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On the Concept of Musical Performance

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The paper focuses on the controversy term of “performance”. There was given a range of definitions of the term at different levels of commonness and specificity: performance as a kind of activity; performance as a part of creation; performance as a kind of intonation, including the real moment of sound formation; performance as a kind of existence of form-process in the time and the space-time arts. The author of the paper uses and justifies the notions of “complete” and “incomplete” acts of intonation. The conclusion is that the structure of the complete act of intonation is an invariant structure of every music performance in general.

Keywords: music performance, interpretation, intonation, performing technique, musical text, music composition.

In the vast stream of books and articles on issues of music and performing arts, there are not almost any fundamental works, fulfilling the task of building a general theory of performance, introducing basic notions, outlining the very subject of the study of this science. And the first in a number of these notions to define is, of course, the musical performance itself.

Today, the musical performance is commonly understood as “the creative process of recreating a musical work by means of performing mastery” (Yampol'skii, 1974: 583). But a piece of music as a cultural and historical phenomenon has not always and everywhere existed, whereas the act of performing has history as long as music itself – from the earliest times. It is clear that the traditional concept of musical performance, in fact, the same as the content of the concept of interpretation, does not adequately explain other

important phenomena of European performances (such as improvisation, virtuosity) and does not apply to folklore and extra-European musical-performance cultures. In this connection there is the need to construct a universal concept of musical performance and further development of this typology of notions. The immediate goal of this paper is to identify ways to solve this problem, albeit in a preliminary so far, sketch form.

However, before we begin to consider the notion, it would be expedient to begin the analysis with the general concept of performance. Thus, we determine the next levels of analysis and, accordingly, the meanings of the terms:

- performance as a kind of activity;
- performance as an extricable part of any creative process;
- performance as a kind of existence of form-process in the time and the space-time arts;

– performance as a kind of creative process in performing arts.

Performance as a kind of activity. We begin with broad meanings of performance: to perform means to realize, to make something, as a result of performance something finds real being and becomes valid.

But not every realization is performance. When there is rain, snow falls or summer comes, of course, rain, snow, summer have become real, but it occurs as a result of natural processes. When an act, a construction, or a work of art become real, this process takes place not by itself, but by the will of man, and as a result of human activity. If we consider the individual act of the activity, an object will be presented in two ways: first, as an image of the object in the mind, secondly, as the object itself in its objective existence. The essence of realization is in the “translation” of an object from the internal to the external being.

In this regard, the most common definition of performance may be as follows: *performance is a human activity consisting in sensuously objective realization of human plans and ideas.*

Performance in art. The communicative function of performance. The artistic image is born in the imagination of the creator and in initial phase it exists in the mind as an *intentional* object, created by consciousness and implemented in mental form only. But the mental image is invisible from the outside. In order to realize it in the vision of other people, one needs to make an intentional object real, perceived now by sight and hearing. “Translation of images” – that is the conventional name for a specific for art method of social interaction, in which the communicative function of artistic performance is revealed, and performance makes the idea of the creator “visible”, giving it flesh, translating it into real, sensuously perceived subject. Active and creative perception of the latter leads to the formation

of the aesthetic object itself in perceiving consciousness. Since then, the image begins to engage in spiritual communication.

Materialized image is the result of art. But it is materialized not for the further transformation of the outside world, but for the impact of “on the man himself – because art is a personal plane of social practice” (Rappoport, 1978: 25). Internal in art is to be expressed, discovered in the outer world; external forms exist only to be involved in the inner world again. Internal and external in art are not separate entities, but only dialectical moments of artistic image, two interdependent forms of its existence. In interconversions they acquire the truth of their being. And then they exercise their mutual connection in artistic *performance* and aesthetic *perception*.

Performance is a necessary moment of every artistic creation. But if the performance is just a forced mediation between fully formed in the mind of the creator ideal image and its material analogue, isn't the moment of performance just a purely technical point of execution? Isn't it characterized by a secondary role, while not participating, in fact, in the process of building up an internal image? And should not, in this case, the performance be attributed to the craft, but not by any means creative aspect of the process? Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce wrote in this regard: “When we took possession of inner speech and imagined clearly and vividly a picture, a statue, or a musical motif, the expression had already been born and fully formed. And there is no need for anything else. And then if we want to open or really open our mouths to speak or sing and if we want to hold out our hands to touch the piano keys or take a brush or chisel, then it will be an additional fact complying with quite different laws than the first...” (quoted from the book: Koryhalova, 1979: 54). But let us think about it: does an artistic image from its inception and up to the

full specification reside solely in the mind of an artist? It is unlikely that this view is consistent with the actual facts of the artistic creativity.

A work of art is almost never occurs immediately, suddenly¹. The very birth of the artistic design is accompanied, as a rule, by the creation of plenty of sketches, diagrams, rough drafts, fragments, plans, etc., which find a preliminary, yet vague, not sufficiently articulated vision of the future work. In the process of specification and development of a plan preparatory and auxiliary materials multiply. Why is this pre-objectification in recurring acts of performance is necessary? Why, even W.A. Mozart, an outstanding improviser who could hear all of his future creation at once, why did he write a fair copy of sonata allegro only to the development stage and... stop to clarify for himself on the drafts the polyphonic parts and motivic development?

In our view, the point is that the ability of the internal combinatorics with imaginary objects is not unlimited (even when it comes to authentic artistic genius), both in terms of conservation the results of the thinking process in memory, and in terms of development, specification and finishing of the artistic idea. Performance therefore does not only objectify the artistic image, already established in mind, *it must be involved in the maturation and crystallization of the idea.*

By “externalizing” mental image, really “placing it in front of himself”, the creator expands his possibilities infinitely: what used to be held in the mind is now enshrined in the sensuously given subject and is clearly perceived by the senses. Consciousness, freed from a structural problem, can now concentrate on the following: to work out some details, to seek their approval, to specify the proportions and architectonic of the whole, etc. The results of these actions are synthesized in clarifying, narrowing inner vision and are re-objectified in the next act of “performance-

realization”. That is only one round of an endless spiral of creativity.

Thanks to the performance the artist himself becomes a spectator or listener of his own work. Moreover, perceiving his creation as an “outsider” he becomes its first “interpreter”, seeks and finds in it latent semantic and expressive capabilities and continuations, and starts immediately to implement them. The creative process becomes a peculiar dialogue of the creator with the created artistic design. Comparing actual experience with the idea and fixing the emerging noncoincidences an artist specifies not only the physical form, but also (and most importantly) the inner vision, image. His fantasy is powered by impulses coming from the perception, from living, immediate impressions, found sometimes in unintended (even random) deviations of the real object from its ideal prototype. And then these “mutations” are included in the artistic reality, enriching it and opening new and unexpected faces of it.

What is the relation between pre-objectification and finished product? Strictly speaking, since during transforming activity there is substitution of one object by another, followed by transferring the results to the first object, a preliminary act of objectification functions as the *model*. Often substitution concerns the very material when the preliminary work is carried out by a more plastic material, comfortable to handle. For example, a sculptor before working with marble, draws a lot, sculpts the plaster model; a muralist works out the composition on the canvas of a small size; the composer plays a new symphony on the piano, often writes a piano reduction before begin work with the orchestration². Interestingly, the model function is performed by the work itself: it would seem that the work is finally, fully completed, it happens that it is even published – and here comes the painful period of countless amendments, revisions, editorials, transforming

not only the details, but often, key aspects of the whole.

Thus, without the execution not only the communication in art is not possible, but also the process of artistic creation and artistic thinking itself. From the point of view of modern psychology, the human thinking is inextricably linked with sensuously objective activity and is implemented in constant interaction of internal and external processes. Respectively, artistic thinking in principle cannot be reduced to only subjective and psychological act of the internal construction of the image and its reflection, interpretation, etc. *The process of thinking constantly occupies the area of sensuously objective operating, which is, performing.* Therefore performance is not only the discovery of the inner work (so that the practical transformation of the real thing “exposes” a corresponding transformation of its ideal source). It does not only, together with the perception, provide the relationship and coordination of internal and external plans of the creative process: *sensuously objective operating is also the most important incentive and the way of the inner work of the creator.*

We reviewed the highlights of the general concept of performance, universal for all types of art, which appear equally in all the arts. But, as we know, a number of kinds of art are combined for some reason in the group of “performing” arts; thereby they are distinguished from all other arts, which are not performing. The time of performing, therefore, plays a special role in the first group and has certain specific features.

The specificity of execution in the “performing” arts. Usually for the reason for distinguishing performing and non-performing arts the researchers investigate the way of making the work of art. In performing (or “active”) arts work is not considered complete even after it is completed by the author: recreation (“finishing”) of the work is carried out every time by the

performer. In non-performing (“passive”) arts finishing is not required and there is always a work in its final form. Such are the views of Yu. Kremlev, R. Zdobnov, G. Cogan, Ye. Gurenko, V. Kuznetsov. Criticizing the position of these authors, N. Koryhalova asserts that the performing arts “are different from the non-performing arts not in the way to create a piece of art, but in the way of its existence, its social being”. The product of performing arts reveals itself in public practice not as “a ready result of artistic activity” (Hegel), but “in the form of a constantly renewed process carried out by a special person – ... performer” (Koryhalova, 1979: 154).

Indeed, in the temporal and spatio-temporal kinds of art – music, theater, ballet, etc., an artistic image has a form of a process and in the external mode of existence it is as transitory as the time that it fills. Therefore, the artistic image is involved in spiritual communication (apart from audio and video recordings) only to a certain extent, as its external form – audio or visual – is renewed in the acts of performance.

In the spatial arts, the creative process has its own limit; the number of acts of performance is limited. Whatever the cost of labor for a new picture is, after its final completion, it will not require any more effort from an artist. In order to present this picture for spectators, the artist hangs it on the wall and that is enough

Not so in the temporal arts. This meeting with one of the pieces of art every time requires from creators – artists the actual creative act. The time of presentation is the most responsible, decisive phase of creative work, and the product is presented as a live always work, *as a message of the living subject, addressed here and now to the present audience.* From this follows directly the specificity of artistic content in these arts – its special expressiveness, spontaneity, subjective penetration. Hence the specificity of the means of expression in using as nowhere

else “natural” human material: appearance, character of movements, facial expressions, intonation and rhythm of speech, voice, live emotions, feelings – in short, one’s whole being is becoming, in the words of Hegel, “an animated work of art”. This explains the improvisational nature of performance – a unique feature of “live communication” requires creativity also in the process of the performing, no matter how polished and elaborated the idea has been before performing. An artist is always anew exposed to artistic images, inspires by them again and again, and, of course, each time a little differently works out “an emotional range”, the logic of imaginative development, drama of the whole, not to mention separate details. The product cannot be performed the same way twice, not because it is difficult to implement technically, but because it is impossible *to go through it* exactly the same way twice.

As for the technical aspect, it has also very specific role in temporal arts. As performance is the artistic time subordinate to all the laws of the artistic whole. This eliminates any chance, inaccuracy, arbitrariness, etc., thus, requires a complete and adequate representation of the ideal, and therefore the reliability of the “apparatus of performance”. Artistic stability, in turn, is only achieved when there is clarity of visual images, in conjunction with the “foresight” of specific techniques, with the “foretaste” of specific artistic movements. So the internal processes of performing thinking develop at least two parallel planes: imaginary (“what”) and sensorimotor (“how”), and each foresight in the plane “what” corresponds to the plane of presentiment “how”. The same two-way character is applied to the processes of monitoring and correction. Although, of course, every division is purely conventional: performing thinking possesses special intensity of interaction of internal and external processes, in which all the moments

of the chain “pretaste – presentiment – action – incarnation – perception – control – correction” merge into a latent unity in the moment of time, which is in the dynamic interaction of all the previous and all the upcoming “events” of the idea’s life.

These are the main features of the performing thinking directly in the performing process. If we consider the creative process of the performer during the work on the piece of art, it will appear that the functions of the performance are here, in general terms, the same as in any other forms of artistic creativity: the performing idea is created in the process of constantly recurring acts of its incarnation³. The distinction between temporal and spatial arts is smoothed to a certain extent due to the appearance of a video and audio recording, although, of course, it would be a mistake to believe that the specifics of playing is neglected completely in the era of film and video equipment, tape recorders and synthesizers, that the performer becomes a superfluous and unnecessary figure. Quite the contrary. Just as the invention of photo camera has not cut down the value of painting, but only highlighted its artistic value, which is not confined to reproducing a physical object, so the means of audio and video record have not replaced the performing art, but only emphasized its independent aesthetic role, not reducible solely to the function of reproduction of the work.

The validity of this approach becomes apparent when we remember the earliest forms of art. In them artistic creativity is inextricably linked to all other spheres of human activity (including labor, magic, ritual, military, gaming, leisure, etc.), here artistic creativity serves as truly universal way of life of human and society. At this stage, it would be vain to seek a work of art in the proper sense – in its origins art is manifested primarily as *a live activity*, and created sound objects are firstly the means of the organization of this activity itself⁴.

But, further, with a complete crystallization of the first works of art as a new cultural-historical givenness (i.e. the result of artistic creativity in the temporal arts acquires self-reliant value, becomes a “finished thing”, having a certain system of stable characteristics), and so *performance emerges as a particular kind of artistic creativity*, designed to revive the “finished thing” and store it in the culture. However, performance as a live creative activity as a “way of life”, as the most ancient form of art retains, in broad cultural terms, the same significance as previously the ancient magic action possessed. Performance has its origins in the latter, being a kind of “representative” of it in any “slice” of musical culture. Therefore, the product (the “finished thing”) will never be the exclusive aim for the performance, but it is also *the reason, the means* for performing activity, allowing its incarnation again and again.

The self-worth and primacy of performing arts was emphasized in the works of A. Tairov: “... Of course, I knew that the theater organically does not depend on the literature and that its mission is not the transfer of the works of the playwright. To “Glosses of Doctor Dapertutto to ‘Negation of the theater’” by Meyerhold I could add a whole era of the Roman mime, when there were no authors and their plays, but theater yet so powerfully charmed the audience with its self-contained art that even the all-powerful Caesars were jealous of the monuments, by which the Romans honored their favorite memes. I would also recall the brilliant flash of *commedia dell’arte*, when Gozzi and Sacchi reopened theater of San Samuele, which had been closed once, and jingling harlequin bells

again brought into its walls crowds of Venetians, easily depriving by sparkling improvisations the deceptive strength of Goldoni’s success, based on the written plays. And many more brilliant pages of the past of the theater I could cite as proof that the art of theater and actor is *primary* (the italics are mine – M.B.) and that Melpomene is not a colonial negro in a beautiful galaxy of blue-blooded muses...

Do I have to say that Actor is the main in the theater, that in the history of the theater there were long periods when it existed without any decorations, but there was not a single moment when the theater would be without the actor” (Tairov, 1970: 78-79).

Analysis of the concept of music performance

Concept’s structure. Taking the formulated above general concept of performance as the base for our thought, we give the following narrower definition: *music performance is a kind of creative activity, which consists in finding sound representations in adequate to them real sound.*

Let us draw the structure of the concept of musical performance (Fig. 1).

Music performance is different from any other kind of performance above all in special – sound, or, more precisely, intonation – objectivity, by which the activities are carried out. But being activity in the intonation objectivity music performance is a kind of intonation and requires further definition also from this stand.

Researchers distinguish between two forms of intonation – internal and external. It would be easy to determine the performance as the




Fig. 1: MR – mental representation of the upcoming sound; RS – real sound; PS – perceived sound image; MR → PS – the adequacy is established by comparing the perceived sound image with the represented mentally




Fig. 2

external form of intonation. However, such an idea would have been too poor. Therefore, by some complicating in the typology of intonation, we propose to distinguish between *full* and *partial* acts of intonation.

Full act of intoning includes at least four points: 1) mental representation of the upcoming sound (MR); 2) real sound formation (RS); 3) back inverse of the real sound in perceived tonal image (PS); 4) comparison of MR and PS (feedback, comparing the actual sound with a mental prototype). Structure of full act of intonation thus coincides with the structure of concept of music performance (Fig. 1). What are then partial acts of intonation?

Partial acts of intonation are the isolation of one of two forms of internal intonation, in which the real sound formation and other form of internal intonation are present in the “removed” fashion (Fig. 2).

An example of a partial act is a way of listener’s intoning (Fig. 2b). Partial act of another type can be seen in the composer’s work (Fig. 2a). And only performing intonation cannot be drastically limited to a mental form only, it must include the time of real sound formation. *Music performance, therefore, is a full act of intoning.*

There may be doubts: is a moment of real sound formation a specific feature that distinguishes the performance of other forms of intonation? We know that the composer from time to time “realizes” the work in creation on the musical instrument, the listener hums memorized tune, the musicologist analyzes the work, while playing the piano – is not a moment of real sound formation in all these cases present in one way

or another? May not such acts of intonation be called – even with some limitations – “full”?

Sure, it is as such. But everyone who performs the music, no matter who really – a composer, a critic, a student, etc. – this person acts as a performer and to a greater or lesser extent becomes such. At the same time, we intuitively distinguish between the activities of the artist, on the one hand, and the composer and listener, critic, musicologist – on the other, and this complies with the concept – as non-performing activities *do not necessarily* contain in their structure the moment of real sound formation.

To sum up, emphasizing the moment of specificity, we give the following definition: *music performance is a kind of intonation, necessarily including the process of real sound formation.*

The fact that the moment of real sound formation is an essentially required and specifying element of the concept of music performance is quite obvious. It is more difficult to understand whether two other moments of the full act of intonation are also necessary, and these are pretaste and perception of the actual sound. In other words, can partial acts of performing intonation exist?

Consider first the case when a performer for whatever reason (e.g., due to a bad cold as it once was with Pablo Casals – though judging by the reviews, he played perfectly) cannot hear what he is playing. We get a partial act of intonation with a broken feedback (Fig. 3).

Can such a performance exist? Obviously, in the general case – no, if we keep in mind the full artistic performance: the reason is that the necessary component of the concept




Fig. 3




Fig. 4

of performance is the adequacy of the actual sound to mental sound images, unattainable outside the continuous, intense “hearing by the performer himself”, outside the constant comparing the resulting sound with the ideal prototype⁵.

The ability to “listen to yourself” in the true sense is a very rare quality. Much more often – especially in teaching practice – we encounter the unfortunate case when a young musician is not learned to correctly perceive, evaluate, and adjust his/her play. Does this mean that our conclusion (“performance is always a full act of intonation”) does not correspond to reality? No, it does. We can say that although the type of performance with impaired hearing control occurs in reality, however, it is invalid performance, which is *not relevant* to its conception.

And what about Pablo Casals? It is thought that such cases are classified as the exceptions that prove the rule. An artist with a phenomenal muscle memory, perfect coordination of internal hearing and motor skills, is able sometimes to accurately reproduce the series of motor movements; however, these motor skills were previously found and perfected under intense auditory control.

Let us now turn to the analysis of another way to “perform” when the performer does not

pre-hear music, and by making the usual playing movements he/she plays a kind of acoustic sound, which they then perceived from the outside. Here we have another kind of a partial act of intonation (Fig. 4).

It is easy to see that such a structure of the performance is contrary to the concept of performance itself: it is impossible to perform, to realize something that even before its incarnation has no ideal form, which is in the mind. Music performance, in principle, cannot be reduced only to the acoustic sound generation: real sound is an *expression of* something, which has its *sound* in the singer’s soul, and which is perceived and created by the inner ear of the sound image. Presentiment, by the way, is also a basic condition for the hearing control: “listen to yourself” means to compare the real sound with the ideal, desirable.

Thus, upon closer inspection, both varieties of the partial act of “performing” intonation are just different projections of the same phenomenon – *non-creative* performance that does not conform to its concept. We come to an important conclusion: the structure of the full act of intonation is an invariant of the structure of any *artistic* performance at all.

Formulated in this paper the concept of music performance is, of course, not our discovery or




Fig. 5




Fig. 6

invention. No matter consciously or intuitively, it has always been used by musicians because other methods of performing arts do not exist. So, for Asaf'ev, the crucial point distinguishing creative and uncreative performance was listening and understanding of music by the inner ear before playing.⁶

L.Tseytlin also said in his methodological discussions about presentiment and foresight⁷. Systematic development of this idea was in the works of the German teacher K. Marthinsen.

In 1930, Marthinsen introduced the term “complex of a child prodigy”, denoting by it the following scheme of the play process (Fig. 5).

It is easy to see the correspondence shown in the scheme structure of the play process to the concept of music performance: the sound of a keyboard arises from a desire to realize a sound image presented by hearing. So, according to K. Marthinsen, the play process is for the child prodigies, the outstanding performers.

The structure of the play process for an average performer looks quite different (Fig. 6).

The will of motor skills

There is a disagreement between the structure of performance and its concept: the leading role is performed by motor skills and auditory area remains on the periphery of consciousness, it is not an initiator, but rather a listless observer of what is happening. It is quite clear that such a “performance” never exceeds mediocre level.

We are ensured that the correspondence of the structure of the real play process to the structure of the concept of music performance is necessary and foremost condition for all performing arts.

The alpha and omega of the creative music performance pedagogy has always been and will always remain the idea that “in the course of performance the following things are inseparable: the internal representation of music, consistent experience caused by the deployment of music

in time, and hearing one's own performance» (Kremenshtein, 1966: 40), that, in other words, the performance exists only in the unity of all the moments of full act of intonation.

* * *

Let us continue to analyze the typology of intonation, deepening its level.

Intonation is, by Asaf'ev, "... a meaningful, purposeful, and given in some kind of combination of content and interconnections *the sound reproduction of conceivable* (the italics are mine – M.B.) ... So from the perspective of music as the meaning – explains further B. Asaf'ev – processes of musical creativity and performance are equal. The process of musical creativity includes composer, internal intonation ("translation" of the state of consciousness into the language of musical elements, hearing the composed material by the inner ear and its technical realization). The process of musical performance implies reproduction of the composed work, when musical art object becomes the common property of the public conscience" (Asaf'ev, 1971: 264).

In the context of this quotation intonation for Asaf'ev has double meaning: on the one hand, "the sound reproduction of the conceivable" is a transformation of conceivable life content into the sound images (when "... thinking and feeling of the composer become the intonation, the processes of voicing "of the states of consciousness become the means of music"), on the other hand, "the sound reproduction of the conceivable" is also

understood in the literal sense – as a realization of the sound images performed by inner hearing⁸. We should also add one more important point: "the comprehension of sound", i.e., the back conversion of the structure of expressive means in thinking and feelings of a person listening to music.

We get now three stages of the same full act of intonation. The first stage is a transformation of "living content" (LC₁) in mental sound images (MR). The second stage is a translation of mental sound images into real sound (RS). The third stage consists of a mirror transformation: a) RS PS and b) PS LC₂.

These stages form the full act of intonation, the structure of which we can now draw on the scheme in more detail (Fig. 7).

The applicability of this scheme to certain types of performance (especially improvisation) is doubtless. But is there the same situation when there are three separate functions of a composer, a performer and a listener?

To answer this question, let us consider briefly as possible the structure of the performer-interpreter.

The impetus for the creative process for the interpreter is the perception of music, recorded by the composer in the musical text. The creative process, therefore, begins, as if from "the end".

Perceived through the mental intonation musical text (MR) general outlines of the work are translated into the real sound (RS), and then




Fig. 7

they are transformed into perceived sound image (PS). Then this primary and, of course, mainly preliminary, draft sound image is beginning to increase the interpretative comprehension. The interpreters experience this draft sound image by their own means of understanding. The described act (read *prima vista*) goes into an endless spiral of creativity, in the process of deployment of which there appears the further *structuring* of sound material of the work (conceivable and really sounding), i.e. there happens the revealing of a complex *hierarchical system* of musical, “grammar” and expressive elements, which in fact comprise a piece of music. Simultaneously, there is *the intonation interpretation* of important parts, the transition from a system of means to the semantic-expressive content, which may, in principle, apply to the entire universum of human existence.

In such a way there happens a semantic satiation of sound material, and even in case of the most adequate comprehension of the text, the content is as authorial, as it is personal, as perceived as self-generated. In fact perceived

material is perceived only because that it awakens similar, “resonating” and at the same time deeply experienced and suffered meanings in one’s soul. These highly personal content and images as if soak the sound material. And then the plural being of a piece of music acquires another interpretation, in which the identity of the composer, refracted through the interpreter-performer’s personality, finds a new being.

So, we presented a number of definitions of the general concept of performance, and then we continued the series of definitions by denoting music performance. What was the reason for doing so? Every science begins with definitions: it is necessary to define general principles of the subject of research, to find specific features that distinguish this phenomenon from a different kind of phenomena, but, at the same time, these features unite by common characteristics all the phenomenal forms in their diversity. However, only in a collision with real history and practice definitions begin to develop, comprising a truly living concept, equal in its expanded form to the theory of the subject being studied.

¹ “But what theory do you have, my friend, – Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote to his brother M.M.Dostoevsky, – that the picture has to be written once, and so on, and so on, and so on? When did you believe in that? Believe that everywhere labor, huge labor is necessary. Believe me, easy elegant Pushkin’s poem in a few lines seems written once, because it is was too long once and was worked out for many times. These are the facts. Gogol spent eight years writing “Dead Souls”. Everything that is written at once is immature. You obviously mix inspiration, i.e. the first moment of painting or movement in the soul (which is always done), with the work. I, for example, write down the scene immediately and in the way it appeared to me the first time, and I’m satisfied with it, but then for months, years, I have been processing it, being inspired by it several times, not one (because I love this scene), and for a few times I add to it something or score something out, that is how it is for me, and believe me, the result is much better” (Dostoevsky, 1973: 387).

² Music notation, while remaining objectification, puts a graphical model outside the realization in the proper sense, under which not every objectification is understood, but rather an expression of the internal, “in flesh” real semiotic material of any kind of art, in this case the sound. Music notation only replaces by the graphic means the perfect representation of the sound and its acoustic equivalent.

³ B.L. Kremenshtein writes about learning piano music piece: “... playing, the musician hears the music; once he hears – he feels, thinks, finds desires about performing; once he wants anything – he plays again, in a different way now; now he hears the music again – more fully and better; he feels deeper and wants something new, something more. In this continuous cyclical process there appears an understanding of music and a specific performing idea. Comparing the actual sound with what he wants to achieve, the artist evaluates the quality of the play, thus obtaining an incentive for further piano work” (Kremenshtein, 1966: 40-41).

⁴ Such, for instance, are the original functions of the historically first means of music: rhythm, tonality, tone, melody (For further details see: Beniumov, 2011, 2012).

⁵ See further about the ability to “listen to yourself” in: (Kremenshtein, 1966: 40-114).

⁶ Let us recall the words of Asaf’ev, when he distinguishes between two branches of performing culture, “*co-creative* with the composer” and “*mechanically reproduced* music notation according to the created technical norms (the italics are mine – M.B.): “Between these faces there are many shades. Yet there are two major categories of performers: some listen to music and understand it by the inner ear, *intoning it in themselves before reproduction*, that is, before they hear it from

the outside, upon touch of fingers or the orchestra's play"; other, "while not intoning music in their consciousness, take it from the outside, by reproducing musical text only." (the italics are mine – M.B., Asaf'ev, 1971: 237-299).

⁷ See: (Blok, 1960: 11). M.S. Blok comes close to the concept of performance, defining the work on performance technique as "a process of real incarnation of imaginary sound representations" [Blok, 1960: 8].

⁸ Asaf'ev's formula of "the sound reproduction of the conceivable" contains the definition of music performance: when it concerns "the conceivable", it is the internal form of sound images; the sound reproduction implies the incarnation of the latter in a real musical object. Only very large semantic capacity of this very concise formula forces to understand by "the sound reproduction of the conceivable" the intonation itself, which is a generic term, and music performance is a kind of this intonation.

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О понятии музыкального исполнения

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В статье рассматривается многозначный термин «исполнение». Предложен ряд дефиниций этого понятия на разных уровнях общности и специфичности: исполнение – вид деятельности; исполнение – момент художественного творчества; исполнение – вид интонирования, включающий момент реального звукоформования; исполнение – способ существования художественной формы-процесса во временных и пространственно-временных искусствах. Автором статьи вводятся и обосновываются понятия «полного» и «неполного» актов интонирования. Делается вывод: структура полного акта интонирования представляет собой инвариант структуры всякого вообще художественного музыкального исполнения.

Ключевые слова: музыкальное исполнение, интерпретация, интонирование, исполнительская техника, нотный текст, музыкальное произведение.
