

УДК 323.1(5491)

## **Layers of Anti-Americanism: American Unilateralism and Anti-Americanism: a Pakistani (Muslim) Perspective**

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Received 14.09.2014, received in revised form 08.10.2014, accepted 24.11.2014

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*Christopher Kremmer argues in his famous paper "American Empire: Politics and Culture in the 21st Century" that History will judge that America failed to define the nature of its new empire when it had the opportunity to do so after the end of the Cold War in 1991. It allowed bin Laden to define it for them. Meanwhile, the American emperor concentrated on settling a personal score with the leader of Iraq. (Kremmer, 2001)*

*The new American empire, born in the ruins of the twin towers, Afghanistan, and Iraq has yet to be formally announced. This may be due to the child's uncertain paternity. George Bush and Osama bin Laden can both credibly lay claims to be the father . . . as an empire, the US behaves much like other empires in the past. It's often said that it is a reluctant empire . . . . Nevertheless, imperial thinking permeates its foreign policy, especially towards the Middle East. (Ibid)*

*This paper investigates the perceptions of the United States in Pakistan. It distinguishes two types of attitudes, namely attitudes towards American culture and society and attitudes towards American policies. What is the image of the United States of America abroad? What opinion do foreign publics have of America, its citizens and its institutions, its ideals and its culture, its policies and its symbols? What attitudes do they have towards all things American? The main hypothesis that this paper seeks to test is whether attitudes towards America emerge as a consistent mind frame that manifests itself in a systematic patterns. Is anti-Americanism an ideational syndrome fostering a rejection of America on all its dimensions? Or is anti-Americanism a multi-faceted phenomenon, remarkable more for its ambivalent nature rather than its virulence? Seen in this perspective, the study of the image of America aimed at identifying whether different aspects of America are evaluated in a consistent manner, be that uniformly positive or uniformly negative, or whether patterns of inconsistencies populate the ideational reaction to America. Two dimensions are put under scrutiny in this study: a polity dimension, and a policy dimension. The first dimension refers to America as a societal, cultural, and political arrangement premised on freedom, opportunity, and individual achievement, while the second dimension is centered on the political actions the United States pursues in the international arena.*

**Keywords:** *United States of America, Pakistan, Islam, international relations.*

**Research area:** *politolology.*

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## Introduction

Emmanuel Todd writes in his book *"Après L'Empire"* "A single threat to global instability weighs on the world today: America, which from a protector has become a predator."

Over a half-century ago, the novelist Henry de Montherlant put the following statement in the mouth of one of his characters (a journalist): "One nation that manages to lower intelligence, morality, human quality on nearly all the surface of the earth, such a thing has never been seen before in the existence of the planet. I accuse the United States of being in a permanent state of crime against humankind." America, from this point of view, is a symbol for all that is grotesque, obscene, monstrous, stultifying, stunted, leveling, deadening, deracinating, deforming, and rootless.

The rise of anti-Americanism has been well discussed and documented in recent years among business leaders, governments and in public opinion surveys. The U.S. image has become such a problem in the aftermath of the start of the war on terrorism that the initial outpouring of sympathy for America and Americans seemingly disappeared.

Anti-Americanism is becoming a defining political issue in a world that is suffering not from a deficit of elections but from a deficit of politics. Nowadays democracies are societies with invisible enemies and unspoken dreams. Their economies may grow, but people still do not feel happier. In many places in the world, voters feel caught in a trap: They are free to dismiss governments, but they do not feel that they can influence policies. As a result, conspiratorial fantasies have replaced common sense as the basis for public deliberations. This hollowness of postideological and postutopian politics, its subversive dullness, is one of the major reasons for the seductive power of anti- American discourse. A Council on Foreign Relations report declared

that improving the U.S. image through public diplomacy is directly linked to the country's most fundamental national security needs.<sup>1</sup>

## *Definitional Problem of Anti-Americanism*

The definition of anti-Americanism will always be elusive. The label cannot and should not be applied to any vocal criticism of U.S. values or policies. Opposition to the policies of the U.S. government surely does not qualify as anti-Americanism. But opposing any policy simply because it is endorsed by the U.S. government comes close to being a definition. The trick is to distinguish the sometimes subtle difference between these two stances in real life and in real time. Anti-Americanism is a systemic opposition to America as a whole. It is a critique of the United States that transcends mere disagreement over specific policy questions or government decisions.

Anti-Americanism must be developed as a concept which entails and necessitates social and historical particularity in order to be anything but a form of reaction. (Michael Werz, 2004)

"Anti-Americanism" is a protest not against America itself but against its apparent failure to live up to its own ideals. In the words of Chalmers Johnson, "the suicidal assassins of September 11, 2001 did not attack America . . . they attacked American foreign policy." (Chalmers Johnson, 2002) America is hated for relying too much on its hard power. In the view of the Right, it is America's hesitancy to use its hard power that stimulates the rise of anti-Americanism. As Barry Rubin has written, "It has been the United States's perceived softness in recent years, rather than its bullying behavior, that has encouraged the anti-Americans to act on their beliefs." Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti- Americanism," Foreign Affairs 81 (November–December 2002)

Hostility toward the United States and its citizens is at least as old as Charles Dickens' portrayal of Americans in *Martin Chuzzlewit* (1843) as a collection of braggarts, buffoons, and charlatans.

Summed up in 1983: "The most telling generalization that can be drawn from the poll results is that Americans are seen as a good and productive people with an erratic or even dangerous government. And while the policies of the Reagan administration – like those of some of its predecessors – heighten skepticism about American power and intentions, the world guilelessly embraces America's products and popular culture."

A Pew Trust research poll<sup>2</sup> in 2005 concluded that anti-Americanism is deeper and broader now than at any time in modern history...the rest of the world both fears and resents the unrivalled power that the United States has amassed since the Cold War ended. In the eyes of others, the U.S. is a worrisome colossus: it is too quick to act unilaterally, it doesn't do a good job of addressing the world's problems, and it widens the global gulf between rich and poor. On matters of international security, the rest of the world has become deeply suspicious of U.S. motives and openly skeptical of its word. People abroad are more likely to believe that the U.S.-led war on terror has been about controlling Mideast oil and dominating the world than they are to take at face value America's stated objectives of self-defense and global democratization.

Martin suggests that **anti-Americanism** is a complex mixture of emotions, including envy and anger, provoked by a range of faults and offenses, both real and imagined.

Yannis A. Stivachtis argues in his recent article "Understanding Anti-Americanism" 2007 that three perspectives can be traced out of Anti Americanism i) power imbalances; power imbalances created insecurity and the politics of

cooperations started In addition, American political hegemony makes the U.S. a focal point for opposition since "Mr. Big" is never liked (Joffe 2001)

ii) globalization backlash; The expansion of capitalism through the process of globalization generates many problems. Those adversely affected by this process tend to resist it. According to Karl Polanyi (1957:219), an unregulated market violates deep-rooted social values and thus supports political resistance movements that demand effective protection. and Furthermore, the spread of American practices and popular culture is widely resented even by people who find aspects of it very attractive. The anti-Americanism generated by what has been termed "McWorld" is diffused and widely distributed in the world (Barber 1995).

iii) conflicting identities. In this view, anti-Americanism is generated by cultural and religious identities that are antithetical to the American values. As Seyla Behabib suggests, the products of American secular mass culture, which bring images of sexual freedom, female emancipation, and equality among the sexes into the homes of patriarchal and authoritarian communities, irrespective of religion, are a source of international value conflict and therefore generate antipathy and resistance (Benhabib 2002:251). In addition, religion has become a very important aspect in the lives of Americans. As a result, an important divide between the U.S. and its traditional European allies has been created on issues such as abortion, the death penalty, and the use of new biological technologies (Norris and Inglehart 2004:110). Moreover, the activities of Christian missionaries constitute a threat to the socialist type of Chinese capitalism, to Hindu radicalism in South Asia, and to Muslim fundamentalism throughout the Islamic world.

...The September 11 attacks and subsequent warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq

only amplified and deepened a new ideological constellation that did not develop in a historical vacuum but was a knee-jerk reaction to the political and cultural disintegration of the Eastern hemisphere after 1990. With the end of the Soviet Union even the most unattractive alternative to Western-style modernization had disappeared...The emerging political vacuum was filled with modern ideologies and distorted perceptions of a new world that had lost the stabilizing point of reference assured by the threat of mutual annihilation. And with no more points of orientation in sight, "America" became the cipher that granted sense (and power) to a senseless, unorderly world. Although it does not make much sense to speak of the "sole remaining superpower,"

### **Fear syndrome**

It has been argued that anti-Americanism is being used to create a "European" identity:

"No identity has ever emerged without an important counter-identity. Anti-Americanism thus enables the Europeans to create a hitherto missing European identity that must emerge if the European project is to succeed. This functional dimension of anti-Americanism is a key reason why among the two core proponents and protagonists of the European project – the French and Germans, though not only them – anti-Americanism has become such a central part of political discourse."

But this fear Syndrome also applies to American identity construction. The country got independence on the British fear, made progress in the wake of red fear and when she is unilateral in the world, she needs another fear to built national unity and 9-11 provided that fear in the shape of Islam. The enemy image now shifts from communism to Islamism. The divide for "us" and "Them" is now being presented as "US" and "them" in which "US" stands for America.

### **Types of Anti Americanism**

Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane present four kinds of Anti Americanism in their recent edited book "Anti-Americanisms in World Politics" (Cornell University Press), stating that Anti-Americanism is not a single, unitary phenomenon. Instead, Katzenstein and Keohane suggest there are four distinct strains.

The first, liberal anti-Americanism appears in democracies like France or England. Here opposition to American policies often involves the charge that the United States is being hypocritical by not living up to its professed values and ideals – values its critics share. When Europeans express outrage over the treatment of prisoners by US military personnel in Guantanamo Bay, or in secret detention centers abroad, these are examples of liberal anti-Americanism. How can a country that says it stands for freedom condone such obvious abuses of human rights?

The second strain, social anti-Americanism, comes from critics of the United States who are staunch supporters of the social welfare state, and thus oppose American economic policy because it promotes laissez-faire ideals and erodes welfare state protections. Social anti-Americanism is at play when Bolivian President Evo Morales, for example, rails against American-led globalization on the grounds that, among other things, it exposes people to the vicissitudes of the market.

More dangerous, according to the editors, are the two remaining strains. Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism, which may be found in parts of Latin America and Asia, involves opposition to American geopolitical and cultural dominance on the grounds that they are threats to national identity and strategic interests, as can be seen in Chinese saber-rattling over Taiwan. Radical anti-Americanism, meanwhile, of the kind typically associated with Islamic fundamentalism, holds, according to Katzenstein and Keohane that

"America's identity" must be transformed, either from within or without.

### **Connection between American Empire & Anti Americanism**

#### *The Return of Empire*

The notion of an American empire has become a central figure in contemporary, global political discourse. The dominant view, among those who used terminology like 'imperialism' and 'empire' at all, was of course to stress the informal and free trade character of American imperialism, driven above all by sectional economic interests, and to see the short burst of direct colonial conquest at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th centuries as a deviation from this, for specific short term reasons. Others, though, sought to place the supposedly short 'colonial moment' in a much longer trajectory – even, in the phrase which gave a title to one of the most powerful works making such a case, seeing 'empire as a way of life' across much of modern American history.

Henry Cabot Lodge, urging the seizure of Pacific islands in 1895, proclaimed: 'We have a record of conquest, colonization and expansion unequalled by any people in the 19th century. We are not about to be curbed now.'

Around the time of mid 20<sup>th</sup> century, attention began to focus ever more closely on relationships or parallels between declining European global power and increasing American strength. In 1953 (in a seminal article in the *Economic History Review*) Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher produced the most pervasively influential interpretation of Britain's 19th century expansion, and did so in large part under the prompting of their concerns about a new US informal empire, of which they saw the Marshall Plan as a key part, and which threatened (so they thought) to make Britain itself a semi-colony.

#### *Informal Empire*

The US has indeed ordinarily operated through what Robinson and Gallagher so influentially dubbed informal empire, not formal colonialism. US willingness to intervene directly with military force has, since the end of the cold war and more especially since September 2001, increased sharply. But most analysts concur that this is not likely to result in a disposition to maintain long-run occupation or establish permanent protectorates in the regions concerned.

Informal empire, in Robinson's words, operates through such means as:

"Coercion or diplomacy exerted for purposes of imposing free trading conditions on a weaker society against its will; foreign loans, diplomatic and military support to weak states in return for economic concessions or political alliance; direct intervention or influence from the export-import sector in the domestic politics of weak states on behalf of foreign trading and strategic interests; and lastly, the case of foreign bankers and merchants annexing sectors of the domestic economy of a weak state." ['Imperial Theory and the Question of Imperialism after Empire' in Robert F. Holland and Gowher Rizvi eds., *Perspectives on Imperialism and Decolonization* (Frank Cass, 1984)p. 48]

The ideology of American empire constitutes an entire world view. It includes perspectives on human nature, society, and politics, and it sets forth distinctive conceptions of its central ideas, notably what it calls "democracy," "freedom," "equality," and "capitalism." It regards America as founded on universal principles and assigns to the United States the role of supervising the remaking of the world. Its adherents have the intense dogmatic commitment of true believers and are highly prone to moralistic rhetoric. They demand, among other things, "moral clarity" in dealing with regimes that stand in the way

of America's universal purpose. They see themselves as champions of "virtue." In some form, this ideology has been present for a long time. The University of Chicago's Allan Bloom (1930–92) argued in his best-selling *The Closing of the American Mind* that what he called "the American project" was not just for Americans. "When we Americans speak seriously about politics, we mean that our principles of freedom and equality and the rights based on them are rational and everywhere applicable." (Allan Bloom, 1987) World War II was for Bloom not simply a struggle to defeat a dangerous enemy. It was "really an educational project undertaken to force those who did not accept these principles to do so." (Ibid)

Deepak Lal<sup>3</sup>, argues only hesitation is that America may try to make the world over in its own image in the pursuit and maintenance of its empire. He says, "The so-called universal values being promoted by the West are no more than the culture-specific, proselytizing ethic of what remains at heart Western Christendom," including the "Western value" of liberty. But "many civilizations have placed social order above this value, and again it would be imperialistic for the West to ask [other cultures and religions] to change their ways." He fears that "if the West ties its moral crusade too closely to the emerging processes of globalization and modernization, there is the danger that there will be a backlash against the process of globalization." And this "potential cultural imperialism poses a greater danger to the acceptance of a new Pax America in developing countries, particularly Muslim countries" than any other basis for resisting America's political and military dominance around the world. But for discussing what America's purpose is in having and managing a global empire, Lal concludes that a good beginning "would be the acceptance in domestic politics that the U.S. is an imperial power."

Andrew Bacevich "coherent grand strategy," an underlying purpose to American diplomacy:

That purpose is to preserve and, where both feasible and conducive to U.S. interests, to expand the American imperium. Central to this strategy is a commitment to global openness – removing barriers that inhibit the movement of goods, capital, ideas, and people. Its ultimate objective is the creation of an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms.

Amy Chua argues in her famous book "The World on Fire" that By contrast, the version of capitalism being promoted outside the West today is essentially laissez-faire and rarely includes any significant redistributive mechanisms. In other words, the United States is aggressively exporting a model of capitalism that the Western nations themselves abandoned a century ago.... It is critical to recognize that the formula of free market democracy currently being pressed on non-Western nations – the simultaneous pursuit of laissez-faire capitalism and universal suffrage – is one that no Western nation ever adopted at any point in history.

The US double standard in its policies aims at serving various political and economic groups in the country. The real power in the country is, apparently, not with the president who is just a tool in the hands of mighty economic powers. The people have the responsibility to make the administration and the Congress behave with accountability. It is the people who should find out the reason why the world hates the US. It should be done without any fear of the Zionist lobbyists and Christian fundamentalists. Then only the American citizens will be able to move freely and safely anywhere in the world.

### **Post-9/11 Public Opinion toward Islam and Muslims in the United States**

*"The image of the United States has deteriorated significantly abroad since 2001; particularly in the Muslim world...The spread of anti-American feeling in the Islamic world is a serious problem for the United States. The growth of hostility to America in Muslim countries increases recruitment and support for extremism and terror."* (Carl Robichaud and Rachel Goldbrenner, 2005)

Despite the many laudable values and principles underlying Islam (al-Shahīd 1987; Haneef 1993), since September 11th many Americans have come to see Muslims as dangerous, violent, and hateful fanatics according to several different polls. For example, a national Cornell University poll conducted in November 2004 found that 49 % of Americans described Islamic countries and peoples as violent, 47 % as dangerous, 45 % as fanatical, and 35 % as hateful (Nisbet and Shanahan 2004). Likewise, a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey about 18 months later (May 2006) also found 45 % of Americans describing Muslims as violent, 45 % as fanatical, and 35 % as arrogant. Lastly, a Gallup Organization survey of 1,004 national adults in mid- to late-December 2005 found that 33 % of the respondents named extremism, radicalism, and close mindedness as the "least admired" characteristics of Muslims or the Muslim world. Conversely, on the same poll, 52 % of the respondents replied "nothing" or "don't know" when asked what they "admire most" about Muslims.

Polls have used a method for measuring an individual's knowledge about Islam that fits the demands of telephone surveys. It is fast, very simple, and easily coded and tabulated, but remains debatable as to how adequately it

assesses complex phenomena. This method asks the respondent two fact-based questions. Does the respondent know the name of the Muslim holy book (Quran) and the name used by Muslims for God (Allah)? Using these measures, four surveys taken from March 2002 through July 2005 show that about 42 % to 63 % of American adults knew that the Koran is the correct answer and 45 % to 65 % knew Allah is the correct answer. There is a slight trend toward improvement over time.

American adults have also been asked for assessments of their personal knowledge concerning Islam and Muslims' religious beliefs. Results varied from 25 % who felt knowledgeable in November 2000 to 40 % in March and September 2006. However, the trend is not linear. Generally, these results represent rather modest levels of American public knowledge about Islam and Muslim religious beliefs, seemingly not much affected by the events of 9/11 in 2001 or the subsequent concerns about terrorism. Cohen (2006) called these findings "troubling," noting that Islam is the world's second largest religion, the faith of choice for a fifth of the world's population.

Several other polls since September 11<sup>th</sup> have also shown that substantial portions of the American public believe that a majority of Muslims are hostile toward the United States. Immediately after the September 11th attacks, an ABC News poll found that 55 % of Americans believed that a majority of Arabs and Muslims had a negative opinion of the United States. A Harris poll from the same period found that 50 % and 42 % of Americans, respectively, believed that Arabs and Muslims sympathized more with the September 11th terrorists than the United States. A December 2001 Newsweek poll found that these perceptions extended to Muslim American leaders, with 40 % of respondents believing that Muslim American leaders had not done enough to support the United States and oppose terrorism

since the September 11 attacks. Thirty-percent of Americans also believed that most or all Muslims admired bin Laden according to a March 2002 Gallup poll.

The "Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus" survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in the Summer of 2003 found that large portions of the American public associate Islam with violence and believe that at least half of Muslims worldwide hold anti-American view. Andrew Kohut (2003), director of the Pew Research Center, reached a gloomy conclusion: "True dislike, if not hatred, of America is concentrated in the Muslim nations of the Middle East and in Central Asia, today's areas of greatest conflict"

Anti-Americanism is a far from homogenous phenomenon, even in the Islamic world, where the press would sometimes want to convince us that a near-unanimous hostility to the United States exists. The key determinant is US foreign policy.

In the October 28, 2001, Washington Post, Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. representative to

the United Nations, argued: "If we fail to convince Muslims that this is not a war against Islam but a war against terrorism, if bin Laden succeeds in defining the struggle in his own terms, then he will have succeeded in his goal. ... Even in death, bin Laden could well spawn a new generation of dedicated, fanatical terrorists if his message takes root. The battle of ideas therefore is as important as any other aspect of the struggle we are now engaged in. It must be won."

**For Salhi, H. (2005)** Four failures have sullied America's image in the Muslim world, namely 1) mishandling the Arab – Israeli conflict by failing to play an honest broker in the peace negotiation processes; 2) mishandling Iraq by initially refusing to act in concert with the United Nations and later occupying Iraq and violating basic human rights principles; 3) mishandling Islam by portraying it as a religion of hate associated with terrorism, and seemingly blaming all Muslims for the 9/11 terror attacks; and 4) mishandling democratic change throughout the Arab world by consistently promoting the status quo and supporting authoritarian regimes.

	A GREAT DEAL/ FAIR AMOUNT	U.S. CONSIDERS NOT MUCH/ NOT AT ALL	OTHERS DON'T KNOW/ REFUSED
U.S.	70	27	3
Great Britain	36	61	3
Morocco	34	57	8
Germany	29	69	2
Russia	20	73	2
Jordan	16	77	7
Pakistan	18	48	34
France	14	84	2

Source: Pew Global Attitudes, March 2004




## Perceived Popular Views of September 11 Attacks

	MOST/MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE	
	U.S. POLICY CAUSED ATTACKS	GOOD FOR U.S. TO FEEL VULNERABLE
	%	%
U.S.	18	n/a
Total non-U.S.	58	70
Western Europe	36	66
E. Europe/Russia	71	70
Latin America	58	71
Asia	60	76
Mideast/Conflict Area	81	65
All Islamic states	76	73


Source: Survey of Opinion Leaders, Pew Global Attitudes, December 2001

## Sincerity of U.S. War on Terrorism



Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

## What Are America's Motives?




Questions asked of those who believe the war on terrorism is not a shrewd effort, or who have mixed views. Percentages show the portion of the total population who believe each is an important reason the United States is conducting the war on terrorism. Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

### The World Likes American Popular Culture ...

	LIKE	DISLIKE	DK/REF.
	%	%	%
<b>NORTH AMERICA</b>			
Canada	77	17	6
<b>WESTERN EUROPE</b>			
Great Britain	76	19	5
Germany	66	29	5
France	66	32	3
Italy	63	29	9
<b>EASTERN EUROPE</b>			
Poland	70	22	8
Bulgaria	64	25	11
Czech Republic	59	37	4
Slovak Republic	58	39	3
Ukraine	55	42	3
Russia	42	50	9
<b>CONFLICT AREA</b>			
Lebanon	65	34	1
Uzbekistan	51	44	5
Turkey	44	46	10
Egypt	33	57	10
Jordan	30	67	3
Pakistan	4	79	17
<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>			
Venezuela	78	20	2
Honduras	71	25	4
Guatemala	70	26	5
Brazil	69	29	2
Mexico	60	30	10
Peru	46	43	11
Bolivia	39	54	7
Argentina	52	38	10

2002 Pew Global Attitudes Survey



Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

### Anti Americanism in Pakistan

What explains this turn around in public sentiments toward the United States? The reasons for this Pakistani disenchantment with Washington are varied and complex. The overarching reason is the transactional nature of ties between Islamabad and Washington. Rather than valuing Pakistan as an ally in its own right, Washington has taken an instrumental view of Pakistan. In the early 1950s, strategic links were forged with Pakistan with the sole aim of using the country as a bulwark against the threat of communist expansion in Asia. Pakistani concerns relating to Kashmir and the threat from India were never accorded a strategic priority by Washington. Pakistanis felt “let down” and “betrayed” after the United States suspended aid during the 1965 India-Pakistan war. Pakistani efforts to cultivate China as a strategic ally in the mid-1960s were also disapproved by Washington due to strained Sino-American ties. The United States used Islamabad as an intermediary for its historic opening to China but failed to prevent the disintegration of Pakistan following the 1971 India-Pakistan war.

Regarding the basis of hate towards the US, Professor Hamid Kizilbash’s paper in 1988 stated that Pakistanis give three kinds of reasons for negative feelings about America. One involves U.S. policies toward Pakistan such as failure to come to Pakistan’s aid during the Bangladesh crisis, using Pakistan for its own interests, and opposition to Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear program. A second deals with American global

policy, including support of Israel, opposition to Iran’s present government, and use of force against small Third World nations. The third includes American involvement in Pakistan—for example, support of the military regime, obstructing a settlement of the Afghan issue, and responsibility for the decline in the value of the local currency.

Roughly three-in-four Pakistanis (74 %) consider the U.S. an enemy, up from 69 % last year and 64 % three years ago. And President Obama is held in exceedingly low regard. Indeed, among the 15 nations surveyed in both 2008 and 2012 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pakistan is the only country where ratings for Obama are no better than the ratings President George W. Bush received during his final year in office (for more, see “Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted,” released June 13, 2012). Moreover, roughly four-in-ten believe that American economic and military aid is actually having a negative impact on their country. Additionally, over the last few years, Pakistanis have become less willing to work with the U.S. on efforts to combat extremist groups. While 50 % still want the U.S. to provide financial and humanitarian aid to areas where extremists operate, this is down from 72 % in 2009. Similarly, fewer Pakistanis now want intelligence and logistical support from the U.S. than they did three years ago. And only 17 % back American drone strikes against leaders of extremist groups, even if they are conducted in conjunction with the Pakistani government.

Opinion of U.S. Worsens in Pakistan

	1999/ 2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Views of U.S.	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Favorable	23	10	13	21	23	27	15	19	16	17	12	12
Unfavorable	--	69	81	60	60	56	68	63	68	68	73	80
Don't know	--	20	6	18	18	17	16	17	16	16	16	9

1999/2000 survey trend provided by the U.S. Department of State.

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### **Root Causes of Anti Americanism**

#### *U.S. PRESENCE AS A SOURCE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM*

There is prima facie evidence that increasing foreign investment and trade concentration are likely to give special economic benefits to certain families, groups, and social sectors at the expense of others and to generate pressures on government officials to play by the rules of the international capitalist financing and market system rather than by indigenous rules. At the group level, one of the basic arguments is Coser's theoretical formulation of Simmel's speculation to the effect that "struggle groups may actually search for enemies with the deliberate purpose or the unwitting result of maintaining unity and internal cohesion" (Coser, 1956: 110).

#### *At Least 700 Foreign Bases*

It's not easy to assess the size or exact value of US empire of bases. Official records on these subjects are misleading, although instructive. According to the Defense Department's annual "Base Structure Report" for fiscal year 2003, which itemizes foreign and domestic U.S. military real estate, the Pentagon currently owns or rents 702 overseas bases in about 130 countries and has another 6,000 bases in the United States and its territories. Pentagon bureaucrats calculate that it would require at least \$113.2 billion to replace just the foreign bases – surely far too low a figure but still larger than the gross domestic product of most countries – and an estimated \$591,519.8 million to replace all of them.

#### *"Footprint" on the World*

Of all the insensitive, if graphic, metaphors we've allowed into vocabulary, none quite equals "footprint" to describe the military impact of our empire. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers and senior members of the Senate's Military Construction Subcommittee

such as Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) are apparently incapable of completing a sentence without using it. Establishing a more impressive footprint has now become part of the new justification for a major enlargement of our empire – and an announced repositioning of our bases and forces abroad – in the wake of our conquest of Iraq. The man in charge of this project is Andy Hoehn, deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy. He and his colleagues are supposed to draw up plans to implement President Bush's preventive war strategy against "rogue states," "bad guys," and "evil-doers." They have identified something they call the "arc of instability," which is said to run from the Andean region of South America (read: Colombia) through North Africa and then sweeps across the Middle East to the Philippines and Indonesia. This is, of course, more or less identical with what used to be called the Third World – and perhaps no less crucially it covers the world's key oil reserves. Hoehn contends, "When you overlay our footprint onto that, we don't look particularly well-positioned to deal with the problems we're now going to confront."

According to an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll, released on April 26, 2007, some 78 % of Americans believe their country to be headed in the wrong direction. Only 22 % think the Bush administration's policies make sense, the lowest number on this question since October 1992, when George H. W. Bush was running for a second term – and lost. What people don't agree on are the reasons for their doubts and, above all, what the remedy – or remedies – ought to be.

#### *Hypocrisy of USA*

Failure in assisting Pakistan at an hour of need or taking action aimed at weakening Pakistan at such times has played an important role in determining the feeling of Pakistanis. Friendship is rated highly in Pakistan, and the conventional code requires that one drop everything and come

to the aid of a friend in distress. Both the ban on supply of spare parts during the 1965 war with India and the failure to assist during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971 are viewed as betrayals of friendship.

### *Subverting Democracy*

A lot of Pakistanis are offended by the American support of autocratic and military regimes. They hold America responsible for maintaining Zia ul-Haq, Ayub and now Musharraf regime in power and condemn America for doing so.

Another side of the same coin is feeling that no one in Pakistan can hope to come to power without U.S. approval.

Battah, A. M. (2005) argued that a long history of rivalry between the Christian and Islamic worlds as well as more recent European and American hegemony in the region have created an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust that is ever present in interactions of both sides.

Mushahid Hussain argued in 2001 that the problem is that American goodness is hardly ever exported, remaining confined to its shores. This gap between what American says at home – liberties, rule of law and democracy – is rarely practiced in American foreign policy. He further stated that it was American policies in the wake of WWII which created ambiguity about the United States' intentions. Then there were two events which were to prove a forerunner of the emerging patterns of American policy: the first successful CIA coup against a popular, democratic government because it was perceived to be acting contrary to U.S. economic interests, DR Mossadeq in Iran in 1953.

A decade later, the CIA engineered the ouster and assassination of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem, a friend and ally of the United States simply because he had outlived his utility to American interests.

From ousting an elected nationalist to killing a friend, the U.S. persona was now being defined as an amoral, ruthless power whose foreign policy instruments were capable of anything, irrespective of friend or foe. It was perhaps in this context that DR Henry Kissinger once remarked, "To be an enemy of America can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal." (Ibid)

### *Undermining democracies*

American support for the anti-communist government of George Papadopoulos in Greece (1967-1974), which many regarded as an oppressive military dictatorship and which impelled many prominent Greeks to flee Greece, has been a source of bad will across Europe. It is often held to have contributed to the split in NATO and the European Union over the US-led invasion of Iraq.

The United States was also criticized for meddling in the internal politics of some of its democratic allies. For instance, the US government funded some French unions through the National Endowment for Democracy, including some with links to far-right violent groups.

America has frequently supported undemocratic governments, coups, or insurgent movements in Latin America – e.g. Guatemala, Honduras with John Negroponte – and has on many occasions even invaded Latin American countries for the stated reason of preventing the spread of Communism in the Americas or of stemming the drug trade. This self-appointed role as regional power has roots that go back to the Monroe Doctrine from 1823.

Politico-economic anti-Americanism represents a reaction to current US foreign policies: support for Israel or for repressive governments in the Middle East; the US's role in the Balkans; its embargo on Iraq and Cuba; the lack of support for the Kyoto protocol on climate change or for the establishment of the international criminal court.

US economic policies also draw fire, whether for limits on imports from poor countries or for the use of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to advance US interests.

Both before and after it became the most powerful nation in the world, America has opposed and attacked governments and countries, which often have led to long-lived anti-American sentiments, not only in the attacked countries but also in those which feel threatened by American power. In Canada, for example, anti-American sentiment was strengthened by the War of 1812. The scope and scale of interference in the affairs of other countries itself has angered many. It was often perceived as an illegitimate interference with the politics of other countries, often with a hegemonic attitude, particularly in Latin America and the Philippines (Philippine-American War)

America's role in the Vietnam War also created extensive anti-American sentiment in many countries because of the massive civilian casualties. During this war, the U.S. conducted massive bombing campaigns against Cambodia; an estimated 600,000 civilians were killed, reminding many of the controversial use of the atomic bombs at the end of World War II in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The also used chemicals for deforestation that had devastating long-term environmental effects.

#### *Foreign policy as crucial Source*

It is often said that U.S. foreign policies are inconsistent. One example is Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who was supported and supplied by the U.S. during the war against Iran in the 1980s. When the Senate passed a bill to condemn the Iraqi use of poison gas, then-president Ronald Reagan threatened to veto the bill if it passed the House. Later U.S. presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush fought two wars against Hussein.

Amr Moussa told the conference that most Arabs do not hate the United States but oppose its double standards.

"Muslims cannot accept the US policy of supporting Israel and its occupation of Arab and Muslim territories," he said, adding that Arabs could also not understand Washington's opposition to Iran's nuclear program while Israel's was ignored.

Meanwhile, The Times of London reports that the largest survey of Muslims ever conducted shows that the war on terror has radicalized even well-educated Muslims to unprecedented levels.

Gallup's Centre for Muslim Studies in New York carried out surveys of 10,000 Muslims in ten predominantly Muslim countries. One finding was that the wealthier and better-educated the Muslim was, the more likely he was to be radicalized.

Shibley Telhami – a University of Maryland professor and a fellow of the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution – at a conference on America's relations with the Muslim world held in Doha, Qatar this past weekend. The survey, by Zogby International, was done in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

In these six "friendly" countries, only 12 percent of those surveyed expressed favorable attitudes toward the United States. America's leaders have surpassed Israel's as objects of anger. Asked which foreign leader they disliked most, 38 percent named George Bush; Ariel Sharon was a distant second at 11 percent; and Ehud Olmert was third with 7 percent.

#### *Relationship with Israel*

Another major cause of anti-American sentiment, especially in the Muslim world, is what many people around the world see as America's blind support for Israel.

American intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict is widely seen as being unfair and biased

towards Israel and against the Palestinians. There is also a widespread belief in the Muslim world that America's support for Israel was motivated by a racist bias against Arabs, Fundamentalist Christian bias against Islam, or that the American government was controlled by Zionists.

Another cause of resentment against America in the Middle East is that America supports regimes in many Middle-Eastern countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan that are unpopular with many people in those countries, and are seen as oppressive and tyrannical.

#### *International institutions*

America's treatment and use of international institutions such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization is often seen as self-serving and hypocritical in other countries. Critics point to non-payment of UN dues and refusal to heed to International Court of Justice decisions against America on the one hand, and to enthusiastic embrace of international trials against foreign war criminals and UN sanction mechanisms against official enemies on the other. America's veto power in the United Nations Security Council has repeatedly been used to prevent censure of Israel, thereby angering Arab countries and those supporting them in the Israel-Arab conflict. US unilateralism, or "going its own way" on issues varying from the International Criminal Court to the Kyoto Protocol (see below) is also a cause of criticism.

#### *American funding of paramilitary groups*

America has a history of supplying funds for paramilitary groups that are called freedom fighters by the donors and their allies, but regarded as extremists or terrorists by the victims and their allies. Such funding may be provided by the government, by private citizens, or by a combination of the two. The Contras in Nicaragua are an example of this.

Even a close ally like the United Kingdom has been the target of such action: there is a long history of Americans openly raising funds for both the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Real Irish Republican Army. Funds for these groups are commonly raised by Irish-Americans, such as (it has sometimes been alleged) members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, who feel a patriotic sense of involvement in The Troubles in Northern Ireland. (It should be noted that no American government has ever approved of or supported this activity, and that, in general, America has tried to help resolve problems in Ireland, rather than add to them.)

#### **The Politics of Economics**

Having achieved a "pre-eminence not enjoyed by even the greatest empires of the past," the US is focused on securing its power globally, through both military and market interventions. America's "war for freedom" or "war on terrorism" is at one with its expansionary goals for the market: open invasion in some places, and open markets everywhere! Successive US administrations have used the rhetoric of economic freedom and opportunity to describe this policy: "free trade," "liberalization," "deregulation," "globalization." It is pushed ~ when necessary at the point of a gun-for countries the world over. This is the new Monroe Doctrine, underlying the empire's foreign policy-that the United States will dominate affairs around the world-expressed here in terms of economics, with the ubiquitous military underpinnings left discreetly in the background, unspoken, because there is no need to speak of them.

Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, and member of the most elite organizations of the planet (Bilderberg, CFR, and Trilateral), explains American thought in a press club meeting of March 28, 1999:

For globalization to work, America can't be afraid to act like the almighty superpower that it is. The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist. McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonald-Douglas, the designer of the F-15, and the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technology is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

"Military forces with global reach, as demonstrated by bombing, serve the interests of the U. S. – based transnational corporations dominant in the globalization process, by showing what can happen to countries that are slow to open markets or to install friendly regimes in power. Using boycotts and bombs to punish "rogues" who somehow presume to control their own markets and resources has been an integral feature of U.S. and western policy since 1917. Periodic bombing forays also help justify the large military establishment and allow it to reduce old inventories and display and experiment with new weapons. (Edward S. Herman, economist, 2007)

Indian novelist and critic Amit Chaudhuri writes:

"America has been a great self appointed proponent of democracy the modern world, while in actuality it has treated it as a nuisance and an obstruction when it gets in the way of its self interest. It now justifies war by speaking of the will of the people but the will of the people in Palestine has for decades meant little more than the rubble of Palestine. In order to root out communism from Afghanistan, it armed a religious extremist group, and created in effect a Bhindranwale. For years, America's foreign policy has been concerned solely with extending its own sphere of influence whatever the cost. Only the American public can put pressure on and change, the aberrant policy: but the American public's main source of information about its country's foreign policy is Hollywood with its images of

terror and frightening rhetoric of good and evil." (Chaudhuri, 2001)

Ronald J Herring, Director of the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies at Cornell, said that "those who feel marginalized, betrayed, humiliated, or wounded by our power are not part of our inter subjective community. We are just beginning to come to terms with their anger, its distribution and root causes.

Seeking causes as ironically been portrayed as unpatriotic. The obverse is true: if we fail to understand causes we will as a nation exacerbate and replicate the threatening conditions that now afflict us. We will leave fear as a legacy for following generations."

### Conclusion

The contours of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship need to be unpacked in intellectual discourses through seminars and meetings. Besides the Pakistani opinion-makers, the country's youth in universities and schools and the media are the most important actors and need to be lured into constant dialogue. The value-added from such an exercise is well established. After all, one of the most successful visits—judged by the tone of the press coverage and the general sense on the Pakistani street—by an American official was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's October 2009 trip.

The principal reason was her decision to engage segments of Pakistani society otherwise believed to be pathologically opposed to virtually all U.S. actions.

Three main findings emerge from this study: first, ambivalence is a prominent feature of people's attitude towards America in the Islamic world. The general public loves America when America means democracy, movies, education, people, and science, but hates America, when America means foreign policies towards Arab nations, the Palestinians, and Iraq in fact in whole



Muslim world. But while this finding generalizes across the eight countries under investigation, differences still exist. Thus, a second finding is that popular opposition to America is greater in Iran and Egypt and little lower in Pakistan, Lebanon, and Indonesia. Nonetheless, there does not appear that systematically accounts for these discrepancies across countries: weak relations are found with respect to the friendliness of elite discourse and the similarity in the voting patterns at the United Nations, while the military, economic, and cultural relations with the United States are unrelated to what the mass publics think of America. It is people who are younger, speak languages, are non-Muslim, and are connected to the global information society through the internet and satellite television who are more likely to appreciate America on its cultural, political, and institutional dimensions, but not necessarily so, on the policy dimension. So, a pattern of differences, distinctions, and nuances informs the image of America as it is portrayed in mass survey data.

The PEW research institute report suggests that the two dimensions have been seen differently by the people in the survey countries. The mix feeling about polity and policy dimension represent mix feelings about the US. The main point on which people developed anti American sentiments is the US interference in the internal matters of a foreign country. Pakistani people

feel it more, as their country has been now twice subjected as "Front Line State" for American Interest.

There may be urgent need to understand the process of dialogue between two different civilizations i.e. Islam and the West. Home Bhahba s concept of "third space" may be good theory which can defuse both communities. For Homi Bhahba Third" refers to the constructing and re-constructing of identity, to the fluidity of space, to the space where identity is not fixed. In cultural studies, the term third space has gained prominence, primarily through the work of Homi Bhahba, who addresses the notion of identity. Third space is where we negotiate identity and become neither this nor that but our own. Third is used to denote the place where negotiation takes place, where identity is constructed and re-constructed, where life in all its ambiguity is played out. This term serves as a rebuttal or corrective to regulating views, and highlights a new way of seeing. Spivak(1990; 1999), Soja (1996), Gutierrez (1999), Hollinshead (1998), Routledge (1996), and Khan(2000) have all contributed to this discussion. The post-colonial construct of **third space** is a place of resistance, a place "imbued with intent, that attempts to challenge, change, or retain particular circumstances, relating to societal relations, processes, and or institutions" (Routledge, 1996, p. 415. n. 1)

<sup>1</sup> To view the Council on Foreign Relations report, see [www.cfr.org/pubs/Task\\_force\\_final2-19.pdf](http://www.cfr.org/pubs/Task_force_final2-19.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> The result of the poll can be seen on [www.people-press.org](http://www.people-press.org)

<sup>3</sup> Professor of international development studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. On October 30, 2002, he delivered a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., entitled "In Defense of Empires."

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## **Уровни антиамериканизма: американский унилатерализм и антиамериканизм: взгляд из Пакистана (мусульманское восприятие)**

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*В своей знаменитой книге «Американская империя: политика и культура в 21 веке» Кристофер Креммер пишет, что история рассудит, почему Америка не смогла определить природу своей новой империи, когда была такая возможность сразу после окончания "холодной войны" в 1991 г. Она позволила бен-Ладену определить ее за себя. Тем временем американский император сосредоточился на том, чтобы свести личные счеты с лидером Ирака (Креммер, 2001).*

*Новая американская империя, зародившаяся на руинах башен-близнецов, Афганистана и Ирака, еще не признана официально. Это может быть связано с неясностью источника ее происхождения. Как Джордж Буш, так и Осам бен-Ладен могут претендовать на то, чтобы называться ее отцом... Поведение США как империи очень похоже с другими империями прошлого. Часто можно услышать, что это вынужденная империя... Тем не менее внешняя политика страны находится под влиянием этого империалистического мышления, особенно по отношению к странам Ближнего Востока.*

*В статье представлено восприятие США в Пакистане. Рассматриваются два типа отношения к Соединенным Штатам, отношение к американской культуре и обществу и отношение к американской политике. Каков имидж Соединенных Штатов за рубежом? Как разные сообщества мира относятся к Америке, ее гражданам и учреждениям, ее идеалам и культуре, политике и символике? Каково их отношение ко всему американскому? Задача данной работы заключается в том, чтобы проверить основную гипотезу о том, что отношение к Америке имеет устойчивый характер, проявляющийся в систематических формах. Является ли антиамериканизм воображаемым синдромом, способствующим отвержению всего американского? Или же антиамериканизм представляет собой многогранный феномен, примечательность которого заключается скорее в его противоречивой природе, а не в вирулентности? Рассматривая антиамериканизм с этой точки зрения, данное исследование имиджа Америки направлено на выявление того, оцениваются ли различные аспекты Америки как постоянные, вне зависимости от того, является отношение к ним постоянно негативным или постоянно положительным, или же модели противоречий подпитывают воображаемое*

*отношение к Америке. В данной статье исследуются две плоскости: государственная и политическая. В государственной плоскости Америка рассматривается с точки зрения социальной, культурной и политической структур, в основе которых лежат принципы свободы, возможности, и личных достижений, в то время как в основе политической плоскости лежат политические действия Соединенных Штатов на международной арене.*

*Ключевые слова: Соединенные Штаты Америки, Пакистан, ислам, международные отношения.*

*Научная специальность: 23.00.00 – политология.*

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