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The Method of Clarification and the Figurative Language

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The article is devoted to the relations between the phenomenology and the rhetoric. Edmund Husserl some hundred years ago explored, described, and then used in his eidetic phenomenology the noteworthy ability of every author to create the imaginary objects by the ordinary words. Today we try to find out in the classical texts by Husserl the useful hint on where is the best way or method to pass through the words and to recover the possibility to see clear. Consequently, the aim of this article is to define and to describe the possible paths through the illusions of the so-called direct speech to the insight of the idea as it is. As long as the subject matter of the paper is the very transformative process that transmutes the existing words into the non-existing images, we must make a conclusion in a form of the choice. This choice is predetermined by own Husserl's description of the so-called «free variations in phantasy». We consider these variations to be the rhetorical resistance to the ordinary words, a kind of rubber that layer-by-layer moves forced or erased metaphors away.

Keywords: Rhetoric, eidetic phenomenology, evidence, phantasy, method of clarification, direct speech, figurative language.

Introduction

Despite the fact, that Husserl's theory of phantasy goes back to his early texts written before 1900 it is still worth looking at. The number of the publications of the last decades shows this judgment to be true. I urge that this interest attracted by the old, but not forgotten theory to be closely connected with the contemporary problems of the so-called «visual culture» and its impact over the social communication. The authors usually prefer to discuss the details of the different interpretations of the Husserl's method of clarification. I will try to pass from the reflections on method to the investigation of

the troublesome relations between the words used and the images produced.

Theoretical framework

Since Descartes evidence is one of the most important themes of all the tradition of the modern Western philosophy. In order to achieve both theoretical truth and practical validity the scientists or the philosophers have to provide their first principles to be evident. The way to the evident principles may seem rather simple: the one who wants to formulate them must simply doubt in every proposition that does not seem obvious or clear just from the beginning.

However, since the times of Franz Brentano and his disciples we know that this path leads to the painful question whether one evident statement may be more or less radical than the other one. In its turn the comparison between the equally evident but controversial statements throws us back to the new search for the method that make the gaze clear enough to see not the phantoms, but the things themselves.

Statement of problems

The philosophers of the last century as well as their predecessors in the previous centuries usually have dreamt about the solid foundations to load them with their extraordinary argumentation. They would have liked to deduce the necessary (or, at least, universally valid) conclusions based on the firm principles. They usually have sought for such clarity of vision, such focal point, or such concentration, which would have allowed seeing the things as they have been and thus have guaranteed the approach to the necessary (or at least conventional) truths in the course of further argumentation. A philosopher of nowadays has to provide the clear gaze, like that which had discerned his greatest predecessors, and only then he can turn to the conscious construction of the world, to the application of the rules of logic, to the struggle against his enemies with the help of all defensive and offensive techniques of eristic.

The stare becomes clear in two fundamentally different, though related, situations. One of them is the situation of naïve amazement, which Aristotle had determined in one of the well-known places of his *Metaphysics* to be the very first impulse for the philosophy: «For from wonder men, both now and at the first, began to philosophize» [Aristotle, 1896: 9]. The presence of a wonder makes the eyes to be widely opened, so there are no any obstacles for the look from the inside or for the light from the outside. Most intriguing for us, the philosophers, must be the

situation where this widely opened eyes shine on the face of the skilled or sophisticated person – would it be the philosopher or the scientist. How could they become so naïve as to see the light and to grasp what they have seen in the obvious statements? Is it necessary for the philosopher to come back to the primordial simplicity? Finally, closing this same passage into the circle, what is the relationship between these two situations, «naïve» and «sentimental»?

Methods

For sure, the philosophers need some kind of method to move from subtlety to simplicity or vice versa. In fact, here as elsewhere, it would be better to speak not about *methodos*, but about *hodos*. Once upon a time Richard McKeon stated that «“Method” (*methodos*) was used by Aristotle to signify a “path to” the investigation of a scientific subject matter or the solution of the scientific problem and he distinguished “methods” from “paths” or “ways” (*hodos*) constructed in universal arts for the statement of arguments or descriptions or accounts applicable to any problem or subject matter» [McKeon, 1987: 29]. The method makes the way straight because it appears to be the consequence of the rules. However, there are no any rules or even principles for the one who paves the path. On the pages of this article I will discuss some typical situations occurred when the philosopher smashes this way. I also take into account the fact that only the extraordinary popularity of the word «method» makes the philosophers to reflect on method even then they in fact look for the path.

Discussion

Edmund Husserl in the first and third books of his *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy* writes on the method of clarification as if it would be the path to the clarity. This method of

clarification is a way to fulfill the very goal of the phenomenology. «It must expose to its views events of pure consciousness as examples <and> make them perfectly clear; within the limits of this clarity it must analyze and seize upon their essences, trace with insight the essential interconnections, formulate what is beheld in faithful conceptual expressions which allow their sense to be prescribed purely by what is beheld or generically seen; and so forth» [Husserl, 1983: 150]. Therefore, the phenomenologist (or the contemporary transcendental philosopher) is the one who makes clear, analyzes, seizes upon, traces with insight, formulates in faithful expressions. He has to clothe some «events of pure consciousness» with the suitable words. Just from the beginning, there are two different problems to be stated: first of them is the clarification of the images while the second one is the choice of the words. If the philosopher tries to solve the first one, he will have to focus his gaze upon the subject matter and in doing so he himself or his gaze will move from here to there and then back, and back again.

In a way, the assertoric seeing and the apodictic intellectual seeing resemble each other. «We need a more universal term which encompasses in its signification both assertoric seeing and apodictic intellectual seeing» [Husserl, 1983: 330]. Everybody's gaze may grasp not only the surface details but also the general view without any details. However, this curious idler may not as well divert his thoughts from the details to see the general view. This is the task for the philosopher, and that is why we must make a distinction between the simple seeing and the intellectual contemplation. The philosopher, or apodictic intellectual seer, looks not for the best sightseeing place but for the insight. He focuses not upon all the changeable details but upon the unchanged general view. The phenomenologist, or the philosopher of these days, undertakes the

serial movements from one degree of clarity to another to find out his own place in the nearness of the essence. Husserl wrote: «...[J]ust as there is for the moment corresponding to it in the individual there is for any essence an *absolute nearness*, so to speak, in which its givenness, compared to the series of degrees of clarity, in an absolute – i.e., a *pure* givenness of it itself»¹ [Husserl, 1983: 153]. Everybody knows these serial movements as the movements of a wanderer who searches the best observation point to know where to go next or as the movements of a hand that tries to make the tuning precise. The philosopher direct his movements from the remoteness to givenness and design them to separate the solid clarity from the fluid inclarity. «That which floats before us in fluid inclarity, with a greater or less intuitional remoteness, must therefore be brought into normal nearness and *made perfectly clear* before it can be used as the basis for a correspondingly valuable eidetic intuition in which essences and eidetic relationships intended to attain perfect givenness» [Husserl, 1983: 153]. This activity looks like the interior of a creamery or perhaps like the genesis of the planets from the primordial fog, but in fact, Husserl describes our common way to idea, or *eidōs*. Husserl as well as the pre-Socratic philosophers and Plato in his «cave symbol» before him has passed this way through. In fact, all the ordinary women or men usually grasp the idea as the general view or overview. However, as far as the eidetic phenomenology tries to see not the facts, but the essences, Husserl must distinguish the mere seeing from the insight into the ideas as such.

The transitions from one degree of clarity to another Husserl describes in a long but beautiful passage. «Thus the method, which is *fundamental part of method of all eidetic science*, universally requires proceeding step by step. The intuitions of style particulars serving the seizing upon essences may be already clear to an extent which

allows for acquiring an essentially universal moment which, however, does not extend as far as the guiding intention; clarity is lacking on the side partaking to more detailed determinations of the essences combined with <what had been attained>, consequently there is a need to bring the exemplificatory single particulars nearer or to provide anew more suitable ones in which the confusedly and obscurely single traits intended to stand out and, consequently, can become given with maximum clarity» [Husserl, 1983: 156–157]. The philosopher has to move his glance step by step to find out the only exemplary particular that would arrest the guiding intention and organize the intentional structure, or style. Even the illumination is not necessary for the insight. In the darkness of the undetermined areas, it happens that the knocking at the door of intuition is possible. «A bringing nearer is effected here throughout, even *in the sphere of obscurity*. What is obscurely intended to comes closer to us in its own manner; finally it knocks at the door of intuition, but even so it need not come in (and perhaps it cannot “because of psychological obstructions”» [Husserl, 1983: 157]. Nobody can distinguish the particulars perfectly well in the obscurity of the unknown areas though the observer may anticipate some kind of the insight here too. Anyway, the halo of darkness always surrounds the particulars given in the circle of light. «It should also be mentioned that *what is given at any particular time is usually surrounded by a halo of undetermined determinability*, which has its mode of being brought closer “*explicatively*” in becoming separated into a number of intendings [Vorstellungen]; at first it still may be in the realm of obscurity, but then within the sphere of givenness until what is intended to comes into the sharply illuminated circle of perfect givenness» [Husserl, 1983: 157]. What will the philosopher see when he uses the method of clarification to provide the insight? Sometimes he will see the

style particulars perfectly clear so everybody may choose the exemplary particular, sometimes in the obscurity he will anticipate the knocking at the door of his intuition, and he always grasp the halo that surrounds every illuminated sphere.

We may clarify the concepts of our predecessors and we may make the new step through the sphere still illuminated because of our first attempts to clarify. «The process of clarification... means two things: making a concept clear by recourse to fulfilling intuition, and, second, a process of clarification executed in the sphere of intuition itself» [Husserl, 1980: 89]. In any case, the clarification means not only the transposition of the attention from one point to another, but also the selection of the words. The philosophical and scientific heritage is nothing more or less than the wide set of the concepts. In order to clarify the concepts the philosopher has to bind them with the insights of the intuition. Afterwards it is possible to make the next steps to the further clarification. Despite this fact, the «method», or the way, of clarification is both useful and necessary. «A thing is not given; a thing-concept is not brought to actual clarity, if a thing is merely seen. A phantom is also seen, a mere seeing also yields no more than what corresponds to the phantom, namely as sensory schema» [Husserl, 1980: 88–89]. Thus far, the observer needs the clarification just to set apart the phantoms or the usual mistakes and to perceive the structure of the given world beyond them. When the observer makes this distinction between the simple ability to see and the insight, he will comprehend how complex the adventures of his eye are.

Husserl describes in the passages above the illustrious picture of the operations with the images and the darkness. However, there exists also the problem of the words used in these descriptions. As long as the insight and the naming coincide in space and time, the clarification process is

two-fold. Husserl unambiguously prefers the ambiguous words of the ordinary language to the logical or mathematical formulae. «The words used may derive from the common language, they may be ambiguous and their changing senses may be vague. As soon as they “coincide” with the intuitionally given in the manner characteristic of an actual expression, they take on a definite sense as their actually present and clear sense, *hic et nunc*; and starting from there we can fix them scientifically» [Husserl, 1983: 151–152]. We know all the disadvantages of the ordinary language fair well. Yet the technical terminology is much worse being the road to the dead-end hidden in the darkness of senselessness. «Since, for good reasons in view of the existing ambiguities of common usage, foreign technical terms should, in so far as possible, be avoided in the generally accepted language, there is a continuing need for caution and for frequent re-examination to see whether what was fixed in the earlier context is actually employed in the same sense in the new one» [Husserl, 1983: 152]. The one who likes to preserve the insight has to compare the different contexts. The earlier context is even better as far as «clarification must follow precisely the stages of the constitution of the exemplary object of intuition in question» [Husserl, 1980: 88]. However, we must change context for the further clarification of the object still grasped by the intuition. The language consisted of the conventional signs must be the worst possible context as concerns the saving of the insight. Husserl strictly opposes the indirect symbolism of the mathematics or the natural and technical sciences for it excludes or ceases the very possibility of the insight. «The art of continually inventing new symbolic procedures is practiced more and more perfectly and its rationality is essentially one that depends merely on the symbolism and from the outset presupposes, without insight, the value of the symbols. What

was relatively a matter of insight on a lower level is symbolized anew on a higher level and robbed of evidentness (as a superfluous burden of thought), and so the sciences become what we know them as: factories turning out very valuable and practically useful propositions – factories in which one can work as laborer and inventive technician, factories from which, as a practical man, one can without inner understanding derive products and at best comprehend the technical efficiency» [Husserl, 1980: 82]. Since «the clarification also has the function of giving old words the newly constituted sense» [Husserl, 1980: 88], there must be the element of a fancy in all the intuitive attempts to grasp the essence, and Husserl knew it. He wrote: «Thus if one is fond of paradoxical phrases, one can actually say, and if one means the ambiguous phrase in the right sense, one can say in strict truth, that “feigning” [Fiktion] makes up the vital element of phenomenology as of every other eidetic science, that feigning is the source from which the cognition of “eternal truths” is fed» [Husserl, 1983: 160]. This phrase is not that paradoxical, as it seems to be for the fictional language is perhaps the best way to grasp the essence.

In his lectures and notes published under the title *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory* Husserl states: «Consciousness of what is *not present* belongs to the essence of phantasy. We live in present; we have a perceptual field of regard. In addition, however, we have appearances that present something not present lying entirely outside this field or regard» [Husserl, 2005: 63]. Usually we see the phantasy appearances as «empty *phantoms*» [Husserl, 2005: 64], they are colorless and unsaturated. However, «there are often cases in which phantasy appearances present themselves as vigorous formations, cases in which they bring to intention objects that are sharply drawn, plastic and color saturated» [Husserl, 2005: 63–64]. In any case,

every phantasy appearance changes, manifests its «*protean character*» [Husserl, 2005: 66], so «we can speak of one phantasy presentation with discontinuous representation» [Husserl, 2005: 67]. The observer of the sensuous perception has at his disposal only the image, the «representing» object and the «represented» object [Husserl, 2005: 21]. That is all. Situation changes when the observer looks upon his own phantasies: he has at his disposal the marvelous variety of the non-existent objects. «Anyone who phantasies has an image experience. Something objective appears to him. However, no one considers this appearance to be an appearance of the object itself. Certainly no one takes this faint, fluctuating appearance – now rising fleetingly to the surface, now disappearing, its content changing in so many ways as it does so – to be the appearance of the object» [Husserl, 2005: 27]. The different image experiences change each other in a free play. They come, they vacillate for a moment or so, they go away. It is this vacillation we need to see the essence as clear as possible. «The apprehension that constitutes the image object is at the same time the foundation for the presentation that, by means of the image object; and in normal phantasy presentation and image presentation the act of meaning is aimed at the latter, directed toward it alone» [Husserl, 2005: 2]. The unchained phantasy invents or creates the subject matter and that makes Husserl to choose the unchained phantasy as the best kind of the pursuit for the clarification of the essence. Husserl here mentions the overwhelming force of the images, which can provide the material layer for the newly creating essences.

Taking into account the uselessness of the formal languages, we must advert to the simple language used by the ordinary (or even illiterate) people in their everyday life. What another kind of language is better to make the gaze clear? However, the authors who describe these variants

of speech sometimes exaggerate the effects of the ordinary language.

The outstanding American writer Robert M. Pirsig in his second novel *Lila. An Inquiry into Morals* compared simple language of the Native Americans with the sophisticated language of the Whites. The Native Americans lived the life on their own. They did only necessary things. They never used ineffective or just ceremonial gestures. «... [W]hen the Indians entered the teepee, or went out, or added logs, or passed the ceremonial peyote, or pipe, or food, they just *did* these things. They didn't go *about* doing them. They just *did* them. There was no waste motion. When they moved a branch into the fire to build it up they just *moved* it. There was no sense of ceremony. They were *engaged* in ceremony but the way they did it there *wasn't* any ceremony» [Pirsig, 1992: 43]. It was the ceremonial world without any kind of the overt ceremony. The speech of the Native Americans was also direct and simple. «The directness and simplicity was in the way they spoke, too. They spoke the way they moved, without any ceremony. It seemed to always come from deep within them. They just said what they wanted to say. Then they stopped. It wasn't just the way they pronounced the words. It was their attitude – plain-spoken, he thought...» [Pirsig, 1992: 43–44]. The protagonist of the novel or perhaps Pirsig himself used the wordplay as he compared the speech of the Indians to the Plains they lived on. «They were spoken in the language of the plains. This was the pure Plains American dialect he was listening to. It wasn't just Indian. It was white too...» [Pirsig, 1992: 44]. This plain speech was not something specific to the languages of the Native Americans. Everybody could remember as Pirsig really did Woody Guthrie songs or the cowboy movies (westerns) as the sources of the same plain speech. Sometimes the Native Americans used the language that was not their own (American English) but they

were not imitators even at that. «...They were *not* imitating. If there's one thing these people didn't do it was imitate. Everything was coming straight from the heart. That seemed to be the whole idea – to get straight things down to a point where everything's coming straight on, direct, no imitation. But if they weren't imitating, why did they talk this way? Why were they imitating?» [Pirsig, 1992: 44]. The protagonist ate some peyote with his friend anthropologist and the Indians. And then the huge peyote illumination came to him: «They're the *originators!*» [Pirsig, 1992: 44]. The Native Americans had originated the imitative (American English) language. This language was not native for the Indians but they used it as if it was one. Along with the language the Native Americans had created the main traits of the white American character. «The Europeans usually think the Americans to be sloppy and untidy, but the Americans imagine the Indians to have just the same traits of character». The Indians had created this kind of all-American character by their manner to speak. «Indians don't talk to fill time. When they don't have anything to say, they don't say it. When they don't say it, they leave the impression of being a little ominous. In the presence of this Indian silence, whites sometimes get nervous and feel forced as a matter of politeness or kindness to fill the vacuum with a kind of small-talk which often says one thing and means another. But these well-mannered circumlocutions of aristocratic European speech are “forked-tongue” talk to the Indian and are infuriating. They violate his morality. He wants you to either speak from the heart or keep quiet. This has been the source of Indian-white conflict for centuries and although the modern white American personality is a compromise of that conflict, the conflict still exists» [Pirsig, 1992: 50–51]. The white Americans seemed to be the simpletons for the Europeans, although for the Native Americans the speech of the whites

looked like a spider web. «...To the Indians, whites *seemed* like spiders when they talked. They sat there and smiled and said things they didn't mean, and all the time their mind was spinning a web around Indian. They got so lost in their own web-spinning thoughts they didn't even see that the Indian was watching them too and could see what they were doing» [Pirsig, 1992: 51]. The plain speech of the simple people is opposed to the spider web of the cultural speech. This contraposition had to become the ultimate foundation for the every discussion of the preferences of the simple language and direct speech over the sophisticated language and the polite meaningless words.

An ability to express the state of affairs in just a few necessary words will absolve from superfluous deeds. If you are on the far side of the word web you will be able to see clear. As opposed to our meaningless talks, the direct speech of the primitive and non-educated people allows seeing. The simple usage of the language is so closely connected with doing and making that it gives way to make the life what you like it to be and not only to do the deeds in a life you are doomed to. Both the language and the life will become ceremonial without overt ceremonies. And many other natural and supernatural properties the authors interested in these kinds of speech and language usually ascribe to them.

Sometimes they even sanctify the simple language. When the archpriest of the Russian Old Believers and one of the prominent authors of the movement finish his autobiography, he referred to his own speech as «*viakanie*» (blathering) [Abbakum, 2010: 73]. For sure, we have here the kind of self-humiliation. However, we have just read his autobiography and have been able to use our own evaluation, not the author's one. We have just experienced him to be the eminent and almost perfect writer. We have more than enough reasons to treat his

evaluation of his speech as a kind of a strategy. Abbacum had called his speech a blathering in an attempt to humiliate himself but not his speech. In any case, the uncolored language had been the worthy material for the preaching. On the contrary, the rhetorically colored speech of the official church had been irrelevant in such a case. The good preacher had had to break away the web of the words woven of the rhetorical devices by the government officials and the priests of the fallen church. The true believers had had to put off all the wiles of the official church and of the government embodied in the words of the rhetorically educated people.

This or that variant of the simple language may not be so close to the Holy Writ, but it usually exhibits the great health and purity. Anyway, all these imaginary stories about imaginary plain speech are doubtful. All the flowers of the rhetoric bloom in the simplest words of the everyday speech. Everybody knows a set of the arguments concerning the inner rhetorical character of the simplest speech. César-Chesneau Dumarsais points it as follows: «In effect, I am persuaded that it is possible to find out more figures while you spend only one day on the Central Market, than during a long time in the Academy» [Dumarsais, 1818: 3]. For sure, he speaks on the urban culture, but the language of the servants and of the tradesmen displays us at the same time its figural background and the vital simplicity of its forefront. The simplest language could be the most figural one. This is true as concerns the language of the Scriptures as well. Gerard Genette argues: «Genesis says: “And there was light”. Nothing is more *marked* than this simplicity: it is the very figure, indeed the perfectly obligatory figure, of the sublime» [Genette, 1982: 48]. The contraction is not the way from the figural language to the direct or uncolored speech. Just the opposite, it is an example of the rhetorical device exercised.

Perhaps the simplicity of the figure is the source for the force that is enough to create the reality as sacred as the reality of the Holy Writ.

The rhetoric has known this force for the centuries. The classical tractate *On the Sublime* by the so-called Pseudo-Longinus describes the impact of the figural language on the reader or hearer. «This striking image, being thrown in by the speaker in the midst of his proofs, enables him by one bold stroke to carry all mere logical objection before him. In all such cases, our nature is drawn towards that which affects it most powerfully: hence, an image lures us away from an argument: judgment is paralyzed; matters of fact disappear from view, eclipsed by the superior blaze. Nor is it surprising that we should be thus affected; for when two forces are thus placed in juxtaposition, the stronger must always absorb into itself the weaker» [Longinus, 1890: 36]. The «striking image» is not taken from the outer space of the other realities. The playful painter does not draw the image mentioned above over the written text. In fact, any writer has to create both the images and the statements from the same matter. He has to produce his images as well as his proofs from the words and by the words. He uses the same means to achieve two opposite aims at the same place and nearly at the same time. In this way, he creates the place called text where the images may break off the statements and absorb their remains.

On the one side, the freely floating imagination creates the material foundation for the ideas. On the other side, the images may destroy the rational content of the statements, or ideas. Paul de Man has seen the same situation in Friederich Nietzsche and described it as a kind of rhetorical «aporia» between the language of tropes and the language of persuasion. «Considered as persuasion, rhetoric is performative but when considered as system of tropes, it deconstructs its own performance» [De Man, 1979: 131]. The

incessant strife between the persuasive tropes and the effects of persuasion is the very essence of the rhetoric. This inner strife makes every text such a complex structure that is hardly imaginable in the simple and direct speech. One could not blame the hypocrisy on the people whose words in no way disagree with their deeds. The only possible source of the «rhetoricity» of the simple speech is not the word neither deed but the very situation of speech. In the situation of the utterance, the one who speaks must transfer or translate the infra-situational acts into the common words with their inherent rhetoric. This transitional process creates the obstacles for the stare inside the words. They are more or less accidental words, they are the bad metaphors, erased or forced

In his prose poem «Rhetoric» French poet Francis Ponge treats the innovation in rhetoric as a kind of the salvation for it «save some youngsters from the suicide and some other youngsters from the careers of the police officer or firefighter» [Ponge, 1987: 157]. Any attempts to create rhetoric anew are extremely necessary for those youngsters who feel repulsion not to become themselves but to live through some other persons' life. Their greatest obstacle is their speech. «The words are made not by me and they express themselves: they never express me» [Ponge, 1987: 157]. Only the simpletons like police officers or firefighters just use the common words. The persons who like to become themselves or the poets must change the words. «It is worth and useful to teach *art of resistance*

to words, to say only what one want to say, the art to violate the words and to subject them to one's power. As a result to found a rhetoric, or rather to teach everybody to find out his own rhetoric, is a public work of rewarding» [Ponge, 1987: 157]. Everybody is obliged to search his own rhetoric for the standard language of the words that can express nobody's wishes not to become an impenetrable obstacle for a gaze that would look for the essence of the world. To find out the perfect word means to win the two-dimensional struggle. First, it is the struggle against the settled words and speech turns. Second, it is the struggle against accidental and approximate turns of speech.

Conclusion

As long as everyday language of ordinary people is capable to fasten an insight, the clarity of a sight is in a way connected with simple and plain speech. Exaggerated all of apologia of ordinary language are, they only confirm this fact. The usage of the rhetorical tropes or figures creates all the unconceivable effects of an everyday language. The internal contradiction of art of eloquence and a seeming naturalness of popular speech represents one more reason of an ambiguity and of a misty gaze. That is why the opening of rhetorical character of an ordinary language, becomes a necessary condition of the glance clearing. Deleting of metaphors during creation of new versions of rhetoric is directly conformed to free variations in phantasy.

¹ The italics here as elsewhere in the text were used by the authors cited.

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Метод прояснения и фигуральный язык

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Статья посвящена отношениям феноменологии и риторики. Эдмунд Гуссерль приблизительно сто лет тому назад исследовал, описал, а затем использовал в эйдетической феноменологии примечательную способность каждого автора создавать воображаемые объекты при помощи обычных слов. Сегодня мы стремимся отыскать в классических текстах Гуссерля намек на то, каков лучший путь или метод прохождения сквозь слова и обретения возможности видеть ясно. Следовательно, цель этой статьи в том, чтобы определить и описать возможные пути сквозь иллюзию так называемой прямой речи к пониманию идеи. Поскольку предмет статьи – легко преобразующийся процесс преобразования присутствующих слов в отсутствующие изображения, она приводит к выводу в форме выбора. Этот выбор предсказан предложенным еще Гуссерлем описанием так называемых свободных вариаций в фантазии. Мы полагаем, что эти вариации будут риторическим сопротивлением обычным словам, своего рода ластиком, который слой за слоем стирает метафоры.

Ключевые слова: риторика, эйдетическая феноменология, очевидность, фантазия, метод прояснения, прямая речь, образный язык.
