Energy Restructuring and Social Distribution in the Transition Economies of East Germany and Poland

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This article analyzes the political economy of energy restructuring in East Germany and Poland from the perspective of social distribution. Its purpose is two-fold: on the one hand, it provides analytical dichotomies between regulatory vs. procedural and horizontal vs. hierarchical restructuring to explain the different paths in the liberal transformation of the energy industry in East Germany and Poland. The substitution of a central and legitimate government by Treuhand in the East German case as well as the central coordinating role of the government in the Polish case constitute the key indicators for these conceptual distinctions. On the other hand, post-socialist energy firms are treated as social distribution mechanisms, whose restructuring is defined by a public ownership minimum. Contrary to Treuhand, which functioned as an institutional sponsor for an ethnically-driven transfer of the East German energy sector to a set of subsidiaries of West German corporations, the Polish Ministry of Privatization preferred to adopt the equity constraint rather than regulate its energy policy preferences through the private sector. Private organizations or semi-legitimate public agencies captured by corporate interests have no incentive to maintain the public ownership minimum as the central government can. The existence of distributive energy firms implies distributive energy bureaucracies; the preservation of a public ownership minimum rather than inter-elite privatization contracts is a prerequisite for energy-driven distribution in post-socialism.

Keywords: energy, restructuring, privatization, social distribution, East Germany, Poland, Treuhand, public ownership minimum.

Introduction

The Oder-Neiße borderline between the German Democratic Republic and Poland did not only signal Germany’s defeat in the Second War and the end of Prussia as a formative component of German political identity and economic development; it also hallmarked highly differentiated patterns of enterprise restructuring in the transition period following the dissolution of the USSR and led both communist economies to divergent sets of industrial arrangements. The purpose of this article is to unfold the economic and institutional mechanisms that created divergent corporate structures in the energy sectors of East Germany and Poland; in its next stage, the article treats these structures as fixed and analyzes their role as social distribution mechanisms. Why the energy sector? I contend that the increased role...
of public interest in the continuity and diversity of energy production combined with the cross-nationally observed inclination of the socialist and post-socialist state to exercise direct or indirect control over their natural resources justifies this choice. Furthermore, the significant share of energy companies in the industrial GDP of GDR and Poland as well as the social cleavages rising in the aftermath of restructuring implementation in both countries form the basis for a second question; what were the distributive effects of energy restructuring and how can they be translated into the ex novo formation of socio-economic strata in East German and Polish societies?

There is a clear distinction between restructuring and privatization. Restructuring can occur before or after privatization, but unlike privatization it does not touch ownership relations inside an enterprise; the latter can be either a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) or a private corporation. Hence, corporate restructuring focuses on debt reduction, attraction of state aid and foreign direct investment, boost of labor productivity, employment adjustment, reform of corporate governance, increase of exports and profitability, and new marketing strategies. Nevertheless, the time differential between restructuring and privatization can be so small that the boundaries between these two phases in market transition are uncertain. The East German and Polish energy sectors pose interesting cases in that direction, given their common state origins and their distinct structural features. The Polish energy sector has had a higher degree of diversity in resources: oil, gas, electricity and coal (lignite) have constituted the main market fields, open to structural reform. On the contrary, the East German energy sector is determined by coal (lignite) and electricity production, while natural gas has only had a marginal role in domestic growth, as the GDR never enjoyed natural gas reserves.

This plurality in Polish energy resources does not change the fact that Poland has been one of the most coal-dependent countries in the world (US Department of Energy Overview). Coal dependence has been the main common energy industry feature across the Oder-Neiße borderline. However, what I observe in East Germany and Poland is the distinction between procedural and regulatory energy restructuring. What I define as procedural restructuring is the organizational reform of SOEs with the imminent purpose of privatization. There is practically no difference between the time point of privatization and the time point of restructuring. Moreover, the direct involvement of Treuhand as the institutional intermediary between the East German government and West German energy corporations indicates a multiplicity of actors that participated in the restructuring and privatization process; thus, I can also argue for a critical distinction between horizontal and vertical (hierarchical) energy restructuring; horizontal energy restructuring is linked to the implementation of energy reform plans by institutional coalitions that do not belong to the same administrative or hierarchical line.

I define Polish energy restructuring as regulatory and vertical (hierarchical). The adjective regulatory refers to restructuring implementation with the use of administrative acts. Its purpose is not imminent privatization, but the preservation of state control and the maintenance of lower subsidized energy prices for both social and electoral reasons. Hierarchical restructuring is the top-down implementation of organizational reform at the enterprise level. The government alone is the common denominator of all restructuring efforts; foreign investors and international organizations are complementary rather than central in the reform process. In
addition to these theoretical formulations, I argue that the difference between shock therapy and gradualism, which is observed in the East German and Polish cases, is heavily influenced by the factor of state sovereignty. East Germany’s energy restructuring was designed as a consequence of the abolition of the country’s sovereignty; in Poland energy restructuring was connected to a transition to a new form of government within set geographical boundaries, but with diversified economic foundations.

In the aftermath of these parallel reform processes, the distributive role of companies emerged in both countries is evaluated in terms of employment, income, education, pensions, and labor representation. More specifically, I intend to analyze the impact of energy restructuring in East Germany and Poland in terms of equality rather than liberty. The underlying normative principle of economic liberalization in Eastern Europe is reversed; if the purpose of the state is to advance individual liberties constrained by social deliberations, then this article provides an explanation that reverses the roles of liberty and equality. Now equality is the objective principle and liberty the constraint. Social distribution is used as a proxy for equality to the same extent that privatization is used as a proxy for liberty.

The article is organized as follows. In Section 1, I propose an ideal type of industrial restructuring and then I compare the politics of energy restructuring in East Germany and Poland based on my aforementioned distinctions. In Section 2, I treat energy firms as social distribution mechanisms through the lens of the public ownership. Section 3 proposes a two-dimensional map on the interaction between energy restructuring and social distribution. Moreover, it stresses the derived observation that the existence of distributive energy firms in post-socialism implies the existence of distributive energy bureaucracies. The treatment of energy as a public rather than private good is critical in that respect. Section 4 concludes.

I. Models of Industrial Transition in former Eastern Germany and Poland

To provide an effective analysis of energy restructuring in East Germany and Poland I propose an ideal type of industrial restructuring in the period of transition from a communist to a capitalist economy. The actors of my model include the state, which is the owner of any given enterprise and represents people’s interests, institutional intermediaries that assist the state in restructuring implementation such as banks, independent agencies, international organizations and private advisors. The organizational division of the firm into smaller corporate units, which become financially viable with state subsidies, FDI and bank loans, is considered to be the first step toward efficient restructuring. Furthermore, the substitution of public managers with short-term skilled personnel and preservation of the government’s veto against to block any major proposal presented in the board of directors constitute the second step in the restructuring process.

Profitability and therefore liquidity is the key proxy used to evaluate the success of the restructuring phase. Increased market value for the firm is translated into higher state revenues, increased job security for the currently employed and sustainable economic growth. Export growth, increased labor productivity, cash flow as well as total factor productivity are treated as functions of profitability; the term organizational restructuring encompasses both what the literature calls organizational and financial restructuring. Privatization is regarded as the final component of industrial transition, which is an inclusive term that I use both for restructuring and privatization. The institutional map of
privatization does not have the state as its main point of reference, as is the case in restructuring.\textsuperscript{13} On the contrary, it entails a significant bargaining role for entrepreneurs who are willing to acquire governmental shares in state corporations.\textsuperscript{14} It also includes supporting institutions, which can be either financial (banks), international (World Bank and IMF), or administrative (agencies) with a broader and more independent statutory mandate.\textsuperscript{15}

Because the goal of privatization should be a contract, where economic efficiency and social justice meet, I argue that the government has to preserve a package of \textit{vetoing minority shares} in the post-privatization period. This should be particularly the case for sectors of reinforced public interest such as energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications.\textsuperscript{16} I treat this package of shares as a \textit{public ownership minimum} that affects the management’s decisions about employment relations, when both phases of industrial transformation are over.\textsuperscript{17} My transition theory of corporate governance necessitates an alliance between the unions and the government. The imposition of the \textit{public ownership minimum} protracts the privatization process and increases the number of private contenders.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, the bargaining position of the private investor is restrained, but not to such an extent that he opts to exit the transaction. In this approach minority state ownership does not have a positive, but a normative component (Meyer 2002: 269-274).\textsuperscript{19} The government does not care about maximizing the value of its stocks, but its reelection. By blocking decisions against labor interests, it indirectly implements social policy.

This two-stage concept of industrial transformation can be applied in the cases of East German and Polish energy restructuring. When the Berlin Wall fell, East Germany’s energy industry consisted of the electrical power industry and lignite (brown coal) mining operations in Lusatia and Middle Germany.\textsuperscript{20} The Electricity Treaty (\textit{Stromvertrag}) signed among the Treuhand – East Germany’s privatization agency – the GDR government and seven West German firms on August 22 of 1990 led to the creation of the Unified Energy Plants as a joint-stock corporation (\textit{Vereinte Energiewerke AG}); this company included the East German lignite power plants, which had been already restructured by the Treuhand for that purpose.\textsuperscript{21} Treuhand was not as efficient in selling the lignite mines per se; Middle German mining operations were finally bought by PowerGen plc, Morrison Knudsen Corporation and NRG Energy Inc., which formed the Middle German Lignite Corporation (\textit{MIBRAG BV}).\textsuperscript{22} Nevertheless, it was able to sell the Lusatia mines to a business consortium formed by RWE AG and Viag/Veba (\textit{Lausitzer Braunkohle AG}).\textsuperscript{23} It is evident why the definitions of procedural and horizontal restructuring are useful to conceptualize the industrial transformation of the East German energy sector. Treuhand functions as a quasi GDR government, whose mandate and legitimacy is derived from its institutional linkage to West Germany’s political and economic system.\textsuperscript{24} The immediate transition from restructuring to privatization resulted in the rapid generation of property rights; the source of these property rights was not the East German government, but the Treuhand.\textsuperscript{25} This was the first time in the history of democratization and industrial transformation that an administrative agency was subjected to the laws of a foreign country (West Germany) and then privatizes the energy infrastructure of a country, despite the obvious welfare spillovers that this series of policies would impose on GDR’s populous working class.

Communist economies are two or three times more energy intensive than capitalist ones; this feature is likely to endure in early transition period.\textsuperscript{26} The economic report on East German
The energy sector in 1990 confirms the belief that this industry can form the basis for generalizable research conclusions; while the energy sector did not occupy a leading position in the share of industrial employment, it reflected accurately the changes in labor relations and employment during the post-reunification period. The negative slope of the East German energy intensity curve between 1990 and 1994, which implies a parallel decrease in both energy consumption and production, shows Treuhand’s objective to fully change the sectoral distribution of East German industrial GDP. This strategic decision was not supported with a sustainability plan for neither power plants nor mining operations; on the contrary, it linked them to the corporate interests of West German multinationals without taking into account the input from either East German state governments or trade unions.

I argue that restructuring served exclusively the interests of West German energy oligopolies; not only did it increase energy market concentration and therefore violated even more antitrust law in the New Germany, but it also facilitated an unprecedented bargaining between energy multinationals and an administrative agency for resources and infrastructure that belonged to the people, whose legitimate representative was certainly not the Treuhand. Energy restructuring in East Germany should be seen as a seminal paradigm of an ethnically driven FDI externalization and state capture. Although West and East Germans belonged to the same state (German Empire) before the Second War, this does not serve as a justification for Bonn’s raw economic intervention into a foreign state entity. The distinction between vertical and horizontal restructuring, which will be further elaborated in the Polish case, does not refer to the way that the old Kombinate were reorganized or liquidated but to the matrix of institutional players that participated in the unbundling process. Treuhand’s failure to generate a surplus between restructuring revenues and expenditures undermined the infrastructural modernization of the East German energy companies and had an adverse effect on the overall competitiveness of the German economy. Particularly in the energy sector, the rapid transfer of privatization costs from producers who bought underpriced power plants and brown coal (lignite) mines to consumers who had to pay higher prices and many of them lose their energy industry jobs or see their wages decrease constitutes the most ample manifestation of Treuhand’s politically conservative bias and pro-business orientation.

I argue that in Poland the state remained the main source of energy industry transformation (hierarchical and regulatory). Energy restructuring was defined not only in terms of privatization, but also in terms of energy law reform, commercialization of energy enterprises, energy pricing and policy-relevant issues for each subsector. The World Bank’s seminal proposal on Polish energy restructuring outlined the reform steps that were actually implemented in this sector; privatization of infrastructure was designed and advanced under the regulatory supervision of five different ministries. Pricing – while still subsidized – was cost-reflective to the best possible extent, and in many cases state management was accountable to workers councils. The Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNG) is the most important corporate actor in the oil and gas sectors and was owned by the state; nevertheless, Poland’s limited gas and broad oil dependence on Russia render the politics of oil and gas industry transformation less interesting. What matters most is electricity restructuring and the regulation of the Upper Silesian lignite mines that have been intertemporally accounting for a major component of electricity production.
The government maintained direct control over PSE SA, the Polish National Grid, as well as over the generation and distribution companies until mid-1990s; only when the Energy Act entered into force and adjustment to the European acquis became a serious incentive for energy restructuring, the state embarked on a partial privatization of its energy assets.40

Polish transition to market economy is considered to be a success story for shock therapy privatization proponents. However, I suggest that in energy restructuring rapid privatization was certainly not the case. Unlike East German restructuring where the boundaries between restructuring and privatization are substantially blurred, Polish energy industry was transformed under the public ownership minimum that I described in the beginning of this section; this observation is also supported by the weakened role of the Privatization Ministry and the increased role of workers’ councils in enterprise restructuring.41 Differentials in profit and time are large enough to make a clear distinction between restructuring and privatization; the latter stage was largely concluded upon Polish accession to the European Union. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the government in Warsaw has been reluctant in the public offerings of its energy assets. This is in line with the results of its mass privatization programs; their scope was not as wide as initially expected and in sectors where extensive privatization took place it was due to the impact of foreign experts rather than administrative pressures.42 Hence, energy restructuring is one of these policy initiatives where the government decided to defend its ownership shares; minority state ownership in the energy sector was seen as a method of offsetting the negative welfare effects of employment decline.43 Contrary to Russian privatization schemes, direct rather than indirect bureaucratic intervention in the restructuring and privatization of energy SOEs preserved a minimum equality threshold in Poland necessary for social solidarity.44

II. Energy Firms as Distributive Mechanisms: The Oder-Neiße Dichotomy

Social distribution is inherently connected to the idea of the allocation of public resources by the government.45 In this article, I do not intend to limit my analysis to the political mechanics of energy restructuring and privatization. I also propose an analytical path that links the industrial transformation of energy assets to equity; it is assumed that restructuring and privatization as a two-stage process provides the firm with a series of property assets that are taxable by the government. In that respect, I suggest that the public ownership minimum determines the distributive power of the firm both toward its employees and the citizens. I contend that the same set of incentives that prevent the government from fully privatizing the energy sector is also valid for the explanation of energy firms as social distribution mechanisms; thus, state ownership, unemployment benefits and taxation may be considered as forms of social insurance that bridge corporate restructuring with inequality alleviation.46 When transition to market economy occurs, the government is not likely to treat the energy sector as a first priority privatization area, because this would radically increase energy prices, inflation and unemployment rates; this it would bolster an evolving social crisis that no government wants to face. Energy restructuring and privatization may be seen as a more powerful but indirect way of social distribution; firms that receive less subsidies and pay more in social services and compensation for their employees are “rewarded” with lower taxes and vice versa.

The existence of the public ownership minimum defines my understanding of energy firms as social distribution mechanisms in the post-
communist context of East Germany and Poland. I argue that in the former German Democratic Republic distributive energy restructuring did not occur due to biased and unilaterally inspired macroeconomic and political planning. Minimization of state ownership over electricity markets and coal operations, dramatic increase of the East-West unemployment differential without taking proper policy measures and the conclusion of industry- rather firm- or employee-centered collective wage contracts indicate what the Treuhand’s finite regulatory objective was: the political and resource expropriation of the East German energy sector rather than the preservation of social stability with the maintenance of a public ownership minimum, which is a sine qua non component of positive distributive dynamics in the energy sector. Lignite industry production and employment data in the 1990s amplify a radical decrease in energy significance for East Germany, which becomes broader as the time distance from 1990 increases; the lignite employment/lignite production ratio also becomes exponentially smaller. Schleiniger has argued that the exemption of energy-intensive export sector from environmental-friendly taxation can increase energy use because energy-intensive commodities are cheaper and therefore substitute for labor-intensive commodities; taxation of energy companies does not distribute per capita income for the benefit of lower-class people, unless it discourages producers from shifting the additional cost of taxation to consumers without the provision of any additional public goods or social services. The goal of a tripartite social contract becomes critical here; because antagonistic relations among capital, labor and the government are constrained by minority state ownership and the public interest component of energy business, the establishment of a social contract can only occur under conditions of stringent labor and corporate tax regulation with direct or indirect distributive effects. I contend that the energy sector is the main industry from which the distributive intentions of any government can be clearly inferred. The maintenance of powerful regulatory mechanisms in the Polish energy sector prevented the adjustment of energy prices to efficient levels; it is shown that although rich people make a much more extensive use of electrical power, any price increase in residential electricity is much more likely to hurt workers, pensioners, self-employed people and social transfers recipients, whose energy expenditure occupies a relatively large share of their total expenditure basket. I argue that the prospect for upward mobility (POUM) motivates lower- and middle-income citizens to support the public ownership minimum in the energy sector given the limited price elasticity (in comparison with mature market economies) and the strong income elasticity of energy consumption. The Polish Ministry of Privatization chose to sell state-owned energy enterprises only if it was able to substantially support the state budget; thus, complete corporate restructuring has been treated as a prerequisite of privatization due to the distributive considerations of the government. More specifically, the energy administration in Warsaw opted for negative rather than positive distribution by continuing to subsidize electricity prices while maintaining variable but significant control over domestic energy firms.

III. Analytical Framework

The arguments presented above lead to the following propositions:

1. Propositions

P1: The public ownership minimum rather than full privatization guarantees the survival of energy firms and the maintenance of social peace.
P2: Hierarchical rather than horizontal energy restructuring leads to socially distributive subsidies and prices.

P3: Procedural rather than regulatory energy restructuring is likely to benefit producers at the expense of consumers.

P4: Institutional and political legitimacy of the regulatory authority are prerequisites for effective energy restructuring.

2. Corollaries

C1: The Treuhand was the institutional sponsor for an ethnically-driven transfer of the East German energy sector to a set of subsidiaries of West German corporations.

C2: The Polish Ministry of Privatization preferred to adopt the public ownership minimum rather than regulate its energy policy preferences through the private sector.

Moene and Wallerstein argue that higher degrees of inequality do not automatically generate support for social spending in the form of publicly financed insurance; this is the case only when public distribution is targeted toward lower-income people that already have a job rather than to unemployed people or pensioners. To provide a primary analytical design on the interaction between energy restructuring and social distribution, I suggest a two-by-two matrix (Matrix 1) where energy restructuring forms the first axis of analysis and sectoral workforce constitutes the second axis of analysis. I classify energy restructuring into two categories according to its sequential timing with respect to privatization; a high value is assigned when privatization follows restructuring, whereas a low value is assigned when privatization precedes restructuring. Sectoral workforce is evaluated on the basis of its vocational training; the government can restructure its own energy assets considering the welfare of either high- or low-skilled energy workers.

According to matrix 1, when energy restructuring benefits the interests of high-skilled workforce and energy privatization follows restructuring, then social mobility is likely (High, High); hierarchical restructuring makes the government in charge of the industrial transformation process. Under the condition that the government is in control of energy restructuring and sectoral transition rents are used to improve the status of high-skilled workers, then social mobility is expected; the public provision of a resource-based insurance to the qualified middle class generates sufficient levels of occupational mobility. In the lower left entry of the matrix (Low, High) the government supports its low-skilled workforce; due to their limited skills in the phase anteceding restructuring, they can only use public insurance in a non-positive way, i.e. to reduce their unemployment risk, but not to find a more qualified job. That is why labor peace is achieved.

In the upper right entry (High, Low) I combine procedural restructuring with the interests of high-skilled workers; the immediate transfer of state-owned energy assets to private investors reduces the volume of energy rents that the government can distribute. Hence, high-skilled employees are incentivized to change their occupational status; however, this change is constrained by the limited quantity of the public insurance provided. This is why it is more likely to observe horizontal (intersectoral) rather than vertical labor transfers. The lower right entry (Low, Low) implies limited public insurance for low-skilled workers; socially disruptive unemployment is the expected policy outcome, because the latter are not any more protected by the public ownership minimum.

Distributive energy firms imply the existence of distributive energy bureaucracies; since the fall of centrally planned economies, culture and the “symbolic-ideological control” of resources have been in decline in Eastern
Europe. The level of adherence to the political legacies of socialism defines the distributive role of bureaucracy in the transition period. The appropriation of the East German government by Treuhand and the centralized authority of the Polish Ministry of Privatization constitute two extreme phenomena in the energy map of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Unlike the institutionally supported oil privatization in Russia and the successful implementation of shock therapy policies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Poland suggests a case where energy bureaucracies maintained the majority of their regulatory privileges. At the same time, in East Germany they ceased to exist.

I define social distribution as the set of those expenditure-minimizing policies that maintain a minimum of social welfare for all citizens. Because there is no objective definition of equity, social distribution can never be value-free or impartial. As Nee points out, the transition from socialism to capitalism entails the transfer of resources from hierarchies to markets; nevertheless, gradual reforms can preserve the social stratification observed under socialism and maintain the significance of bureaucracy in the market allocation of resources. To examine the impact of energy bureaucracies on centralized and decentralized marketplaces, I propose a two-by-two matrix (Matrix 2) where energy bureaucracy constitutes the first dimension and economic organization the second. I divide energy bureaucracy according to its regulatory capacity; when the public ownership minimum is preserved, then I assign a high value. The opposite holds when the energy sector is fully privatized. Economic organization is explained in terms of centralized vs. decentralized markets; centralized marketplaces imply interventionist governments with sufficient ownership shares in the economy. On the other hand, in decentralized markets, the state plays an intermediary role in the regulation and allocation of resources.

I suggest that when energy bureaucracy maintains an ownership minimum in centralized market systems, then social distribution is feasible (High, High); the government is able to subsidize energy prices at a low cost and thus ensure a minimum of energy consumption for all citizens. This is the entry where I locate the Polish energy sector. When the government maintains an ownership minimum in decentralized

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Matrix 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy Restructuring →</th>
<th>Privatization Ex Post →</th>
<th>Privatization Ex Ante →</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral Workforce ↓</td>
<td>Hierarchical Restructuring (High)</td>
<td>Procedural Restructuring (Low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Skilled Workforce (High)</td>
<td>Social Mobility</td>
<td>Intersectoral Transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Skilled Workforce (Low)</td>
<td>Labor Peace</td>
<td>Disruptive Unemployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Matrix 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy Bureaucracy →</th>
<th>Economic Organization ↓</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Ownership Minimum (High)</td>
<td>Full Privatization (Low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized Markets (High)</td>
<td>Social Distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized Markets (Low)</td>
<td>Union Corporatism</td>
</tr>
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marketplaces, then union corporatism is the political equilibrium; advanced rather than transition European economies could qualify for that entry, where public ownership meets labor co-determination and tripartite negotiations (Low, High).

Nevertheless, when energy bureaucrats give up their distributive potential and approve full-scale privatization policies, while economic organization is still defined by a centralized marketplace, then the formation of patronage networks between business and government is observed; the cases of energy privatization in Azerbaijan, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states are indicative in that respect (High, Low). In the lower right entry (Low, Low), the privatization of energy firms in decentralized markets leads to elite contracts between the government and corporate investors; after the contracts are concluded, the government ceases to control its energy assets; this was the case for the East German electricity sector whose privatization followed German reunification.

IV. Conclusions

The politics of energy restructuring in East Germany and Poland provides a paradigm of the theoretical inclination presented here, contrary to the general and often appraised theory of democratic transitions in East-Central Europe. The Oder-Neiße dichotomy shows that the public ownership minimum rather than the withering of public regulation is the most effective basis for collective welfare and the increase of public revenues through privatization. The thesis of this article is heavily influenced by the normative foundation of equity rather than liberty. It is clear how crucial the role of two administrative bodies, the Polish Ministry of Privatization and the Treuhand, has been despite their variable political legitimacy and connections to the domestic business community. A major part of this article has focused on the administrative and social aspects of energy restructuring. Because the energy sector has been the epicenter of industrial development under socialism and post-socialism, it is crucial to link its ownership transformation to the ex novo class formation, which has been observed in Eastern Europe.

My analysis brings together two elements which have made this part of the world invariably important in the history of world economy and economic thought: Marxist economics and energy resources.


For a good account of the reasons why privatization and industrial transition may not coincide see Brada Josef C. “Privatization is Transition--Or is it?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 10, No. 2, (Spring 1996): 67-86.


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Реструктуризация энергетического сектора
и социальное распределение в переходных экономиках
Восточной Германии и Польши

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В статье анализируются политические и экономические аспексы реструктуризации энергетического сектора в Восточной Германии и Польше с точки зрения социального распределения. Ее цель двояка: с одной стороны, она обеспечивает аналитическую дихотомию между регулирующей и процедурной реструктуризацией, с другой — между горизонтальной и иерархической. Таким образом, можно объяснить различные пути реформирования энергетических отраслей Восточной Германии и Польши. Замена центрального и законного правительства Тройхандом в Восточной Германии, а также центральная координирующая роль правительства в случае Польши являются ключевыми показателями этих концептуальных отличий. Постсоциалистические энергетические компании рассматриваются как механизмы социального распределения, реструктуризация которых определяется минимумом общественной собственности. Вопреки Тройханду, который стал институциональной основой для передачи энергетического сектора бывшей ГДР на множество дочерних западногерманских корпораций, польское министерство приватизации предпочло поддерживать экономическую справедливость, а не разрешить проведение полной приватизации в энергетической отрасли страны. Кажется, частные организации или государственные институты, которые связаны с корпоративными интересами, имеют меньше стимулов для сохранения этого минимума общественной собственности, чем центральное правительство. В энергетических секторах переходных экономик, сохранение минимума общественной собственности, а не полная приватизация является необходимым условием социального распределения.

Ключевые слова: энергетика, реструктуризация, приватизация, социальное распределение, Восточная Германия, Польша, Тройханд, минимум общественной собственности.