On the Issue of the National Reconciliation in Russia: Problematization Perspectives*

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The article views upon the national reconciliation in Russia in the context of socio-philosophic analysis of the “reconciliation” concept. Reconciliation in duality of its meanings always implies more than “restoration of relationships” or “humility with what has happened”. The roots of our understanding of reconciliation (national reconciliation in particular) lead to the Abrahamic tradition focusing on the horizon of the absolute peace and in its secularized variant appearing as an ideal external ground of solidarity, “a collective culpa or responsibility”, “Amor Patriae”, “verdict of history”. The Abrahamic tradition forms our “self-evident” perspectives of understanding of “the national component” in national reconciliation. These perspectives can be conditionally termed as “the Unity”, “the Equality” and “the Borders”. On closer inspection they turn into very practical (strategic and tactical) items of reconciliation programs development and realization. Moreover, they determine socio-normative limits of their implementation.

Keywords: reconciliation, historical memory, peace, Abrahamic tradition.

At the meeting of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, held in 2011, the project of “On Perpetuation of the Memory of the Victims of the Totalitarian Regime and on National Reconciliation” program (a full Russian text version of the project and a shorthand record of the meeting can be read on the web-site of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights) was presented to President Dmitry Medvedev. The project was immediately called “de-Stalinization” by the press. Despite sharp (and in most cases justified) criticism against it the value of this program is hard to overestimate: the problem of rehabilitation, reconsideration, and re-evaluation has been urgent for more than twenty years and it is paradoxically no less relevant nowadays. It is probably due to the fact that for various reasons – political, ethical, and religious – we avoid discussing painful events of our country’s past the same way we avoid unpleasant memories of our own life. Both the history of the country and unpleasant memories of our biography evoke a burning sense of shame, hurt and / or anger. According to Nietzsche’s words, we cannot “digest” such kind of a scary explosive cocktail. From this point of view creation of a common book of the victims’ memories, “memorialization” of the space, that is construction of a completely different way of a human’s perception of him / herself and his/
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her history, is more than a justified step for ... for what?

It is in this problematic ground where the main question arises: what do we ultimately expect from this difficult, long and very painful operation? Pardon? In this case, the task is no less difficult: for this it is necessary to “separate” victims from criminals for making a pardon possible. And the main attempt of this “operation” threatens to turn into new conflicts. Oblivion? But in this case access to memories is meaningless... Is it, probably, a specific common feeling of inner innocence that is expected to be cultivated?

In the long run the results presented above are intended to create a common understanding of the whole country’s history not in the textbooks’ official language, but on each citizen’s personal level of his/her attitude to the past. This attitude seems to be able to rule out drinking quarrels, fierce scientific disputes, talk-show debates and necessity of future “history reconsiderations”. Such a state of total harmony with the past is probably understood as national reconciliation. The program creators really put ‘perpetuation of the memory of the victims’ on the same level with ‘national reconciliation’. However, the ratio of these two tasks still remains unclear. On the one hand, reconciliation is understood as the result of rethinking of the experience of own tragic past. On the other hand, it is a parallel process which has nothing to do with ‘perpetuation of the memory of the victims’. Until understanding and purpose of national reconciliation turn to be clarified, it will be hardly possible to answer the questions about the objectives of the program and the challenges that need to be addressed through its implementation.

**Reconciliation: Duality of Meanings**

Reconciliation refers to deceptively simple concepts. Operating with them, we trustingly surrender to the power of imaginary self-evidence. Eternal peace is that limit of our desires when we expect to see the world of eternal harmony, liberation from guilt and / or past insults, and a sort of stagnation in relationships.

Meanwhile dictionaries provide with at least two meanings of reconciliation implying not only a very specific temporal orientation but peculiar scenarios of social behavior as well. Thus, reconciliation is 1) restoration of relationships or 2) tolerant “attitude to something” (Ozhegov, 1989: 356). Which meaning will be preferable for us when it comes to national reconciliation? What makes this choice difficult is that we have to decide on the following: “who is to be tolerant and what / who is to be tolerant to”. Moreover, we must determine the range of problems, requiring reconciliation, for each case.

In its first meaning reconciliation is understood as rapprochement. In this case the focus is given to the events of distant or non-distant past that interfere with interaction and coexistence of individuals as well as whole groups, social institutions, etc. This understanding of reconciliation is central in the work of reconciliation commissions in the North Caucasus. Dwelling upon reconciliation in general, we shall not deny quite a number of events in the history of Russia, having a separating character and mostly related to the nearest post-communist past, “yesterday’s” news wire still vividly imprinted in people’s conscience. From this point of view the main objective of reconciliation (its focus) is to build common future opportunities through restoration and creation of new channels of cooperation, search for common points of contact, (mutual) penitence, admission of guilt and acceptance of responsibility, both subjective (in case perpetrators are alive) and institutional (when someone acting as a social institution’s or some other community’s representative recognizes this community’s responsibility and
gives evidences concerning its historical memory upgrade).

The second meaning of reconciliation, regarded as tolerant attitude to something, leads us to different results. “Something” here doesn’t stand for people, but refers to historic facts, the so-called injuries of the past. In this case tolerant attitude turns out to be reconciliation transformed into humility, painful acceptance of what happened as something given, finding its place in present life and getting rid of rancor. The construction of a post-traumatic picture of the past, which makes it possible to live without constantly looking back and asserting rejection again and again, comes to the forefront here. Various forms of memorialization of spaces, including perpetuation of the memory of the victims of the totalitarian regime, favours exactly such kind of reconciliation. Memorialization pursues another goal: in a few generations period, for example, humility can turn into oblivion, devaluing and erasing the traces of the past.

The meanings mentioned above represent two scenarios of reconciliation, each with its objectives which coincide in no way. The following example can be given to show this discrepancy: an ardent supporter of the Soviet Union’s disintegration re-established relationships with a fervent supporter of the Soviet Union twenty years on, but the latter hasn’t accepted the fact of the country’s disintegration and regards the changes as a stop before a turn back. Thus, duality can manifest itself in relation to the same event, and when it comes to public reconciling, concerning large social groups, a “correct” definition of meanings becomes fundamental (this issue will be regarded further on).

**Hard Processes**

Temporal direction peculiar for both meanings of reconciliation has been already mentioned above. But attitude to time is not limited to the influence on our perception of certain events and people. Reconciliation is not a single act marking out overall chronology of events into “prior” and “post” moments. It is a discrete process manifesting itself as a chain of actions and deeds performed towards each other “for the sake of peace”.

Thus, in case of a long process (such as restoration of relations between Germany and France in the second half of the twentieth century, for example) it is possible to consider it in retrospect, gradually fixing its periods and stages. Therefore, like cameramen we grasp the reconciliation process in time, tying it to historical reasons and events of the beginning, to their being or non-being determined by specific reasons (political, religious, ethical).

However, determining the causes, considering them one by one, either generalizing or separating them, it is almost impossible to reconstruct a “trigger”, or, in other words, the point at which a decision on reconciliation, its necessity was accepted, but didn’t get its rational form. A “trigger” is an event in which people, who find themselves on opposite sides of the gap separating them (resentment, conflict, misunderstanding, suffering), start regarding each other fully-fledged moral subjects. This is a moment of fraternization, understanding, common grief, unity… It is the form in which national reconciliation in Australia was represented: the speech of the Prime Minister, apologizing to the indigenous people of the continent for segregation and discriminating policy of previous years (this also serves an example of taking institutional responsibility), was broadcast live, on thousands of outdoor screens and projectors.

It’s obvious that not every reconciliation process, including the one that was described in the example above, takes such optimistic and universal forms. It doesn’t always have even a primary event. The fact is that we need to
distinguish reconciliation as a natural process from an artificial process started or initiated by a third party and being entirely under their control.

The need for artificially forced reconciliation is partially caused by the need to prevent re-escalation of violence in difficult situations, such as under “transition period” conditions (Walker, 2006: 377-395). In this case the process starts from “above”. It is virtually imposed. Thus, it acquires a form of a carefully planned strategy, right tactics. All permissible means of compulsion (explicit and implicit) can be used for being involved in it. In particular, amnesty, reduction or change of the period and term of criminal punishment, aid or work in various social programs and organizations are offered to prospective participants. However, despite the fact that the periods of conciliatory programs as well as their financing are strictly fixed, and the course, terms and results of reconciliation are specified in advance and consistently recorded, it is hardly ever possible to predict the effectiveness of the measures planned.

Analyzing the experience of conciliatory programmes implementation, Briony Jones points out a problematic status of external initiatives in states which have recently come over war conflicts. Firstly, according to the author, there are two forms of “humanitarian interventions”. One of them bases upon interaction with new sovereign countries’ political institutes. It presupposes the government’s official responsibility for fulfillment of all necessary terms towards both its own people and foreign organizations. The second one implies work at the local level. In this case the initiated reconciliation processes must correspond to social and religious norms and values dominating in the territory (Jones, 2012: 128–130). Besides, “in the context of a sovereignty paradox, postwar reforms may be neither meaningful for people living in this community nor concordant with their own ideas of what is necessary for peace and reconciliation. This is important for two reasons. The first one is of an instrumental character: if the reforms are not controlled by local communities, they are less likely to be able to change generally accepted norms or root themselves at the local level. The second one is more significant: if the reforms are not important for the community, the opportunity for actual change in everyday life of those who have experienced violence will not be realized; as for inequality between those who have power to demand changes and those who are merely the objects of such changes, it will not disappear” (Jones, 2012: 130).

Thus, if a reconciliation process is initiated and controlled by the third side, it should be represented at several social levels at the same time and controlled by the reconciling societies. External factors and powers often become a necessary condition for conflict parties to take a fresh look at a current situation and their own past. However, it happens not always and sometimes can cause a new round of conflicts.

Lack of coordination and impossibility to foresee or predict the effectiveness of reconciliation programmes with a greater degree of certainty are caused by the absence of a common normative model of behavior, being the base of reconciliation. Undoubtedly, there are many local traditional and religious scenarios of reconciliation. Each of them may be either appropriate for a current situation and under certain circumstances, or, vice versa, contravening the expectations and preferences of other members of community. For instance, according to E. Doxtader, “in part, South Africa’s reconciliation process is composed of argumentation that calls on citizens to employ particular modes and attitudes of communication. /.../ The very occasion of reconciliation, historical animosity and deep disagreement over the nature
of justice and equality, marks a moment when the grounds of collective agreement cannot be presupposed. Accordingly, a compelling defense of reconciliation requires advocates to recognize and bridge an enormous range of needs and opinions” (Doxtader, 2002: 50-51).

Quite an interesting conclusion can be drawn out of the following statement: initiators of reconciliation processes are relatively free to choose means and methods to restore relationships or rethink past events, but they should base on both unique local social norms and traditions and international ethical and legal norms. Speaking about countries like Russia, for instance, where within the borders of one state a reconciliation process must necessarily involve understanding of numerous local problems, different from each other in their ethical, cultural, religious, historical, and even geographic significance, it is more likely to be presented as a series of isolated episodes or local processes, organized in compliance with their own unique programmes or scripts within the frame of a common strategy.

Discreteness and Duration

As it has been mentioned above, a reconciliation strategy makes it possible to organize multiple simultaneous reconciliation processes or actions within these processes in a single system. Certain actions, therefore, can slow down, or vice versa, be forced as priority ones (for example, cultural activities, education reforms, “memory books” establishment, etc.). These are ways of “managing the time”.

On the other hand, “managing the time” in the process of reconciliation means acceptance of quite diverse angles of vision of historic events, lined up in their chronological order and suggesting a common axiological basis of vision. The latter are obligatory for a reconciliation process not to be reversed and for the picture of the common past not to be destroyed. This process can be observed on the example of Lebanon, where the peace, set steady in early 90s of the XX century, is still too fragile and vulnerable to the challenges of the past, also being one of the factors that make a reconciliation process never completed in essence.

The word ‘reconciliation’ itself contains the idea of non-completeness, never ending approach to peace. Any initiated process (whether artificial or natural) is under threat of the situation when reconciliation might become an armistice in reality, that is when peace is concluded for a certain period, which is under threat to end. The armistice will be always a lengthy stage between the turns of disagreement, subject to rethinking. This is where the cause of the situation, when a reconciliation process is not perceived as a single unit taking place “here and now”, is rooted. The parties regard a reconciliation process as not quite real, yet to come one day, in the future of a steady peace. Thus, reconciliation is carried out in retrospect, through the awareness of the fact of its accomplishment.

But if the goals of an initiated process aim at something more than just restoration of relations or humility with the past, if a process is intended to construe the history as a ‘true’ one, focusing on both the past and the future, the question remains: what is the position of reconciliation towards history? It would be appropriate to agree with D. Agamben, who analyzed a witness’s non-marked and non-expressed position towards history and pointed out the following: “What is truly historical is not what redeems time in the direction of the future or even the past; it is, rather, what fulfills time in the excess of medium. The messianic Kingdom is neither the future (the millennium), nor the past (the golden age): it is, instead, a remaining time” (Agamben, 1999: 159). The endlessly receding horizon of absolute reconciliation is, actually, the messianic Kingdom.
It is impossible to achieve absolute reconciliation by other, more “practical” reasons as well. Firstly, restoration of relationships under the conditions when injuries of the past are still fresh in people’s memories are often reduced to the construction of necessary aspects of interaction while existing social gaps continue to exist at the level of rooting stereotypes, family narratives, etc. Secondly, if it refers to the events separated by time at a great distance, reconciliation starts affecting the aspects of mythological representations as well as numerous forms of manipulation and speculation associated with them, both modern ones and old obsolete residues. At the level of everyday interaction such partial process of reconciliation gradually gets over due to a newly breaking out “war of facts”, or, on the contrary, sinks into oblivion. One could say that in the latter case reconciliation is a sure thing, it happens with no parties’ effort. But the point is that the vision of the past, constructed by reconciliation, and the former points of conflict sink into oblivion as well. Therefore, to put it bluntly, reconciliation becomes unnecessary as new relations are built instead of former ones and there is nothing to reconcile with. Thirdly, no one can exclude situations when revelation of new traumatic facts of the past, caused, for example, by the fact that not all necessary archival documents were opened at the right time, or actualization (for example, an ideological one) of existing data, leads to the following: the whole system of formed relations goes to ruin again and a reconciliation process turns back.

The National Reconciliation

In his speech “Globalization, Peace, and Cosmopolitanism” delivered at the UNESCO headquarters, J. Derrida mentions: “The concept of “world” gestures toward a history, it has a memory that distinguishes it from that of the globe, of the universe, of Earth, of the cosmos even (at least of the cosmos in its pre-Christian meaning, which Saint Paul then Christianized precisely to make it say world as fraternal community of human beings, of fellow creatures, brothers, sons of God and neighbors to one another). For the world begins by designating, and tends to remain, in an Abrahamic tradition (Judeo-Christian-Islamic but predominantly Christian) a particular space-time, a certain oriented history of human brotherhood, of what in a Pauline language … calls citizens of the world (sympolitai, fellow citizens, [concitoyens] of the saints in the house of God), brothers, fellow men, neighbors, insofar as they are creatures and sons of God” (Derrida, 2002: 374-375). It is important to point out that the word “world” is used in J. Derrida’s English text in the meaning of a mode and container of a human’s existence. This word’s polysemantic meaning in the Russian language as well as in the Abrahamic tradition, dwelt upon in the statement above, turns out to be united in the context of reconciliation.

J. Derrida’s analysis of reconciliation in the context of the Abrahamic tradition is not incidental. It represents a relatively new way for conceptualization of reconciliation for us (it is important to mention that such concept existed long before we began discussing it). However, it will not be right to consider that reference to religion origins in our research contradicts to everything that has been said above about reconciliation. On the contrary, the research integrates all general grounds and objectives that form a conceptual (including political) focus of any reconciliation process, either naturally or artificially initiated. So, the words, nominating fraternity, universal (global) solidarity, abolishing borders and asserting the unity of all reconciling people, imply more than the attempt to get to the initially religious roots of some concepts.

In one form or another (whether secularized (the official language of “On Perpetuation ...” draft
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Each of our discussions of national reconciliation is based exactly on this ecumenical-and-fraternal idea, expressed in Abrahamic terms and originally implying quite certain absolute and absolutized values. (As for the concept of “nation”, it won’t be defined or specified in this article. There are numerous pieces of research devoted to this issue which is quite painful in some aspects of its understanding. We can hardly add something new to it. However, it will be impossible to avoid mentioning it.)

The point is not even in the fact that extreme simplification of the fraternity (“brotherhood”) concept will again lead us to that ideal horizon of the absolute “World in Peace” and, thus, another utopia creation. The “national component” of reconciliation, understood as fraternity or neighborliness, commits to (e.g., indulgence or debt forgiveness), demands (to be more tolerant others or others, to render aid or protection), prohibits (to commit acts or deeds if contrary to the base of fraternity). All these demands, prohibitions and obligations lie outside legal norms or legislative acts. They assume voluntariness and naturalness of subordination, remaining unchanged in its base over time.

Currently, national reconciliation expressed in Abrahamic terms is understood not only as a process offering the possibility of the future and preventing re-actualization of the negative past. It is also comprehended in the context of the eschatological chronotope, being one of the ways of (nationwide) salvation, rewarding messianic kingdom. This is true that the absolute peace, being a central point of meaning creation, is unattainable at least in a real worldly life. But through a variety of asynchronous painful reconciliation processes the perdition of humanity is postponed for an indefinite period that gives the next generations the opportunity to live further. Never ending getting nearer to the horizon disunites and at the same time destroys the borders, both physical or geographical and national in their integral historical, cultural, ethnic, and especially political problematic character. National reconciliation is not, therefore, a particular kind or type of reconciliation that has an obligatory and stable form in history, which, if adhered, makes it possible to achieve a desirable result. It is neither a mode of transmission of regional specificity emphasizing the dissimilarity of what is happening with what is “conventional”.

The national reconciliation is that “World in Peace” embodied and replicable by Scriptures, that we can neither express nor accept by any other way but in Abrahamic terms, which has long lost their direct link with religion, no more obvious to us (Derrida, 2001: 26).

Thus, the Abrahamic tradition, to which we resort mainly unconsciously, without assuming any religious ideas, forms our “self-evident” perspectives of understanding “the national component” of reconciliation that have already been outlined schematically above. Now we can theoretically term these perspectives as “the Unity”, “the Equality” and “the Borders”. Each of them is based on the transcendent absolute, the universal value and aim of a reconciliation process that is called “the unity in the face of history”, “collective responsibility”, “Amor Patriae” (or something else that imposes obligations on those who seek to restore the relationships) depending on the situation.

It is not correct to suppose that some abstractions or fine words, having no direct relation to the processes in a country or region, for example, are meant here. On closer inspection the perspectives of “the national component” understanding turn into very practical (strategic and tactical) issues of development and implementation of reconciliation programmes. Moreover, they determine socio-normative limits of programmes implementation.
The Unity

Thus, the idea of fraternity, being the basis of national reconciliation, presupposes a consolidating and uniting principle, bringing some semblance of uniformity for all those who resign themselves or restore relations. But who or what is involved in “the unity”? What are the roots of its foundations? Should it exist at all? It is clear that if we consider the main objective of “On the Perpetuation ...” programme, that is “to ensure the modernization of the Russian society’s and the Russian elite’s consciousness” (“On Perpetuation ...”), there will not be anything there but a queer contrast between “the Russian society” and “the Russian elites”, that are apparently not a part of the society, and the reference to the need to perform some manipulations (probably, similar ones) with their consciousness. However, below one can find quite an interesting statement which is more responsive to our goals: “The only thing one can be really proud of is the Great Patriotic War, but its uniting potential is getting exhausted over the years” (“On Perpetuation ...”). While initial religious understanding of the “World in Peace” formed the Unity on the idea of God, community of divine origin and messianic aspiration for the future, the present, secularized version of the Unity is based on the past (either glorious (the heroic feat in the Great Patriotic War) or painful (the victim of a totalitarian regime). It depends on the goals that need to be resolved: “A social community finds some historic ancestors, singles out historic events or periods that are crucial for the group identification. “The origins”, the eidolons of socio-cultural community genesis take a special place among these events and periods. / .... / The changes in the degree of remoteness of the historic past, related to the group’s identity, may provoke a change of that identity. / ... / In our country the projects of modern Russian identity in the choice of historical depth range from the period of Kievan Rus’ (or, in the most exotic versions, from a much more ancient Etruscan or Aryans times, etc.) – up to 1991” (Vasil’ev, 2009: 61).

The more painful the issue of the past event (the Civil War, the war in the North Caucasus) is, the fewer positions for the parties to hear each other’s points of view are, the more difficult it is to identify the messianic horizon of the common future which is a real aim of reconciliation. Consequently, the matter is not an authoritarian right to dispose of historical memory, either being formed now or formed a hundred or more years ago, as in this case the history understanding will be sharply contrasting, and, therefore, containing the possibility of the established peace destruction The matter is also not the national idea, theological in its essence, because its understanding at the official level may be quite contrary, or even conflicting, to its understanding by certain social groups.

For the national reconciliation to be understood and implemented from the perspective of unity we must be able to answer the following questions: Is there such a position in which the general horizon of the absolute peace wouldn’t presuppose domination of one way of understanding the past over the others? Does national reconciliation refer to one historic period only with distinctly specified frames of certain events and periods of time or it necessarily includes that extensive “reservoir of the past”, which, one way or another, is subject to intra-national manipulations and discord? And finally, are all the events equally significant? It is here where we face the need to consider the equality, regarded as another perspective of “the national component” of reconciliation.

The Equality

The idea of equality is extremely difficult because it inevitably draws us into the sphere of
the political, to the issues of justice, distribution of responsibility and pursuit of ultimate bases of compatibility. Moreover, being a part of this idea, the very status of “reconciling parties” turn out to be problematic: Who are they in relation to each other? Who do they intend to become for each other through reconciliation? Must this phenomenological conversion happen at all since in the Abrahamic tradition reconciliation is the event establishing “fraternity”?

Let’s imagine that this context will be provided to regard the issue of Stalinist repressions, one of the key issues for the national reconciliation in Russia. Who will be influenced or involved into the reconciliation process? They are, probably, those who identify themselves with the victims or the victims’ descendants, calling for justice, confirmation of their sacrificial status (the aim of perpetuation), and those who, either consciously or not, either personally or at the level of social institutions and even ethnic groups, are put into the category of perpetrators’ representants. In such a case the parties involved in the reconciliation process will be in the position of inequality. The party whose claims are of a greater significance under these circumstances will have the right to dictate their claims (public penance or satisfaction) to the other party in conformity with the idea of justice. But where will there be the borderline of an adequate assignment of a share of responsibility and guilt or the degree of the reconciling parties’ suffering? To what extent may an employee of a state department, who committed a crime once, pleaded to be this department’s representant, apologized on their behalf, claim his belonging to the victims as he is a descendant of those who fell victims to the repressions machine? What should those, who are descendants of both the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) employees and the victims of political repressions, do in this situation?

It is likely that the conflictogenuity degree of the above mentioned issues could be mitigated by setting a single mode of equalizing the attitude to the past through the recognition of general guilt, general sacrifice or both at the same time: “all of us are victims of our own guilt”. If the idea of equality is formed within the Abrahamic tradition, then by giving preference to one or another modus we actually confess our sins assigned by the position of victims and the position of executioners, and we do so in front of God, setting hopes for being donated with unity and peace. In a secular, secularized vision of the issue, the place of God is occupied by something else which is external to a rallying nation of brothers in sin or sacrifice. The matters might be other countries or nations, the International Convention on Human Rights, the trial of history towards which the community of reconciling parties becomes homogenized and “truly equal” (Kerimov, 2007: 79-84).

For ourselves the fraternity in sin or sacrifice will be based on different principles. Elder and younger brothers, supporting and taking care of each other, dominating each other, competing, instructing, leading others astray, indifferent or too biased ... Out of external absolute, general guilt or sacrifice will prove to be split and separating (Ibid., 79-84). Therefore, the issue will be always with a touch of a specific guilt and a specific sacrifice, the only of their kind. In this case reconciliation will require personalization of a significant degree, search for certain ways of interaction that would suggest each participant of the process an opportunity to be heard. As applied to the national reconciliation in Russia, this claim is complicated by the fact that the classical idea of the nation, “inscribed” in the borders of a single state (nation = state) (Gadzhiev, 2011: 5-10; Chernilo, 2008: 12-18), is no longer suitable. Regarding the equality as a perspective of “the national component” of reconciliation turns out to
be impossible without regarding the perspective of “the borders”.

**The Borders**

As it can be inferred from the text, “On Perpetuation” programme first and foremost focuses on understanding a set of events covering the “Soviet power formation and establishment” period from 1917 to somewhere mid 50-ies of XX century. We should admit that the national reconciliation, referred to in this programme, cannot be “inscribed” in the borders of the Russian Federation of nowadays only. They are too narrow for such a large-scale regard to history. At least, the matter had to be regarded the following way: the process of restoration of the relations involves all the states which were the republics of the former Soviet Union. In a broader sense, the descendants or legal representatives of those who used to participate in what was going on and for whom the appeal to this tragic period is something more than a tribute to the “political civility” should be involved in reconciliation.

Thus, “the national component” of reconciliation is deprived of its specific territorial claim but at the same time it doesn’t turn to the size of omnitude, globality. The attempt to consider reconciliation within the well-established Abrahamic tradition becomes problematic since blurring of the boundaries makes it almost impossible to suggest a single and universal external absolute and, consequently, to appeal to the idea of fraternity with a single eschatological chronotope of existence inherent to it.

Undoubtedly, the issues of correlation between a large-scale process of humility and / or restoration of relations with numerous “national histories”, including the history of Russia, will become the most acute in case of the revision of the basis of the national reconciliation in Russia (we should think about the necessity of another term for the ‘reconciliation’ concept that would imply the idea of the territory to a lesser extent). Cross-border reconciliation without any basis is probably disadvantageous and undesirable in situations when the right to an official vision of the past becomes a way of asserting national sovereignty, national, ethnic, territorial unity, and “the war of histories” turns into a tool of foreign policy, “unconditional” (Finkel, 2010: 53-55), cross-border reconciliation is probably not profitable and desirable. As an artificial process, it is doomed to be the subject of diplomatic bargaining and deals for years, until it will gradually lose its relevance and value, or get its natural character by destroying institutional barriers. Which scenario will be implemented in reality depends on us only.

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**References**

К вопросу о национальном примирении в России:
ракурсы проблематизации

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Статья посвящена исследованию вопроса о национальном примирении в России, в контексте социально-философского анализа понятия «примирения». Примирение, в двойственности своих значений, всегда есть нечто большее, чем просто «восстановление отношений» или «смирение с произошедшим». В истоках нашего понимания примирения (и в частности, национального примирения) лежит авраамическая традиция обращения к горизонту абсолютного мира, в секуляризированном своём варианте предстающая как внешнее по отношению к примиряющимся сторонам основание «коллективная вина или ответственность», «любовь к Родине», «суд истории». Авраамической традицией формируются наши «самоочевидные» ракурсы понимания «национального компонента» примирения, которые мы можем условно обозначить как «единство», «равенство» и «границы», которые при более детальном рассмотрении, превращаются в сугубо практические (стратегические и тактические) вопросы разработки и воплощения в жизнь примиренческих программ, и кроме того, определяют социально-нормативные рамки их (программ) реализации.

Ключевые слова: примирение, историческая память, мир, авраамическая традиция.