Dynamics of Nationalities Policy in USSR and their Manifestations in the Daily Living of Citizens: on the Phenomenon of the Diffusion of Interethnic Marriages

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The article analyses the history of Nationalities Policy in USSR on its refraction to the private life of citizens, in the area of marital relations and ethnic self-identity of descendants. There are some graphical models of correlations between Nationalities Policy and mating behavior of Soviet citizens. The author’s theory of Implicit Generalized Cultural Script also set out in the paper. The author uses this theory as explanatory model of some social, demographic, cultural and political processes.

Keywords: interethnic marriages, interethnic relations, daily life, descendants of interethnic marriages, ethic self-identity.

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Settings in culture are not accidental – their focus is set by culture as a whole. According to Roy D’Andrade, the world is a powerful, unlimited “flow of material.” It is indifferent for us; we may not perceive it at all. As the elements of this flow acquire certain significance for us, “significant systems” are distinguished from it (D’Andrade, 1984: 110). Each culture defines its own filter that selects “significant systems” for its carriers. The world we live in is perceived by us only through what matters to us, both personally and ethnoculturally.

Therefore, our world is “intentional”, which means it is selectively constructed in our imagination within our culture (Shweder, 1991: 74).

Since we acquire “significant systems” belonging to one particular culture, we also unconsciously acquire something common that there is in its scenarios, this common condenses in our psyche, most likely in the unconscious than in the consciousness, and the “generalized models” of interaction, the representations of interaction models are imprinted in us. It is these
representations that influence how a person sees the world.

Private scenarios form the basic structure of culture – an implicit generalized cultural scenario (hereinafter referred to as IGCS) (Lourie, 2017). It generates the entire spectrum of possible interactions in a given culture, includes all the possible models of perception and action in a particular culture. IGCS is like a skeleton of culture with its spine with vertebrae in the form of modal structures of perception and action and branches of all permissible variations of action in this culture. IGCS is specific for each culture.

Since infancy we have become part of cultural scenarios based on systems that are significant in intentional culture (Cole, 1996: 208). They determine the significant systems accepted by IGCS that constitute the experience of a person in culture. This happens within the framework of a stable cultural scenario that is passed on from generation to generation. But crisis epochs destroy IGCS. Culture, however, does not tolerate emptiness and new scenarios are formed in it, a new tradition that is more or less stable.

The new IGCS is formed on the basis of new private cultural scenarios that are formed spontaneously in various spheres of interaction between cultural actors that themselves become such and acquire their cultural role through the emergence in culture of a new filter that redefines significant systems of a given culture. This process is associated with the change of value and worldview systems in a society, but it is not a direct consequence of it. Ideologemes that are common in a society are subject to interpretation and reinterpretations, they are the basis for production of action scenarios that are much more complex and branched out than any ideologeme. Ideologemes can be rejected by the society, as impossible to implement in the action scenarios. In turn, the emerging scenarios in the society themselves generate ideologemes that are more or less widespread.

Marriage behaviour of cultural actors is also determined by IGCS, because it is a model of action coupled with the entire scheme of action algorithms that culture dictates. As a rule, those who enter into marriage are people whose interaction possibility is determined by IGCS of their culture or cultures existing within the framework of single or conjugate implicit generalized cultural scenarios.

Let us consider this by the example of marital behaviour in the USSR, when for the first time in culture of the peoples living in this country; the possibility of widespread occurrence of marriages between their representatives arose.

In the Russian Empire, marriages not only between people of different faiths and cultures were rarity, but also between representatives of different peoples of the same faith and those close to each other culturally, in particular, between Orthodox Slavs, even in ethno-contact zones (Gantskaia, Terent’eva, 1977: 461). But even after the revolution in 1917, when all obstacles to inter-ethnic marriages were legislatively eliminated, such marriages were rare – up until the Great Patriotic War. Soviet culture of the 1920’s breaks down national, social, cultural marital barriers, but the new cultural model of marriage is not yet developed. And the direction of the development of the Soviet society of that period gave little for the creation of a common Soviet cultural integrity, the formation of a single “we” of Soviet peoples.

Let us consider how the national policy in the USSR was changing and how it contributed to or hindered the formation of a common cultural scenario for the peoples of the USSR. The ideologemes that determine national relations in the USSR undoubtedly influenced popular cultural scenarios of interethnic relations, but these scenarios were much more complex and...
more vital for their party ideologemes, for they arose from the experience of people’s interaction. In the 1920’s, a Soviet “localization policy” had been carried out in the national sphere. This is the time when not only national republics, but also national districts and village councils were created. Schools encouraged teaching in the national language: the Russian language was optional in national schools. National writing languages had been widely created on the basis of the Latin alphabet. The growth of national personnel, especially managerial and cultural had been stimulated. National units had been created in the army. At the same time, the fight against national traditional culture and intellectuals of indigenous nationalities had been getting intensified. The concept of “patriotism” that should have united the inhabitants of the country was rejected – everything was subordinated to the interests of the world revolution. The Russians were accused of oppressing non-Russian peoples in the Russian Empire, and they were offered to redeem their guilt by unselfishly helping other peoples, without expecting any gratitude from them.

The “localization policy” helped many small-numbered peoples of the USSR to rise, but on the whole it had a negative impact on the national policy of the country, disunited the country. There was no cultural scenario for the peoples living together. Perhaps, a situation in the 1920’s contributed to a certain number of interethnic marriages between those who united on a class basis, but it did not become a noticeable phenomenon.

The 1930’s were a start for propagation of Soviet patriotism in exchange for an international class ideology. A gradual transition to Russia-centred policy occurred. The Russian language became official for the army and compulsory in schools. The Russians were said to had led the people’s struggle for freedom and were helping to develop all the Soviet peoples and for this everyone should be thankful to them. The heroes of Russian state history were recognized, as well as Russian “noble” literature. National written languages are converted from the Latin alphabet into the Cyrillic one.

But it is unlikely that the Russian culture – severely truncated in the Stalinist interpretation – could unify the diverse residents of the USSR under those conditions. It was necessary to generate its new imperial refraction; people needed a scenario, in which a notion of the national would have been introduced into a certain framework involving interaction between nationalities. Without this, even the occurrence of the concept “Soviet patriotism” was not enough for a new self-identity common to the peoples of the USSR. Therefore, there is no significant number of interethnic marriages between representatives of the peoples of the USSR.

In addition, and this is extremely important, the formation of a new cultural scenario is connected with the readiness of society for new self-organization, which requires a certain emotional-positive charge, an energy push, an existential joint experience of different representatives of this new “we”. For a multinational country, it is the experience of what can be called an “ethnic connection”. Cultural scenarios of different peoples are combined in such a way that different ethnic cultural systems begin to operate according to the principles of functioning of a single culture, even if there are those conflicting with each other, in such a way that they support the existence and prosperity of the common in their interaction (Lourie, 1994). Each of the cultures of the peoples of the USSR had to break the common scenario in its own way and interact as part of a single culture that generates common or mutually consistent patterns of behaviour.

It seems that such a common existential experience was the ominous Great Patriotic War,
and a victory in it was an energetic positive impetus for the formation of a new Soviet scenario. In the development of the emerging ideology the war is no longer proclaimed class, but Patriotic, peoples. An accent in propaganda is made on Russian history and Russian heroes. The Church begins to be supported. It is assumed that other peoples should help the Russians. Russian patriotism and Soviet patriotism merge into each other. Although it is not uncommon for non-Russian soldiers to refuse to fight because it is a Russian war that does not concern them, the majority perceives the war as their own and expresses solidarity with the Russians. There is a sense of combat unity, from which “us” is born (for the first time!).

It was this experience that gave grounds for the formation of a common scenario of interethnic relations, which later Soviet ideologists called “fraternity of peoples”. It was then when the boom of interethnic marriages began. A Central Asian researcher L.Kh. Sabieva writes: “Most mixed families were formed during the Great Patriotic War (or soon after its end) due to the serving of the natives of Central Asia in the Soviet Army. Former soldiers and officers brought their wives from different places in Ukraine, Byelorussia and other territories set free from the Nazi invaders, from Karelia, Leningrad, Volgograd, Voronezh, etc.” (Sabieva, 1974: 83). “In the post-war years, interethnic families turned into a mass phenomenon” (Susokolov, 1987). A rapid increase in interethnic marriages after the war evidenced that a grassroots ethno-integrated scenario was actively developing in the USSR.

In the post-war years, I.V. Stalin continues to support the “Russian”, does not totally cancel the Church’s indulgence, although is disappointed in the possibility of its political use. However, the “Russian” begins to be understood as the extra-ethnic, the Russian people is understood as a people-cement bonding the Union.

In the first years of his government, N.S. Khrushchev speaks of the coming fusion of the Soviet nations into one. But then he changes the program only declaring “the rapprochement of the socialist nations with the simultaneous prosperity of each.” Now it is assumed that under communism, nations will continue to exist for a long time, and their fusion is a long process. The term “fraternity of peoples” emerges in the mid-1950’s. The appeal to the Russian comes to an end, the “Russian” begins to be persecuted again and the persecution of the Church is resumed. But the role of the Russian language in the state is increasing; its use in national schools is increasing.

The “fraternity of peoples” ideologeme post factum determined the phenomenon of interaction between the peoples of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. It also assumed the mutual assistance of the peoples of the USSR, was not so obviously centred on Russian culture and history, although it was the Russian people who, according to it, were the first to provide assistance and support to other peoples. But the main point is that the “word” was said. On the basis of commonality of the experience of the military brotherhood, the grassroots scenario “fraternity of peoples” began to take shape. At that time migration to large construction projects and industrial facilities was perceived as a manifestation of the “fraternity of peoples”, and relations on construction projects evolved in accordance with the new national cultural scenario. Within its framework, marriages of representatives of different nationalities became more and more possible.

L.I. Brezhnev continues the national policy of Khrushchev. It is a question of the rapprochement of the socialist nations in their heyday. The “fraternity of peoples” ideologeme is actively being exploited. In the very beginning of the 1970’s, a term “Soviet people” confined to
the 50th anniversary of the USSR emerges, which is understood as a system that is higher than the nation and that includes Soviet socialist nations. The RSFSR plays the role of a donor in relation to the Soviet republics; the Russian people are spoken of as an elder brother who is called upon to render unselfish help. But there are no appeals to Russian traditions. De facto, in republics there is a return to the “localization policy”, “national quotas” get to emerge. The call for the stability of personnel destroys the ground for repression, but national nomenclatures and clans are being created.

The ideologeme “Soviet people” gave the basis for an explicit common self-identification of the peoples of the USSR. S. Ualieva, E. Edgar in their article about interethnic marriages in Kazakhstan quote the statement of one of the respondents, half-Kazakh-half-Russian, about the marriage of her parents: “It is hard to say that this is an interethnic marriage. This is a mono-ethnic marriage, because they both were Soviet people” (Ualiyeva, Edgar 2011).

At the end of the 1970’s and beginning of the 1980’s, the grassroots scenario “fraternity of peoples” is becoming less ideological. This is the time of the prevalence of ever more individualistic interests. The percentage of interethnic marriages in society continues to grow, although not that fast. In a number of regions – in Central Asia and Kazakhstan – there has been a slight decrease in the percentage of interethnic marriages among all marriages in these republics, although it is a matter of percentage shares. A.A. Susokolov cites data that in Uzbekistan “the share of interethnic families from all families in the republic decreased from 10.9 % to 10.5 % in the period from 1970 to 1979, and their number increased from 234 thousand to 278 thousand during this period, or by 7 %” (Susokolov, 1987). In the European republics of the USSR, the percentage of interethnic marriages either stabilized, as in Moldova, reaching 42 %, or continued to grow, as in the Baltic states, for example in Tallinn, reaching 32 % by the end of the 1970’s. In general, according to the 1989 census, interethnic marriages accounted to 17.5 %, while in some republics – Latvia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Moldova, the number were much larger: about a quarter of all marriages and more.

Since the “fraternity of peoples” scenario was the basis of interethnic marriages in the USSR, we will pay special attention to it.

Fraternity of Peoples” was also an ideological formula that was developed rather poorly, and a real scenario of interhuman relations, rich in content and full of nuances, which did not always develop in accordance with the Soviet national policy. Of course, the Soviet national policy had a certain influence on its formation, when it appealed to the unity of the peoples of the USSR; it gave the ground for the formation of a single image of “we”. But the behavioural models that, in fact, compose the scenario emerged as a result of popular art.

“Fraternity of Peoples” is a form of mutual relations between representatives of different peoples based on avoiding conflicts, giving game forms to confrontation, cultivating the art of compromise, of what is called tact in national relations, but essentially forming a supranational cultural community that is pervaded by common behavioural patterns and, what is especially important, examples of the intercultural dialogue interaction. Its participants are people who lost most of their folk traditions, but retained their national identity (Lurie, 2011). First and foremost, these are the non-national migrant colonists in the national republics (for large construction projects and industrial enterprises) and part of the indigenous population of the republics that is isolated from folk culture in many respects, although not turned into lumpen, but managed to become material for a new culturogenesis.
However almost all the representatives of the peoples of the USSR who, due to some circumstances, have found themselves in a different national environment (for example, on a business trip), realize the same scenario. So, it can rightfully be called a grassroots common-Soviet scenario of interethnic interaction. And the nationality perceived in the context of this scenario as a role, allowed a person to easily join in a dialogue with another person with a different nationality-role and be clear to him.

We see that the “Fraternity of Peoples” is a scenario of communication, a scenario of relations. The main point in it is the ability to understand the other, which was facilitated by the fact that the other played an anticipated role; the differences between people of different nationalities concerned seemingly strictly defined spheres and were deliberately demonstrated. The interaction was based on mutual compromises that were possible precisely because the positions of the subjects of compromises had already been determined by the role in the scenario. Peoples that were traditionally competing and even feuding had to sublimate their hostility, to represent it only in a playful form. A society, in which the “fraternity of peoples” scenario was realized, was the society of endless mutual compromises, the number of which was so big that they turned into the very meaning of social life, and got sharpened to the level of art. A certain “politesse” was formed in it, tactfulness, smoothing of sharp corners was valued. Of course, this was a game to a great extent. But the game penetrated so deep that it became life.

What is the role of Russians in the “fraternity of peoples” scenario? This scenario is one of the forms of expression of the Russian imperial complex, including in its grassroots. The objective of Russians in the cultural scenario “fraternity of peoples” is central, it was they who put the ideological meaning in the scenario and connected two scenarios (“fraternity of peoples” and “ahead of the curve”) through their national culture.

The cultural etalon of the “fraternity of peoples” was not the Russian ethnic culture, but the Russian imperial, state culture, as it was in the Soviet era, based on the idea of primacy in achievements and, in many respects, on an end in itself (“there will be apple blossoms on Mars”). This culture was refracted into the all-Soviet culture that also had various national and regional refractions in the republics. At the same time, Russian nationality was often perceived as a lack of nationality, Russian culture was perceived not as national, but as nationwide “cement”. To
some extent this has strengthened in the minds of Russian people. Therefore, it is possible that Russians easily entered into interethnic marriages: they do not look intercultural.

The percentage of interethnic marriages in the republics is determined not by the number and diversity of the ethnic composition of the republic’s population, but by the percentage of Russians in this population and by the cultural compatibility of the Russian and the indigenous population of the republic. So A.A. Susokolov cites figures: in 1979 in Azerbaijan, non-indigenous nationalities accounted for 22 %, in the Lithuanian SSR – 20 %. However, in Lithuania the number of interethnic marriages is 1.5 times bigger. Similarly, a share of the non-indigenous population in Tajikistan is larger than in Moldova (41 and 36 % respectively), and the percentage of interethnic families in Moldova is 1.5 times higher than in Tajikistan. The researcher concludes that “the share of interethnic marriages does not conforms to the share of the foreign population in the republic... Of all the indicators of the national composition, it is the share of Russians that determines most what the percentage of interethnic families in the republic will be” (Susokolov, 1987).

Iu.V. Arutunian and Iu.V. Bromley have a similar conclusion: “The Russian population is becoming more active in interethnic marriages... An increase or, conversely, a decrease in the share of the Russian population in the republics leads to a corresponding change in the share of interethnic families” (Arutunian, Bromley, 1986: 155).

Migration that mostly affected the Russians, but also the representatives of other peoples of the USSR, was the driving force behind the formation of interethnic nuptiality in the USSR. Especially large percentage of interethnic marriages was at all-Soviet Union construction projects, in “young cities” that were home for young people torn from the national and family contexts, and therefore open to the influence of the Soviet ideology. “International teams at small and large construction projects contribute to the creation of interethnic families. Young cities that have arisen at sites of construction projects are multinational in composition of the population. For example, in Sumgait there are representatives of 70 nationalities, in Volzhsky – 70, in Rustavi – 56, in Temirchau – 50, etc. Naturally, the number of interethnic marriages is quite large here... The Virgin Lands Campaign, in which the whole country participated, led to the creation of state farms with a multinational composition and to a large number of interethnic families” (Sochinskaia, 1983: 5-6). This is what we read in the propaganda literature. But the data of Soviet scientific publications agree with this. “A big share of interethnic marriages is observed in medium and small cities that have arisen around some industrial facility or all-Soviet Union construction site and have a multinational population. For example, in the relatively small town of Nurek, the share of interethnic marriages in 1975 was 37.6 %. As a comparison, let us point out that in a much larger city of Leninabad, the share of such marriages in the same year was 21.6 %” (Sabieva, 1979: 17). One may say: “The reasons for the growth and increase in the number of interethnic marriages lie... in the disproportion of the developed socio-demographic and national structure of the population of marriageable age as a consequence of planning the development of the national economic complex” (Ustinova, 1990: 217).

This created a special layer of the population – migrants in the industrialized cities of the Soviet Union republics, at large construction sites and in young cities, where the share of interethnic marriages was increasingly approaching the theoretical probability. It was here where the scenario of “fraternity of peoples” was realized to the full extend, and
the multinational participants were actually “Soviet people” who were the carriers of not only national but also all-Soviet scenarios. Interethnic marriages within this environment became not so much interethnic, as marriages within one community, “Soviet” nationality.

But national migration led to the growth of interethnic marriages in new cities not mechanically. L.M. Drobizheva gives a curious observation: “In the young town of Novocheboksarsk (Chuvashia), the statistics of interethnic marriages during the time of active formation of the city were studied. The “boom” of interethnic marriages took place in the city during the first two or three years of the mass interethnic communication, then their share decreased and remained relatively stable for almost 7-8 years, and only in the tenth year of cohabitation the share of interethnic marriages started to grow again” (Drobizheva, 1981: 209).

How can this be explained? At the first stage in the young city there is still a non-structured environment where there are no stable cultural scenarios, neither old nor new, and therefore there are no cultural barriers for interethnic marriages between different members of the society. Then comes the stabilization of the new society, and since the new cultural and psychological community develops gradually, the old settings make themselves felt: there are more same nation marriages. The formation of a new cultural scenario based on the common “we” of the recently-new settlers, in which marriages between people of different nationalities will not already be exogamous, occurs in secret and does not show until after a while. So in each case of formation of a new international community, the process of formation of its generalized cultural scenario conditioned by cultural laws takes place.

The percentage of interethnic marriages in the USSR was growing, but not rectilinearly. The dynamics of the change in the share of interethnic marriages in each republic is different, especially for marriages with participation of representatives of the indigenous nationality. The percentage of interethnic marriages in various republics was very different: from 27.5 % in Latvia to 3.8 % in Armenia. “The differences between the republics in terms of the share of interethnic families not only did not decrease, but also constantly increased... The share of interethnic families in the Soviet Union republics deviated from the all-Soviet Union index in 1959 by 35 % on average, in 1970 – by 36, and in 1979 – by 39 %” (Susokolov, 1987).

According to O.A. Gantskaia and L.N. Terent’eva, in the European republics of the USSR and in Transcaucasia, “the combination in conjugal unions of representatives of the indigenous nationality of a given republic with the Russians prevailed. For example, in the Latvian and Estonian SSR such families make up over 32 % of the total number of interethnic families, in the Armenian SSR – about 40 %, in the Azerbaijani and Georgian SSR – 24-26 %. In the Central Asian republics, the families, in which spouses belong to the indigenous nationalities of the region, are quantitatively related to the combinations indicated above. For example, in the Turkmen SSR, the Turkmen-Russian families account for 11 % of the total number of interethnic families, while the Turkmen-Uzbek families account for 8 %. In the Tajik SSR, the number of Tajik-Uzbek families is 2.5 times bigger than the number of Tajik-Russian families” (Gantskaia, Terent’eva, 1975: 465).

What is interesting is that in the RSFSR, despite the large Komsomol construction projects and the growth of young cities in Siberia, vast foreign inclusions, not to mention the autonomous republics, where the percentage of interethnic marriages sometimes reached 50 %, as in Karelia or the Komi ASSR, the percentage of interethnic marriages in whole was not great –
14.7. Apparently, this was due to the fact that there were very few interethnic marriages in Russian villages and in small and medium-sized cities.

In his book A.A. Susokolov points out a lot of contradictory facts connected with interethnic nuptiality. Thus, for example, urbanization, migration from a village to a city does not always contribute to the growth of interethnic marriages. In Tbilisi, for example, former Georgian rural residents rarely entered into interethnic marriages, whereas in Tallinn, on the contrary – rural migrants-Estonians, willingly and much more often than the Estonians-citizens, entered into marriages with Russians (Susokolov, 1987).

It was mostly different layers of the population of different peoples that entered into interethnic marriages. In the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, in Moldova, mainly citizens and members of the intelligentsia entered into marriages with Russians and other Slavs – a Soviet intellectual stratum was being created, which was integrated into the Soviet scenario. R. Achylova believes that “the working class is assimilated more quickly than the peasantry; the technical intelligentsia is assimilated more quickly than the humanitarian intelligentsia” (Achylova, 1987: 151). As noted by O.A. Gantskaia and L.N. Terent’eva, “interethnic marriages occur more often among the local intelligentsia than in other social categories of the population of Kyrgyzstan.” These authors also report that in Uzbekistan, interethnic marriages happen more often among the intelligentsia as well, and especially often among teachers (Gantskaia, Terent’eva, 1975: 473). In Moldova, “the share of specialists entering into interethnic marriages is about the same as among those entering into same nation marriages” (Susokolov, 1987). However, “among Estonians and Georgians, the working class was more inclined to interethnic marriages, and to a lesser extent – specialists... A similar regularity is observed among Estonians of Tallinn” (Susokolov, 1987).

Among the Central Asian peoples, it was mostly men who entered into marriages with representatives of the Slavie peoples. As A.I. Narynbaev writes, “Kyrgyz girls, like other girls of local nationalities, are much less likely to marry Russian, Ukrainian and other young men of European nationalities” (Narynbaev, 1966: 69). “Marriages between Central Asian women and Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian men are especially rare” (Sabieva, 1979: 17). Among the Baltic nations, women entered into interethnic marriages more often than men. According to M.Ia. Ustinova, “Lithuanian women enter into interethnic marriages more often than men do (57 % and 43 % respectively)” (Ustinova, 1990: 209).

Such a different dynamics for different peoples needs an explanation. Is it possible to trace the embodiment of Soviet cultural scenarios by different peoples according to the share of interethnic marriages? Relying on the opinion of Soviet researchers, one can say that a small percentage of interethnic marriages itself did not mean detachment from the all-Soviet Union scenario. As L.M. Drobizheva wrote, “for some peoples, for example, the nationalities of Central Asia, same nation marriages are tightly linked to the whole system of traditional culture... and cannot be directly and unconditionally interpreted as an indicator of interethnic relations” (Drobizheva, 1981: 220).

But, based on the above data on the lower percentage of interethnic marriages amongst the Estonian and Georgian intelligentsia than amongst the workers, we can say that the level of nationalism in their environment was high, was in conflict with a trend to form a Soviet generalized scenario spreading through the whole USSR to a certain extent.

The involvement of the peoples of the USSR in the Soviet cultural scenarios depended on the
intensity of their own national cultural scenarios not only of peoples as whole, but also of different parts of these peoples. Thus, in literature, we find a reference to the fact that from the very first years of the Soviet power the “dispersed living Armenians and Latvians most often entered into interethnic marriages in the European part of the USSR” (Kozlov, 1982: 265). Also in the 1970’s “the greatest desire for homogenous marriages is demonstrated by the peoples of Central Asia, the least – by the Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Armenians with large groups living outside Armenia” (Kozlov, 1982: 270). Meanwhile, the share of interethnic marriages in the Armenian SSR was the lowest in the USSR. According to census data in 1959, there were 3.2 % of interethnic marriages in Armenia, in 1979 – 4.0 %, in 1989 – 3.8 %. The percentage of non-Armenian population in the Armenian SSR was also extremely low, migrants went there, but did not get accustomed, so, despite the Soviet policy of conscious internationalization of republics, Armenia remained monoethnic. This is due to the fact that at that time in Armenia with the centre in Yerevan, not affecting Armenians outside of Armenia, there was a violent intra-ethnic process of forming a new own cultural scenario designed to psychologically compensate for the Armenian genocide tragedy in Turkey at the beginning of the 20th century that was associated with the Russian cultural scenario in a specific way, through the transfer of the patron image to Russians in the worldview of Armenians (Lurye, Davtyan, 2012).

Now let us consider the Soviet ideologeme, as it was expressed in the reflection on interethnic marriages. First of all, from the point of view of Soviet researchers, it testifies to the rapprochement of the USSR peoples, i.e. assimilation. Since the 1960s Soviet ideologists did not speak about the merging of all Soviet nations into one, but the idea that these nations were assimilating to each other, becoming closer, was central. V.I. Kozlov was sure that “the very appearance and increasing frequency of such marriages attested to the beginning of...
rapprochement between the nations” (Kozlov, 1982: 262). According to A.A. Susokolov, “the growth of interethic marriages is both an indicator and a factor in the development of the ethnic assimilation and consolidation processes” (Susokolov, 1987).

But who assimilated to whom or to what? The fact that this was assimilation to the Russians was hardly admitted by the Soviet sources. I found only one mentioning of this view in one of the first studies of interethic marriages in the Soviet scientific literature. In 1966 the Kirghiz researcher A.I. Narynbaev wrote as the following: “The importance of interethic marriage between young men of Central Asian nationalities and Russian women is evident for the families of non-Russian nationalities. In interethic families representatives of other nationalities perceive progressive traditions, customs, way of life and culture of the great Russian nation” (Narynbaev, 1966: 69). With a very big assumption, one can consider the passage of the Azerbaijani researcher G.Sh. Sadykhov as a reference to the assimilation of the non-Russian population by Russians: “Young representatives of the Russian nation with its cultural, historical and revolutionary traditions, with a highly developed sense of national solidarity, with its atheistic worldview, often marry representatives of various peoples of our country” (Sadykhov, 1982: 40-41). More characteristic is the utterance of L.Kh. Sabieva: “Interethic marriages show that the strengthening of fraternity between the USSR peoples, the process of bringing the socialist nations together, led to a significant expansion of the bases for the compatibility of the spiritual world of people of different nationalities; the creation of all-Soviet moral ideals, views on family life, the upbringing of children, the transformation of internationalism into the moral norm of Soviet people... The internationalization of marital and family relations has become an essential prerequisite for forming a single Soviet way of life in the USSR” (Sabieva, 1979: 2, 14). This idea was also supported by N.P. Skachkova: “Members of an interethic family in everyday practice unite the best features of both nations and directly or indirectly contribute to fostering the features of multinational all-Soviet ideas” (Skachkova, 1977: 13). Interethic families were also seen as “one of the ways of forming a new historical community – the Soviet people” (Sochinskaia, 1983: 10).

But more often the researchers simply mentioned the rapprochement of the peoples: “The role of the family is most obvious in such ethnic processes as assimilation and integration, where interethic marriages are the most important leverage” (Sobolenko, 1980: 257). V.I. Kozlov emphasises interpenetrating cultures: “The assimilation processes widely developed in our multinational country are largely conditioned by the spread of international marriages between representatives of already formed peoples who have a fairly clear national identity” (Kozlov, 1982: 263).

However, heterogeneous marriages “often ... unite people who have already been assimilated both culturally and linguistically”, and therefore it is impossible to exaggerate their significance in the matter of assimilation (Achylova, 1987: 151). In many respects, interethic marriages themselves are the result of assimilative processes in the society: “There is compatibility of behavioural norms, the possibility of mutual understanding for people of different nationalities, even in such a sphere of communication as the family, which contributes to the nationally mixed marriages and creation of interethic families” (Arutiunian, Bromlei, 1986: 152).

As regards the state aspect, in interethic families there was an assimilation to the Soviet-imperial, state mode. In the ethnic sense, assimilation was mutual: non-Russian people...
adopted the Russian language, while Russian migrant colonists – the everyday habits and the normative system of the indigenous peoples in the republics where they lived.

Interethnic families were often Russian-speaking, even if their members were not Russian by nationality: “In most nationally mixed families, communication is either in both languages or in Russian only. Often the Russian language is used in intra-family communication in interethnic families, even when none of the spouses is Russian” (Susokolov, 1987).

L.N. Terent’eva remarks that “with the spread of bilingualism in almost all variants of interethnic marriages the Russian language becomes a language of intra-family communication. There is also a more rapid spread of the Russian language among the relatives of this married couple, their friends and neighbours” (Terent’eva, 1972: 6).

L.Kh. Sabieva believes that “the increasing number of interethnic marriages is one of the essential factors redounding to the spread of the Russian language as a language of interethnic communication and as a second language for people of non-Russian nationality” (Sabieva, 1979: 16). At the same time, A.A. Susokolov notes that it is not so much interethnic marriages that have conduced the spread of bilingualism, but “the very people who are fluent in the language of interethnic communication and so they are more likely to marry someone of another nationality”(Susokolov, 1987).

Everywhere in the republics the Russian vaunted culture and the Russian language were promoted. But in behavioural terms, Russian migrants in the republics assimilated to the local indigenous population: “The Russian language as a language of interethnic communication is much more intensively learned by representatives of indigenous nationality than the language of the latter by the Russian population. On the contrary, the peculiarities of social and normative culture, the behavioural culture of indigenous nationalities are more quickly perceived by the Russian population. Thus, one can observe as if counter flows of ethno-cultural information. One of the indicators of the preservation of traditional norms in the family is the answer to the question: is it necessary to ask the consent of the parents to marry?.. Comparison of the results of the survey among the urban population in various republics shows that the proportion of those who consider it obligatory to ask the consent of the parents to marry is approximately the same both for the Russian population and the indigenous peoples” (Arutiunian, Bromlei 1986: 164).

A.A. Susokolov supposes that in the future “the ever increasing adaptation (as regards the groups of non-indigenous origin, including the Russian population) to the culture of the indigenous peoples in the union and autonomous republics will play a dramatic role in the development of interethnic communication, as well as in the linguistic aspect”. Even now, the non-indigenous population grasps the norms of behaviour and childbirth, elements of rituals and material culture characteristic of indigenous nationalities...

Interethnic marriages will further favour the assimilation of the non-indigenous population in the union and autonomous republics” (Susokolov, 1987).

In the USSR there was no assimilation to the Russian ethnos, but rather mutual rapprochement of peoples, or more precisely their assimilation to the Soviet model, which in each republic had its own variations and to which both the indigenous population and Russian migrant colonists should have assimilated. In the republics there was laid an original stratum of the Russian population, different from the Russian population in the RSFSR and being specific for each region. These people felt some difficulties being on the main Russian territory, but it was that substratum of Russians, which bore the need to unite the Russian
people with other peoples of the USSR. The Russians, becoming closer to different peoples of the USSR, as if “stitched” the inhabitants of the USSR together, starting to form their one culture. They were the bearers of the Russian-Soviet imperial standard, the form of imperial self-realization of the Russians that had been formed since the Soviet period. The fact that their values and behavior did not contradict the values and behavior of the indigenous population is a central adaptive mechanism. Certainly, a Russian woman (Russian men rarely married someone of different nationality), who married the indigenous man, was involved in the republic’s national scenario and should have assimilated its behavior patterns. There was interpenetration of scenarios, adaptation of the model of the Soviet person for different peoples. And most fully it was embodied by the descendants of mixed marriages.

The descendants of nationally mixed marriages “make up a significant share of people whose nationality and native language are not the same... The divergence of two key factors of self-identity (identification with this or that nationality and choosing one’s native language) speaks for a certain blurriness, duality of ethnic self-awareness” (Susokolov, 1987). The ethnic self-identification of “children in such families becomes very challenging” (Kozlov, 1982: 263).

However, most often descendants of mixed marriages choose the indigenous nationality of the republic where they live: “The preference of the dominant nationality while getting a passport is natural for children from mixed marriages, which enhances the ethnic homogeneity of the republic’s population... As a result, the number of indigenous nationalities in all the union and most autonomous republics increases instead of decreasing thanks to these interethnic marriages” (Susokolov, 1987).

When teenagers choose “one of the parents’ nationalities, this choice is largely determined by the intensity and general internationalization direction of the Soviet families life” (Terent’eva, 1974: 7). This intensity varied in different republics. For example, the Central Asian region was characterized by “a high share of young people opting for a nationality that coincides with the indigenous nationality of the given republic”, while the cities of the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian SSR demonstrated “a prevailing role in the creation of ethnic self-identity of Russian nationality”, in the cities of the Baltic republics there was a pattern “when the dominant indigenous nationalities in these republics assimilated the representatives of Russian nationality only a little” (Terent’eva, 1974: 7). And the population in many autonomous republics of the RSFSR assimilated to the Russians: “Children from marriages of Russian women with men of other nationalities within the RSFSR, and especially in cities where the Russian population predominates, most often identify themselves as Russians” (Kozlov, 1982: 264). For instance, “in Cheboksary (a city in the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) only 2.2 % of young people born in the marriages of the Chuvashes with the Russians identify themselves as the Chuvashes with 97.8 % identifying themselves as the Russians. The situation is almost the same in the Mordovian-Russian families, too” (Terent’eva, 1974: 15).

When marriage is between representatives of Russian and other non-indigenous peoples, “children usually identified themselves with the first nationality, regardless of whether a father or a mother is Russian” (Achylova, 196: 12). But “the ethnic self-identification of children from mixed marriages is greatly complicated in the case when both spouses quit their indigenous ethnic territories and live in a different national environment. A similar situation is quite common in the areas, which attract migrants from various in the national aspect regions. So, the child of the Chuvash father and the Belarusian mother, if
the family lives in the virgin lands or industrial regions of Kazakhstan, in the Russian (perhaps, Russian-Kazakh or even Ukrainian-Kazakh) environment, learns the Russian culture from childhood, and it is not easy for this child to define their nationality" (Kozlov, 1982: 264).

As reported by L.T. Terent’eva, “a noticeable, however, small part of the youth often has an idea of their belonging to some third nationality, which is neither the father’s nationality nor the mother’s, but which is the same as the ethnic majority in the place where the family lives” (Terent’eva, 1974: 8).

However, whatever the nationality is chosen by teenagers born in interethnic families, the ethno-unifying processes aimed at the formation of the Soviet people are involved. L.T. Terent’eva writes about the vague ethnic self-identification of descendants of mixed marriages (in this case, Russian-Latvian): “Such people in response to a question about their nationality can often say ‘I am a Latvian, but I am Russian, too’, or ‘I am Russian, but I am also a Latvian’. Thus, one cannot ignore the fact that they [children from interethnic families] much more often than children from endogamous (same-nation) marriages act as bearers of ethnically integrating interethnic traits, rather than ethnically dividing ones. Hence the importance of these phenomena cannot be overstated, as they cement the foundation of such a new historical community as the Soviet people” (Terent’eva, 1974: 11-12).

So, it is indubitable that the USSR policy was targeted at assimilation, one instrument of which was interethnic marriages of the USSR peoples. Above I described the “fraternity of peoples” as its mechanism, and, in particular, the behavioural models of this scenario. It is more difficult to answer the question of its value dominants. What values were spread through the model of the interethnic marriage, which was a part of the “fraternity of peoples” scenario? Their set is not large; basically, these are the ideas of denying the traditional dimension and cultural devaluation.

Soviet authors, such as V.I. Kozlov, often wrote that “the spread of interethnic marriages was facilitated by the failure of previous ethnic and religious prejudices, the breakdown of the old cultural and everyday way of life and the making of a new way of life, the introduction of international cultural elements, new rites, etc. (Kozlov, 1982: 267). O.A. Gantskaia and L.N. Terent’eva, while commenting natural assimilation via rituals, highlighted that it can be “barely traced in connection with the levelling of the old customs and the spread of the new ones” (Gantskaia, Terent’eva, 1973: 8). In such a way the assimilation that accompanied interethnic marriage was presented in the official ideology, expressed by Soviet scientists.

Soviet authors welcomed interethnic marriages as an instrument for destroying the transfer of national and religious traditions through the family as an institution: “The idea of interethnic family is called upon to play its role in the scientific worldview creation, in the atheistic education of the individual. Today religious remnants are not so much dogmatic, but mundane and daily practiced. They exist in the form of traditions, customs, superstitions, certain norms of behaviour and are often mistaken for national ideas. Under socialism, only the family is an institution that can reproduce religious views in the child’s mind. An interethnic family that unites representatives of not only different peoples but also people who practice different religions (Christianity – Islam: Russians – Kazakhs, Catholicism – Judaism: Poles – Jews) without much effort frees both spouses from the dogmas of faith and everyday religious forms, often mistaken for the nationally special (Sochinskaia, 1983: 11-12). That is why the Soviet authors rejoiced at the thought that “one of the main social results of the increasing share...
of interethnic young families in new cities is that these cities demonstrate a tendency to the destruction of religious views, rituals, customs and morals on the basis of the development of new marital and family relationships. In these families religious rituals and customs disappear more easily and quickly. This is manifested in how the holidays are celebrated, and in what new rituals and irreligious festivals have replaced the old ones (Sadykhov, 1982: 42).

Ergo, the interethnic family was seen as the support of everything Soviet and as openness to communist ideology: “An interethnic family of representatives of different nations influences the spread of Soviet progressive traditions” (Sochinskaia, 1983: 12, 17). Therefore, when “public organizations are fighting for the introduction of Soviet rituals devoid of religious overtone, interethnic families act as their facilitators” (Sabieva, 1979: 23).

So, the Soviet authors who wrote about interethnic families alleged that the Soviet person in the foundation of the Soviet cultural scenario lacks traditions of the past that were related to negative phenomena. It would seem a true statement: in the years of Soviet power, there was a catastrophic gap in continuity of traditions, and the few that kept these traditions, e.g. religious faith, as a rule, were not quite Soviet people in fact, and they did not fit into the new Soviet scenario. And consequently, one may conclude, they did not marry someone of another nationality. But indeed it was completely different: 76 % Moldovans among those who do not celebrate religious holidays are also not against to interethnic marriages, with 61 % of those celebrating such holidays who are not against such marriages (Drobizheva, 1981: 190). The share is less, but not significantly little.

The cultural scenario, being developed according to its cultural laws, as a general matter, bestows the former experience into new cultural models, integrating this experience into a new context. Therefore, there was nothing to prevent marriages between, for example, Orthodox Moldovans and Orthodox Ukrainians, although in the past such marriages were rare. After all, they lived in a cultural space where such marriages were the norm, and this space influenced them, they acted within the framework of the wide spread cultural scenario to the extent that was acceptable to them in the aspect of values.

But the Soviet cultural scenario was not quite ordinary, but rather extreme: it included a lot of people completely put off from their traditional stride, those who lost their previous cultural background. In many respects this scenario itself signified a rejection of cultural continuity. Moreover, it constantly experienced the pressure of ideological attitudes that were imposed by Soviet ideologists on those people who performed this scenario.

Another problem stemming from the rejection of traditions is the relatively high divorce rate in interethnic marriages. However, the discussion of this problem has been ideologized, and therefore, even scientific literature has had typical statements that “the probability of dissolution of interethnic marriages does not exceed the level that is characteristic of homogenous (non-interethnic) marriages, and is even below it, perhaps” (Achylova, 1968: 14). There is also the assertion that “interethnic marriages more rarely end up in divorce than same-nation marriages, and this trend persists throughout the entire 50-year studied period” (Neprimerova, 1979: 13). The papers also give reasons for the greater stability of interethnic marriages: “Facing a number of difficulties during their marriage, spouses of different nationalities have some additional potential for overcoming them. Here, they take into account the peculiarities of the national character and make as if an allowance for the partner. Sociologists claim that in interethnic
families the percentage of divorces is much lower compared to nationally homogeneous marriages. This is explained, on the one hand, by the great mutual willingness to make concessions, the search for ways of compatibility and, on the other hand, the fact that the spouses treat interethnic marriages more thoughtfully, weigh up all the pros and cons” (Sochinskaia, 1983: 21-22).

However, a competent scientific study of the problems of interethnic marriage by A. A. Susokolov gives a refutation of the point of view about a lower divorce rate in interethnic marriages. The author argues that the assumption about the greater stability of interethnic families in comparison with same-nation families is justified by the fact that “the share of nationally mixed marriages among all marriages, concluded in 1960-1964 in Latvia, was higher than the share of the divorces of interethnic families among all the divorces” (Susokolov, 1987). Analysing the statistical data, he comes to the conclusion that they “prove just the opposite assertion – about less stability of interethnic families” (Susokolov, 1987). According to Susokolov, interethnic marriages tend to be less stable than same-nation marriages of the majority of the peoples in the USSR, except for same-nation marriages among Russians, which demonstrate approximately the same divorce rate as in interethnic families.

The reason for the high number of divorces in interethnic marriages is explained by A.A. Susokolov as denial of family traditions. After all, he writes, “only to some extent free from kinship care people get married to someone of another nationality, and these people do not have a large and close-knit family” (Susokolov, 1987). And first and foremost, it is the Russians who have broken with family traditions: “The high proportion of Russians in interethnic marriages is due to the weakening of ‘intraethnic’ family ties... Among them, there is a significant share of migrants from different regions of the country, people with weakened kinship ties” (Susokolov, 1987). Furthermore, V.I. Kozlov mentions the weakening of the relative ties of those who get married to someone of another nationality: “The autonomization of married couples, the weakening of their ties with relatives, including the older generation (more conservative in terms of choosing a marriage partner), was no less important for the spread of such marriages in the cities” (Kozlov, 1982: 268).

Another reason for the relatively high percentage of divorces in interethnic marriages was the natural national differences in culture and psychology. However, even though Soviet scientists admitted these differences, they tried to belittle their significance, as the union of the USSR nations was to be accompanied by creating a common way of life for all Soviet people. As R. Achylova writes, “investigations of the causes of the dissolution of interethnic marriages in comparison with the reasons for the dissolution of same-nation marriages make it possible to conclude that they are completely identical. The only exception is marriages of indigenous peoples with the most frequent reason for divorce as incompatibility of temper. Sometimes the divorce is the result of the national and, more rarely, the religious differences between the spouses, of offended national dignity of one of the spouses, of the feudal-patronising attitude towards the wife (usual among the indigenous men), etc. However, the percentage of such cases is very small (Achylova, 1968: 12). A.A. Susokolov cites data proving that the reason for the damaged relations in interethnic families is the difference in traditions. Thus, in Russian-Georgian families Russian women more often named jealousy and parents’ interference as hindrances to family life, while in Russian families wives first of all mentioned their husband’s rudeness and poor housing conditions as such hindrances. A sociological survey in Estonia showed that the
Estonians are better at homemaking than the Russians living in Estonia. This also cannot but affect relations in some Estonian-Russian families (Susokolov, 1987). The researcher points out that “the materials of ethnosociological surveys have shown that divorce in an interethnic family is often the result of the fact that both the spouses and their relatives usually consider only such behaviour correct which seems familiar to them, being picky about unfamiliar customs and norms of communication (Susokolov, 1987). However, according to Susokolov, “interethnic marriages do not show markedly worse family relationships... Although men and women in interethnic marriages were somewhat less likely to respond that relationships in their family are ‘generally good’, but at the same time respondents more often that same-nation families believed that their relationships are very good” (Susokolov, 1987).

* * *

So, the scenario “fraternity of peoples”, which became the basis for the wide spread of interethnic marriages in the Russian Empire and the USSR for the first time ever, is grounded in three sources:

1. Soviet ideology aimed at bringing the peoples of the USSR closer together and assimilating them to the common Soviet model. It can be revealed in two aspects:
   a) as an approach to the problem of the transformation of the national category in the Soviet space, which also provided the basis for self-conception, the real life content of which was formed spontaneously in many ways and was not always ideologized, and
   b) in its relation to religion and national traditions, as the experience of previous generations, except for some ideologically neutral customs directly related to communication, such as the customs of hospitality of many peoples.

2. It can be doubted that spouses in interethnic families (somehow different from other families) had a penchant for a communist worldview, but it was these spouses, having been assimilated by the Soviet model, who turned out to be more susceptible to the creations of the Soviet era, sometimes based on a truncated understanding of culture.

3. Soviet mythology that provided Soviet people with a sense of strength and significance through the scenarios like “there will be apple blossoms on Mars”, faith in their state greatness, strength, power and their rightness in the world arena and, in part, state pridefulness, and attribution of exceptional moral purity to the Soviet person. This complex was expressed in the ideologeme “ahead of the whole planet” and was extensively introduced into the consciousness of Soviet people, giving meaning to their existence as Soviet people, defined their unity and common self-identification.

4. Behavioural scenario, which through a kind of “politesse” developed by Soviet people ensured conflict-free coexistence of people of different nationalities and their self-perception as a common “we” of Soviet people. Spouses of different nationalities, when it came to their traditions, cultural traits and national identity, acted in accordance with the models of relations prescribed by the scenario “fraternity of peoples”.

On the basis of the foregoing, let us imagine a model for the correlation between the “fraternity of peoples” scenario and the mass practice of interethnic marriages with the representatives of the USSR peoples as follows (Fig. 1).

* * *

Most active in the Soviet Union to marry someone of different nationality were the Russians. But not all the Russians. The Russians living in places of traditional residence rarely did this and represented exactly the same
Substratum of the Soviet country as other peoples. It is no accident that the religious and folk traditions of the Russians (like many traditions of other peoples) were more or less evidently persecuted. The Soviet state was not interested in Russians themselves, Russians as a people with their character and their own mindsets. They were interested in Russians in their imperial meaning. And in the USSR, unlike the Russian Empire, these imperial Russians were migrant colonists who were eager to create transnational families. Their function was assimilation:

1. Creation of the unified environment for migrant colonists of different nationalities, i.e. the Soviet international imperial class (those who were called Russian-speaking in the 1990s), who got used to the common Soviet model, marriages within which were culturally homogeneous. Inside this class interethnic marriages were the norm, as these were the marriages between already “Soviet” people. Since the representatives of the Slavic peoples were prevalent among migrant colonists, the percentage of inter-Slavic marriages was growing, reaching the theoretical probability there and then.
2. Mutual assimilation of Russian migrant colonists and typically the upper social stratum of the indigenous population, the creation of the international environment that tended to form not so much a single Soviet model, but its republican version, special for each republic. In this environment inter-ethnic marriages also occurred with varying shares.

Such was the process of assimilation in the USSR, the formation of the “Soviet population” consisting of “Soviet nations”, therefore not homogeneous, but due to be brought together by a common but “reduced” culture based on the shared experience of breaking old traditions – which was actively promoted by interethnic marriages, based on new replica – “Soviet traditions” (Fig. 2).

Thus, the behavioural scenario “fraternity of peoples” at the micro-level determined the interaction of spouses within an interethnic family where they acted as representatives of different peoples. And at the macro-level, this scenario placed the family into the common and coherent Soviet model, making it an element of the state functioning – the Soviet empire with its ideology created by Soviet theoreticians and the behavioural scenario generated by the people’s creativity.

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Динамика национальной политики в СССР
и ее выражения в обыденной жизни граждан:
k феномену распространения
национально-смешанных браков

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В статье анализируется история национальной политики в СССР в ее преломлении к частной жизни граждан, в частности, в сфере семейно-брачных отношений, заключению и расторжению национально-смешанных браков и этнической самоидентификации потомков от таких браков. В работе представлены графические модели соотношения национальной политики и брачного поведения граждан СССР. В работе также кратко изложена авторская концепция имплицитного обобщенного культурного сценария, использующаяся как объяснительный механизм некоторых социальных, демографических и культурно-политических процессов.

Ключевые слова: межнациональные отношения; обыденная жизнь; национально-смешанные браки; потомки от национально-смешанных браков, национальная самоидентификация.

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