People's Liberation Army in PoK was also reported in August 2010. Selig S. Harrison, Executive Director of Washington-based think tank, Center For International Policy, in his article, "China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands", which was published in *The New York Times* on 26th August, 2010 cited the presence of PLA in the Gilgit-Baltistan (Harrison, 2010: NP). He reported that until recently these soldiers were lived in the temporary encampments. But after completion of their assignments, they were building big residential enclaves there which establish the China's design for a long-term presence of PLA soldiers in PoK. Harrison had also highlighted the issue of the construction of 22 tunnels in secret locations while raising the apprehensions that the said tunnel could be used for missile storage (Harrison, 2010: NP). Initially, China said that PLA troops are stationed in PoK solely for flood

relief efforts, but the construction of permanent residential enclaves for the PLA soldiers instead of the original temporary encampments that they used to live in indicates that PoK's guests from the East intend their stay to be more long-term in nature. This reflects that China's encroachment into PoK has other long-term ambitions besides its prospects of energy trade in Middle East and Central Asia (Bakshi, 2011: NP). In addition to this, possibility of PLA soldiers' involvement in assisting the Pakistan army in the suppression of Balawaristan movement of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan can not be ruled out.

The influx of Chinese troops in PoK was confirmed to Indian authorities by the US intelligence agencies. This was disclosed openly in April, 2011 by the Chief of the Northern Command, Lieutenant General K.T. Parnaik, when he said that "We have strong real time intelligence sharing mechanism with US and they have conveyed the same thing to Indian agencies including RAW – that these troops are stationed all along the LoC in PoK" (North Korea Times, 9 April, 2011). While answering to Lok Sabha, in April 2011, India's Defence Minister, A.K. Antony also acknowledged the Chinese presence in PoK. He said that India had conveyed its concerns to China and also asked Beijing Administration to stop its infrastructure development activities in PoK (News, 2011b: NP).

C) Controversial Visa Policy: China's controversial visa policy also reveals its strategy towards Kashmir. China had started to treat people of Indian Kashmir distinctly by issuing the stapled visas the treatment which it did not apply to the residents of PoK. Reportedly, the Chinese Embassy had started issuing stapled visa in May 2009 to the people from Indian Kashmir. These stapled visas were not recognized by the Indian immigration authorities. Indian authorities had said that by issuing such visas, China was refusing to recognize Kashmir as a part of India

and considering it as 'disputed territory' (Hussain, 2011: NP). Similar type of stapled visa was started to issue in January 2011 by China to residents of Arunachal Pradesh which Beijing refers to as "Southern Tibet". Chinese officials had even said that Beijing's policy of issuing stapled visas to "all disputed regions" was remained consistent and unchanged (The Hindu, 22 July, 2011).

Another matter related to China's visa policy was emerged in the mid-2010 due to Beijing's refusal to give visa to Lieutenant General B.S Jaswal, Army's General officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command because according to Beijing, he was responsible for "disputed" region of Jammu and Kashmir (Hindustan Times, 27 August, 2010). Interestingly, in the past China had not refused visa to the Army Commander who was also commanding troops deployed in Arunachal Pradesh an area which claimed by Chinese. Thus in Indian defence circles, denial of visa to Lieutenant General Jaswal was viewed a part of its grand strategy (Pradhan, 2010: NP). India had refused to recognize the China's stapled visas policy as it was questioning the Indian sovereignty over a particular region. Responding to the Chinese denial of visa to Army General, India had suspended defence exchanges with China (Hindustan Times, 27 August, 2010). These ties were resumed, after nearly a year long freeze, during the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Beijing in April 2011 as China agreed to give a "proper visa" to Major General Gurmeet Singh, who had to lead the 8 members Indian defence delegation to China. Major General Gurmeet Singh was also serving as the Commander of the Delta Force, a part of the specialized anti-insurgency Rashtriya Rifles deployed in the Jammu and Kashmir (Indian Express, 16 June, 2011).

D) Invitation to Kashmiri Separatist Leader: Beijing's changing attitude towards Kashmir considering it as "disputed territory"

has also given it a chance to interfere directly in the internal politics of Indian Kashmir in favour of secessionists as well as Pakistan. This is evident from the Chinese invitation to Kashmiri secessionist leader Mirwaiz Farooq to visit China for dialogue. Indian think-tanks are expecting "greater Chinese interference" in this field. Thus it would be a challenge for the Indian intelligence agencies to keep an eye on the Chinese intelligence penetration in the Kashmir secessionist movement and its connections with the Kashmiri separatist leaders. In the India's strategic circles, this move has been observed as that China is signaling New Delhi to lay off Tibet and not to dabble in Tibet affairs (Kapila, 2010: NP).

All these Chinese activities in PoK are contradictory to its declared stand on the South China Sea dispute. In a way, Beijing has itself disregarded its own policies in PoK by objecting to India's exploration activity in Vietnamese off-shore blocks in South China Sea where Beijing claims its "indisputable sovereignty" (Sibal, 2011: NP). If India can not explore the oil from the "disputed" South China Sea, then, how China can be indulged in various construction related activities and deploy its army in PoK?

Pakistani Perspective over the Beijing's Activities in PoK

Both Beijing and Islamabad have repeatedly refuted the Indian charges of its military encirclement by China in Kashmir. Infact, Pakistan views that India has its hegemonic intentions in the South Asian region and therefore, 'Pakistan-China friendship' is considered by India as source of threat to these intentions due to which New Delhi is leaving no opportunity in creating a wedge between Beijing and Islamabad. It is argued that for this India intentionally linked rioters in Kashgar and Hotan to Pakistan and then a negative opinion that Chinese Deputy Premier has visited to Pakistan to warn Islamabad

over terrorist being trained in its tribal areas was constructed by the Indian media. While reacting to New Delhi's claims in case of China's 'construction' and 'development' related activities in the PoK. In the official, academic and media circles of Pakistan, it has been opined that it is a 'trivial' issue which is being sensationalized by India. In the context of Chinese assistance to Pakistan in upgradation and expansion of Karakoram Highway (KKH), Ashraf Javed, a Pakistani analyst writes:

The Karakoram Highway is the lifeline that connects Gilgit-Baltistan from Kashgar, a city in the Xingjiang region of China, to Abbotabad. An extension of the highway south west from Abbotabad, in the form of N-35, meets the Grand Trunk Road, N-5 at Hassanabdal Pakistan that would finally link to the southern port of Gwadar in Balochistan through Gwadar-Dalbandin Railway. Chinese engineers and builders are in Gilgit-Baltistan region to help repair the Karakoram corridor which has been severely damaged by the earthquakes, floods and landslides (2011: NP).

Pakistan thinks that the KKH trade route agreement and the KKH project have alarmed many powerful economies. Besides, the Kashgar-Gwadar trade route affected the trade and economic interest of neighboring states of the region. According to Pakistani perspective, New Delhi alongwith Washington do not like Chinese working on developments in Pakistan and thus are creating such sensations (Javed, 2011: NP).

In the context of presence of Chinese army in PoK, Pakistan has denied the US reports as well as the Indian allegations. Infact, it has been argued that:

...the theme of Chinese troops presence in GB has been blown out of proportion so as to deny Chinese access to Karakoram. Indian strategists consider

that infrastructural improvements of the 'Karakoram Corridor' heralds a new phase of China flexing its muscles not only against India but more significantly against US in the wider global context. India's propaganda regarding ceding of the Gilgit-Baltistan to China is a dubious ploy to politically implant US against Pakistan that it is no longer a frontline state of US strategy. All this is aimed at undermining the strategic relationship between the two countries (Javed, 2011: NP).

In brief, Pakistan accepts the importance of KKH but denies the Chinese activities are aimed at to encircle India in Kashmir. Hence, it is being argued that New Delhi is propagating about "the presence of PLA soldiers" and "development of infrastructure in PoK" especially Gilgit-Baltistan to undermine the US-Pakistan relationship.

Gainer-Loser Syndrome

In the China's grand strategy, Pakistan, being its frontline state is emerging as the major beneficiary. Pakistan has achieved direct results in economic and military cooperation with China. China contributed \$20.5 million humanitarian aid to Pakistan for earthquake relief in 2005. China has entered into nuclear deal with Pakistan and provided two nuclear reactors. China has become Pakistan's second largest trading partner. Pakistan's major infrastructure and engineering projects are being done by the Chinese enterprises (Xiaoqiang, 18 May, 2011: NP). More than 200 Chinese companies involving 13,000 engineers and technicians are indulged in the various projects ranging from infrastructure, energy and agriculture to higher level of science and technology, finance and aerospace (Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2011: NP). Pakistan's annual bilateral trade with Beijing has exceeded rapidly from \$4.2 billion in

2005 to \$8.7 billion in 2011 and, both countries are committed to achieve the target of \$15 billion (Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2011a: NP and; Javed, 2011: NP). Its joint military manoeuvres have increased China. Through joint efforts, as a Pakistani analyst Ashraf Javed argues, these countries have successfully developed hi-tech military equipment such as K-8 jet trainers, type-2000 main battle tanks and the Xiaolong fighter jet. Pakistan is the largest arm receiver of China. China has agreed in May 2011 to provide 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter lanes to Pakistan Air Force with the possibility of J-20 Stealth and Xiaolong multi-purpose light aircraft in the pipeline (Javed, 2011: NP). In November, 2011, Pakistan concluded a joint military exercise named 'Friendship-IV with China. In this joint military exercise 260 Chinese troops and 280 Pakistan troops had participate. The exercise was fourth in the series and was another step towards better bi-lateral military cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad (Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2011b: NP).

China in its strategic partnership with Pakistan appears to be absolute gainer vis-a-vis India as it has been able to change geo-strategic equations in the region. Upgradation of KKH, development of roads and railway lines along with the construction of dams and tunnels and deployment of PLA soldiers in PoK make a grip of China on the strategic area while assuring it unfettered road and rail access to the Gulf through Pakistan. A reason behind the costly projects is commerce. Since Beijing has build ports in Gwadar and Ormara in the south-western Pakistan for transporting oil and gas from the Gulf and Africa through Xinjiang (Hasnain, 2011: NP). At present, it takes a Chinese tanker about 16 to 25 days to reach the Gulf. Nevertheless, after the completion

of road and rail links through Gilgit-Baltistan, China would be able to transport cargo to and from Xinjiang to Gwadar and to other Pakistani port facilities, within 48 hours (Harrison, 2010: NP). But, the upgradation of KKH and railway line would cut down the time which it takes to transport the resources from Gwadar to Xinjiang. China would be able to send its goods to the affluent Gulf market in within a short time of span through the same route. Besides its strategic stronghold and access to the Persian Gulf, it would be significantly able to influence the geopolitics and trade in the Indian Ocean Region and Central Asia (Chaudhari, 2011: NP).

China has also emerged as absolute gainer in terms of military perspective. After the completion of such strategic projects, China would weaken India's position on Kashmir and in the entire region by denying it's a strategic depth (Hasnain, 2011: NP). Reason being, improved roads and rail into Gilgit-Baltistan, along with a series of mountain tunnels, constitute military assets, forged through a region sensitive for India and even Russia (Dyer, 2011: NP). The KKH and other ongoing projects related to infrastructural development in PoK would enhance the China logistic capacity against New Delhi especially in terms of fuel supplies which is necessary to prosecute sizeable military operations against India in the western front opposite to the Ladakh region. In addition to this, as it has been apprehended by the New Delhi-based think tanks like Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), this can pose a combined China-Pakistan, the development of strategic infrastructure in PoK by China increases the threat of a combined China-Pakistan military activity against India. In such a case, the developing strategic infrastructure in Gilgit-Baltistan would facilitate speedy and enlarged Pakistan army deployments to complement China's military offence against

India in the Ladakh region (Kapila, 2010: NP and; Chaudhari, 2010: NP). The Chinese military deployment has its potential relevance to the coalition forces in Afghanistan and even, the Asian balance of power. Though, China is unlikely to indulge in any overt military action against the coalition forces in Afghanistan, yet it can make common cause with Pakistan in Kabul by backing or opposing local factions to induce an outcome which they consider favourable for both Beijing and Islamabad (Dyer, 2011: NP).

China's "high-stake poker game" in Gilgit-Baltistan has prospective disastrous environmental consequences for the whole of South and South East Asia. Syed Iqbal Hasnain, a glaciologist and Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Centre in Washington, DC, opines that construction of mega dams and building of roads and tunnels in this mountainous area is invitation to disaster. This is likely to enhance the seismic activities and exaggerate the glacier melt which are already occurring in the region. In 2005, more than 86,000 people were died in PoK just to the south of Gilgit-Baltistan as a result of an earthquake of 7.6 magnitudes. The epic centre of the earthquake was the border of Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan. This is location where Chinese companies are constructing the Diamer-Bhasha dam. The Diamer-Bhasha dam as a huge water reservoir inundating more than 100 miles of mountainous ravines in future would make earthquakes more probable as the still water induces increased seismic activities. As per the opinion of glaciologist Hasnain, the construction of mega dams in this region is also thoughtless because snow and glacier melt are the only source of all water in the region's rivers and rivulets. The melt depends on temperature. Consequently, water-level of the rivers and rivulets fluctuate constantly. In case of a glacier lake bursts out due to excessive glacier melt or seismic activity, dam water would be over-

tapped. In case of a huge flood resulting into large amount of debris and sediments getting deposited in the Dam may threaten its long term stability. Construction of Dam also demands human costs. The Diamer-Bhasha Dam with a proposed height of more than 250 meters would displace tens of thousands of people and submerge habitable areas and thousands of acres of agricultural land. This would also lead to the loss of countless archaeological relics (Hasnain, 2011: NP).

Black carbon is the second leading contributor to climate change. Along with the increased civil human activities and huge deployment of military, the presence of Black carbon is already leading to the high deglaciation rate in the western Himalayas. The upgradation of KKH and construction of railway line and tunnels are also bound to intensify the glacier melting and endanger the infrastructure of the region (Hasnain, 2011: NP). Glaciologist's analysis establishes that most of the economic benefits of these projects would be for China and other provinces of Pakistan and not for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Therefore, in brief, China is absolute gainer vis-a-vis India as well as US in the Asian continent. China's upgradation of the Karakoram Corridor on Pakistan's behalf enables China's strategic outreach to the North Arabian Sea and the Gulf. Building oil and gas pipelines through this Corridor would strengthen the Beijing's military postures in Western Tibet and Xinjiang against India. This would also be instrumental in countering the NATO's creeping influence in the China's peripheries. In this overall scenario, Washington and New Delhi are the main losers vis-à-vis China-Pakistan cooperation in global and regional contexts.

India's Counteractions

Amid the growing concerns over the Beijing's assertive behaviour and its change

in policy towards New Delhi's dispute with Islamabad over Kashmir, India is taking different counter-measures to thwart any Chinese or joint Sino-Pak military move against it. New Delhi has raised two new mountain divisions of 36,000 troops each. Two new battalions of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim scouts comprising 5,000 locally recruited troops are also being raised with plans for a new mountain strike corps and third artillery for the area. Indian air force has begun to deploy two squadrons of Su-30MKI aircraft to Tezpur air base, close to the Line of Actual Control with China. India has upgraded airstrip in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir bordered PoK. It is also upgrading six airstrips in Arunachal Pradesh. Further, along with the acquisition of AWACS aircraft and ground-based air defence close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), New Delhi has bolstered its security with 19 low-altitude transportable medium-power radars (News, 9 March, 2011). The Indian navy also plans to strengthen its eastern fleet by basing an aircraft carrier in the Bay of Bengal. India has stepped up its naval interactions with the US and with South-East and East Asian states. An increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean is being countered by bilateral Indian naval exercises with Singapore and Vietnam in the South China Sea and with the US and Japan off Okinawa (News, 9 March, 2011a).

Adding to this, further, in December, 2011, Indian navy has received a Russian 'Nerpa' nuclear submarine rechristened as 'INS Chakra' on lease for ten years worth \$920 million. The submarine is capable of remaining underwater for months. The Nerpa is an Akula-II class attack submarine. The Akula-II class submarines are equipped with 28 nuclear-capable cruise missiles with a striking range of 3,000 kilometers. The Indian version is expected to be armed with 300 kilometers club nuclear-capable missiles. With

this addition, India has become only the sixth operator of nuclear submarine in the world (Press Trust of India, 2011: 16).

Apart from military capabilities, India is far behind from China in terms of the development of strategic infrastructure. Therefore, understanding this weakness, at the moment, apart from the enhancement of its military capabilities, New Delhi has also started to focus on the construction of strategic infrastructure that may be used for dual civil and military purpose. Irrespective of difficult terrain and topography of Kashmir, India has initiated various projects to connect Kashmir with the other parts of the country. Apart from widening the existing roads and repairing/constructing the bridges, India has planned to create a statewide network of railway line. On 4th January, 2012, Indian government sanctioned an amount of 19,000 crore rupees for the Udhampur-Baramulla section of the railway project which is scheduled to be completed in 2017. Earlier, work on 119 kilometer long Qazigund-Baramulla section was completed in 2009. Besides this, works of the Udhampur-Katra section of 25 kilometers and the Katra-Qazigund section of 148 kilometer distance will be completed in 2013 and 2017 respectively. The Jammu-Udhampur section of 54 kilometer long distance was operationalized in 2005. The Qazigund-Srinagar-Baramulla stretch was also commissioned in 2009. The completion of excavation work for the 11 kilometer long tunnel, the longest in the country, through the Pir Panjal Mountains in October, 2011, was a landmark in the efforts of Indian state towards the development of infrastructure in Kashmir. This tunnel runs below the existing Jawahar tunnel and will reduce the traveling distance between Banihal and Qazigund from 35 kilometer to 11 kilometer only (Service, 2012: 6). Thus, India's attempts to enhance the military capability and projects related to strategic infrastructure in

Kashmir could be seen as the counter-measures to the Sino-Pak nexus on Kashmir.

Conclusion

In nutshell, one can argue that China perceives India, apart from the US, as a threat to its influence at regional and global level. Beijing Administration, in its grand strategy, is eager to revision the international system while containing the US unipolarity and establishing itself as a global power. The emergence of India as an important player in international relations and its natural predominance in the South Asian affairs is difficult to digest for China. China considers India as its rival in South Asia, South East Asia and even in the Middle East and thus, is pursuing a policy of encirclement to contain the rising India. Pakistan, due to its hostile relations with India, is a compliant to the Beijing's strategy towards India. Beijing and Islamabad have formed strategic nexus vis-à-vis New Delhi. During the Cold War era, China used Pakistan as a 'spoiler state' in the South Asian region to deny India its natural dominance in the area. China gave conventional arms and nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan and supported its political perspective on the various international foras. In return, Pakistan also supported Beijing on the issue of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjinag. Since India has entered into nuclear deal with the US, the US-Pak relations have soured continuously on various issues such as the Pak support to terrorism, violation of Pak sovereignty by the US or killing of Pak soldiers by the US led NATO forces. These events have increased dependence of Islamabad on Beijing vice versa Beijing has transformed Islamabad into a frontline state against India. China has also changed its Kashmir policy in collaboration with Pakistan against India. Beijing is aimed at to encircle India in the context of Kashmir and hence it has integrated Kashmir in its

grand strategy. Islamabad Administration is facilitating the Beijing to pursue its strategy. Its presence in the PoK especially Gilgit-Baltistan at large scale makes it an interested party to the 'dispute'. Pakistan is also willing to convert bilateral dispute into trilateral issue to boost the China's grand strategy and to put psychological pressure on New Delhi. China's involvement in the construction and development of strategic infrastructure including the upgradation of KKH, creation of a railway line in the area to strengthen links with Xinjiang and construction of hydro-projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan would enhance economic as well as strategic benefits of China and Pakistan vis-à-vis India. It will enhance the China's strategic outreach to the North Arabian Sea and the Gulf. Building oil and gas pipelines through this Corridor would strengthen the Beijing's military postures in Western Tibet and Xinjiang against India and would be instrumental in countering the

NATO's creeping influence in the China's peripheries. Deployment of PLA troops in PoK is not a positive sign for India. Adoption of visa related controversial policy towards the Indian part of Kashmir and invitation to India's Kashmiri separatist leaders also establish the ill-intentions of the Beijing. Apart from India, people of Gilgit-Baltistan will also be losers as the PLA army can be used to assist the Pak army in the suppression of Balawaristan movement by Islamabad. In long term, mega projects and other human activities in PoK are also incorrect from environmental perspective as these would bring disastrous results at the local, regional and extra-regional level. Though, India has emerged as prime loser in the context of Chinese inclusion of Kashmir in its grand strategy, yet it has also adopted certain counter-measures ranging from the enhancement of military capabilities to development of strategic infrastructure particularly in the Indian part of Kashmir.

References

- Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. (2011), "China's Grand Strategy and Money Muscle: The potentialities and Pratfalls of China's Sovereign Wealth Fund and Renminbi Policies", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 4.
- Chansoria, Monika (2010), "Red Footprints in Gilgit-Baltistan: China's Expanding Presence in PoK", *CLAW Issue Brief*, No. 22, December.
- Chaudhari, Anwesha Ray (2011), "India and the Pakistan-China Nexus in Gilgit-Baltistan", *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 16 March.
- Chellaney, Brahma (2011), "Stagecraft and Statecraft: China-Pakistan Strategic Ties Deepen", *Japan Times*, 9 June.
- Dyer, J.E.(2011), "China, Gilgit-Baltistan (Memorize it Now), and the Balance of Power in Asia", *National Defense*, 4 March.
- Editorial(2011), "Tasting the Chinese Warmth", *The Frontier Post*, 26 August.
- Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan(2011a), "Foreign Minister Khar meets Premier Wen, Foreign Minister Yang, 25 August.
- Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan(2011), "Remarks by H.E. Wang Chen Special Envoy of the Chinese Government and Minister of the State Council Information Office at the Reception of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan", 8 June available at <http://pk.chineseembassy.org>.

Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan(2011a), "Foreign Minister Khar meets Premier Wen, Foreign Minister Yang", 25 August available at <http://pk.chineseembassy.org>.

Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan(2011b), "Pak-China Joint Military Exercise 'Friendship-IV' Concludes", 25 November available at <http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbqx/t881213.htm>.

Feigenbaum, Evan A.(2011), "China's Pakistan Conundrum: The End of All-Weather Friendship", *Foreign Affairs*, December.

Ghosh, Dilip (2011), "China's Hidden Agenda in Gilgit-Baltistan", *The Northlines*, 6 January.

Goldstein, Avery (2002), "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice", *The China Quarterly*, Vol.168.

Harrison, Selig (2010), "China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands", *The New York Times*, 26 August.

Hasnain, Syed Iqbal(2011), "China building road to disaster in Gilgit-Baltistan", *Global India Newswire*, 11 February.

Hussain, Altaf (2011), "Row over China Kashmir Visa Move", BBC News, 1 October, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/8285106.stm.

Javed, Ashraf (2011), "Zionist State of India Alarmed By Sino-Pak Strategic relationship", available at <http://pakdefenceunit.wordpress.com/2011/10/30>, accessed on 10 December.

Jisi, Wang (2011), "China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April.

Kapila, Subhash (2003), "India Needs A Grand Strategy Towards China", *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper No. 841, 19 November.

Kapila, Subhash (2010), "China's Obtrusive Presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Implications for India and United States", *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper No. 4036, 13 September.

Kapila, Subhash(2002), "South Asia Conflict Resolution Impediments: An Analysis", *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper No.553, 25 November.

Krishnan, Ananth(2011), "Chinese firm signals interest in PoK dam project", *The Hindu*, 2 August.

News, Rediff (2011), "How India reacts to China's assertiveness?", 9 March.

News, Rediff (2011a), "Pakistan a Gainer", www.rediff.com, 9 March.

News, Rediff (2011b), "Chinese Troops in PoK a Matter of Concern: Antony", www.rediff.com, 12 October.

Pradhan, S.P. (2010), "Denial of Visa Part of China's Grand Strategy", *Times of India*, 29 August.

Press Trust of India(2011), "Russia 'hands over' N-sub to India", *The Tribune*, 31 December.

Rahman, Fazal-ur(2011), "Pakistan;s Evolving Relations with China, Russia and Central Asia", available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/11799077/Pakistans-Evolving-Relations-With-China-Russia-And-Central-Asia>.

Raina, J.N.(2009), "Gilgit-Baltistan rightly belongs to India", *Kashmir Herald*, 5 October.

Raman, B(2009), "China's growing role in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir", 28 August available at <http://news.rediff.com/column/2009/aug/28/raman-chinas-growing-role-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmir.htm>

Service, Tribune News(2012), "Centre approves Rs. 19,000 crore for railway project", *The Tribune*, 5 January.

Shaukat, Sajjad(2011), "Indian Intervention in Pak Northern Areas", *Indo-Pakistan Opinion Maker*, 21 February.

Sibal, Kanwal(2011), "China stance in East Asia at odds with PoK Policy", *India Today*, 11 October.

Sibal, Kanwal(2011a), "Dangerous Liasons: Pakistan-China nexus poses strategic threat to India", *Force Magazine*, December.

Times Now(2010), "China makes huge inroads in PoK", *Times Now TV*, 19 September.

Times Now(2010), "India to blacklist Chinese Companies in PoK?", *Times Now TV*, 25 October.

Wang, Fei-Ling(2005), "Preservation, Prosperity, and Power: What Motivates China's Foreign Policy", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 45.

Wang, Yuan-Kang (2006), "China's Grand Strategy and U.S. Primacy: Is China Balancing American Power?", *Brookings CNAPS Papers*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Watters, Stewart (2011), "China Encircles India", *The Diplomat*, 21 July.

Wirsing, Robert G.(2003), "The Enemy of My Enemy: Pakistan's China Debate", *Asia's China Debate*, Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies, December.

Xiaoqiang, Fu(2011), "China, Pakistan joined bands of brotherhood", *People's Daily Online*, 18 May.

Zahra, Imran(2010), "Gilgit-Baltistan: Strategic Borderlands for China, Pakistan, India and U.S.", *The 4th Media*, 22 October.

Большая стратегия Китая: Кашмир и Пакистан.

Пекин превращает Исламабад

из штата-спойлера в прифронтовой штат

Доктор Сунил Кумар

Отделение стратегических и региональных исследований,

Университет штата Джамму

Джамму-180 006-Джамму и Кашмир, Индия

Китай в сотрудничестве с Пакистаном включил Кашмир в свою большую стратегию по окружению Индии. Участие Пекина в различных мегапроектах в сфере строительства и развития стратегической инфраструктуры в Кашмире, оккупированном Пакистаном, (КОП), присоединение к Народной освободительной армии (НОА) в регионе Гилгит-Балтистан, принятие противоречивых визовых политик и приглашение в Индию Кашмирского лидера сепаратистов рассматриваются в официальных кругах Индии как окружение Индии Китаем через Кашмир. Во времена Холодной войны Пекин дал Пакистану статус «штата-спойлера», чтобы ослабить естественное доминирование Индии в Южно-Азиатском регионе. Тем не менее, сейчас мы наблюдаем, как Китай превращает Пакистан в «прифронтовой штат» с целью получить растущее влияние Индии на региональном и глобальном уровнях. В данном контексте Пекин использует Кашмир в качестве инструмента в своей стратегии;

действия Правительства Пекина в полной мере дополняются действиями Правительства Исламабада. Гилгит-Балтистан, где начинает формироваться антипакистанское движение в пользу Балаваристана, стал центром деятельности Китая. Согласно развивающемуся сценарию китайско-пакистанский узел становится победителем, а Индия, США и жители Гилгит-Балтистана - проигравшими. Китайско-пакистанское сотрудничество в Кашмире стратегически поставило Индию в невыгодное положение, а жителей Гилгит-Балтистана под угрозу подавления со стороны армии Пакистана и НОА. В долгосрочной перспективе мегапроекты и крупномасштабная человеческая деятельность в Кашмире, оккупированном Пакистаном, особенно в Гилгит-Балтистане, приведут к разрушению местной, региональной и межрегиональной окружающей среды. Индия принимает контрмеры от развития стратегической инфраструктуры до увеличения своего военного потенциала, чтобы предотвратить эту потенциальную угрозу.

Ключевые слова: Китай, Пакистан, Кашмир, КОП, Гилгит-Балтистан, Народная освободительная армия, виза, стратегия.
