The analyzed period was characterized by a combination of three factors. The first of them is a controversial and largely unfavorable dynamics of socio-demographic and ethno-cultural processes. This refers to the uneven growth of the number of different ethnic communities, the demographic crisis of the Russian ethnus (caused by, among other things, “an echo of war”), the continued heterogeneity of the social structure of Soviet ethnic groups, agrarian overpopulation of some Union republics, the beginning of the outflow of the Russian population from the latter, as well as slowing down the spread of the Russian language.

The second important factor is centrifugal political and economic processes. The weakening of job rotation, excessive subsidies for the national republics, the development of the shadow economy, boost training of the national intelligentsia and unbalanced application of the system of territorial autonomies may be mentioned among them as the means of solving the national question.

And finally, the third factor is the socio-cultural crisis, which included the crisis of the Soviet ideology and the official Marxist-Leninist philosophy, a conceptual impasse of the Soviet national policy, and the weakening of the “soft power” of Russian culture.

The political, scientific and creative elite of the Soviet Union could not give a satisfactory answer to these crisis phenomena. Moreover, the increase in the negative trends in the elite circles caused such moods that connected breaking the deadlock with the rejection of the “imperial” policy in favor of the construction of “nationstate” by diminutive nationalism. At the same time the long-term negative consequences of this approach, which are still evident, were undervalued.

Keywords: soviet national policy, socio-cultural crisis, “diminutive nationalism”, nation building, Soviet people, “friendship of peoples”, agrarian overpopulation.

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among infants, that was throughout the country. At the same time, in other parts of the Soviet Union the average family size decreased or did not change significantly. As O.A. Gantskaia noticed, the number of children influenced not only the size of the family, but also, to a certain extent, its internal structure and external relations, namely both family ties and social relations (youth socialization, communication with the school, etc.). In large, small and childless families the relations between family members developed in various ways. Family ties in the Caucasus had a specific character, which they preserved in a modern city.

From 1926 to 1970 the number of Uzbeks in the USSR increased by 2.3 times, while the number of Karelians (mainly due to the natural assimilation) decreased by 1.7 times during the same period. The demographic boom, which was observed in the “Islamic” republics of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, gave reason to American military analysts to suggest that in 2000 the Soviet Army rank and file would be half-Muslim.

The demographic crisis of the Russian ethnos. It was the times when Russian ethnicity entered a period of a protracted crisis. Its share in the population of the USSR was 53.4% in 1970, 52.4% in 1979. In 1970-1979, the Russian population growth was equal to 6.5%, but by the end of the 1980s it declined down to 0.4-0.8% per year. I.V. Vlasova attributes this to the fact that since the 1920s Russians were put in the worst conditions in terms of socio-economic development, while the priority was given to other national areas, for which favorable economic and business conditions were created, means and resources were “siphoned” there, as well as to the degradation of agriculture. From 1939 to 1959 an increased growth of the Russian population went on, but this was mainly due to the natural assimilation of Mordovians, Karelians, Chuvash, etc.

In general, for the Soviet Union the period between 1926 and 1960 was marked by a decrease both in the mortality rate by more than three times (by four times or more in some national areas) and in the fertility rate. The latter trend was influenced by the change in the age structure of the population (the increase in the proportion of elderly people), a disproportion of sexes which arose as a result of wars, later marriage due to the extension of general and special education, urbanization, involvement of women in social production, the weakening of traditions of large families. In the postwar years, the birth rate rose slightly, however, from the late 1950s it declined again, in part due to the marriage of indigenous children born during the war.

However, various ethnic groups were affected by these processes to varying degrees. In the case of the Russian people, the role of these factors was extremely significant. When in the Kirghiz age group of 16-19-year-old people the percentage of the married was 44.8%, in the Russian group it was only 9.1%, and in the group of the peoples of the Baltic countries it was less than 5%. In 1975, the birth rate in Tadjikistan was 37 infants per 1000 people, while in the RSFSR it was 15.6, and in the Latvian SSR it was 14.2.

From 1960 to 1975 the fertility rate in the RSFSR decreased by almost 10%. During this period for the first time Russians showed the increase below the national average. Some regions of the European part of the country experienced a shortage of labor, and there was a decline in the absolute number of the population in some areas (Novgorod, Pskov).

Based on the demographics mentioned partly above, V.I. Kozlov already in 1977 spoke of the tendency to “a significant change in some important parameters ... and the national framework” of the country. With a certain hope the author referred to the words of L.I. Brezhnev,
who had called scientists to study the complex population problems at the XXV Congress of the CPSU. However, as shown by the further development of the situation, the process went on in the same course.

S.V. Cheshko recalls the discussion, which happened in 1970-80s between Moscow and Central Asia scholars on whether the Union budget had to finance the high birth rate in the region. According to the researcher, “the Central Asian patriots” argued that the otherwise would mean disregard for the “national traditions” and perhaps genocide. The offer to support the birth rate of Russians and European ethnic groups of the country did not fit into the logic of the Soviet national policy.

By 1989, every fifth Russian had reached the retirement age. Some “Russian” regions lost a simple reproduction of the population, the death rate exceeded the birth rate there (Pskov, Ivanovo, Tver, Tula, Tambov region), in 11 other areas a natural increase was less than 2.0%. In 1987, the statistics were such that there were 1148 Russian women and 1,000 Russian men. Furthermore, this excess started from the age of 30 and was due to a higher male mortality rate. In the village men became dominant in the group of people under the age of 45 due to higher female migration to the cities.

The heterogeneity of the social structure of Soviet nationalities. It is known that “the economic and organizational functions in 1930s were carried out largely with the help of Russian specialists in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics. A share of Russians was particularly high among the technical staff (industrial and technical intelligentsia) of these republics”. The Soviet government faced a weak adaptation of the local population to the industry and other work outside agriculture, and that led to a “compensating” role which Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusian sometimes played in the development of national industrial areas. The great efforts to accelerate the development of “the same type of social structure of Soviet nations” by supporting nations and nationalities, which had lagged behind in socio-economic terms, were made. However, the situation could not be changed completely. This was especially true for remote or isolated regions, where industrialization came much later than in other parts of the country.

As V.A. Tishkov notices, the industrialization of Chechen-Ingushetia led to the division of its economy into two sectors — “Russian” sector (oil, machinery, infrastructure) and “national” sector (small-scale agriculture, trade, seasonal work, criminal sphere). At the end of the 1980s only a few hundred workers were Chechens or Ingush among almost 50 thousand workers of Grosneft and Orgsintez.

The agrarian overpopulation. In the Chechen-Ingush ASSR agrarian overpopulation in rural areas led to labor migration outside the country from 100 to 200 thousand people. According to the scientist, “it is precisely this category which took an active part in the subsequent political developments and was the main reservoir for the armed struggle”. An excess workforce was also typical for a number of the Union republics, for example, the Uzbek and Tajik SSR.

It is well known from anthropological researches that the agrarian overpopulation is a serious threat to agricultural societies. Disputes over land give rise to numerous conflicts (among close relatives) and undermine social cohesion generated by traditional culture.

V.I. Kozlov notices that during the period from 1959 to 1970 the indigenous population of Central Asia seldom migrated to the cities and industrial areas of other parts of the USSR. For example, Ukrainians and Belarusians moved much more actively than Kyrgyz and Uzbeks to Siberia. However, the agrarian overpopulation, indicated in Central Asian republics in the 1970s,
turned to be a serious problem due to drastic consequences of the disintegration of the Union and a significant difference in living standards between Russia and the new states of Central Asia. It also gave rise to the problem of the labor migration of the latter.

**Beginning of the outflow of the Russian population from the “national” republics.** The census in 1970 showed that only three nations, namely Russians, Armenians and Belarusians, accounted for more than 80% of the population within “their” union republics. Kazakhs accounted for less than a third of the population of Kazakhstan, being second only to Russians. Large groups of the latter lived in Ukraine (mainly in Donbass and the Black Sea regions), in Uzbekistan and in other Soviet republics.

At the same time, a population census in 1959 found that since 1939, in all Transcaucasian republics the proportion of “titular” nationality had increased. Since 1959, this process was marked in all the republics of Central Asia, where “interrepublican migrations were low and the influx of other nationalities, including Russians, continuing in most cases, was overlapped with a high natural growth of the indigenous population.” In the Kazakh SSR the number of Kazakhs reduced down to 30% by 1959, increased up to 32.6% by 1970. Besides, the share of Kazakhs concentrated in the country increased from 77.2% to 78.5% respectively. At the same time there was an ethnic imbalance between urban and rural areas. Other nationalities (mostly Russians) were a significant, and sometimes the greater part of the citizens in most of the republics in the 1970s.

According to G. Hosking, “by the beginning of the 1970s many national republics, especially in Central Asia, had started practicing “the system of the hidden discrimination of foreigners, most of whom were Russians, in favor of the local nationalities.” The demographic data show: Russian migrations “from the 1970s changed ... the direction. Now they were not traditionally directed to the south and east from the European part, but to the north and east from the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic states and Moldova.” The outflow of Russian (Russian-speaking) population from most of the republics of the former Soviet Union had begun long before “restructuring” and quickly developed. In 1979-1988 it covered most of the republics, and in those where emigration went on, its pace slowed down rapidly. The number of Russians decreased in all the republics of Central Asia and Armenia. Assimilation processes also began going down since 1970.

**The slowdown in spreading of the Russian language.** During the period between the censuses of 1926 and 1959, the number of non-Russians who indicated Russian as their mother tongue increased from 6.5 up to 10.2 million people, and by 1970 by another 2.8 million, however, as M.N. Guboglo pointed out, “in general, the ratio of nationality and native language has changed a little.” The scientist noticed an interesting trend: the percentage of the people who considered the language of their nationality to be their mother-tongue, was highest in the Union republics (more than 95%, except for Armenians – 91.4%, Ukrainians – 85.7% and Belarusians – 80.6%), slightly lower in the ASSR and in autonomous regions (over 85%, but lower in the case of the Bashkirs, Karels, Mordovians, Udmurts and Komi), whereas among the peoples who did not have their own autonomy the rate was often below 50%. Thus, the national-state structure of the USSR to a certain extent restrained the processes of ethnocultural rapprochement.

The census of 1970 showed a low level of proficiency in Russian, serving as a means of interethnic communication in many union and autonomous republics of the USSR. In particular, only 10.4% of the Karakalpak, 14.5% of the Uzbeks, 15.4% of the Turkomans, 19.9% of the
Kurds and 38.9% of the Tuvinians could speak it. M.N. Guboglo emphasized that “the classes for a broad and deep learning the language are sometimes poorly organized in some republics, there is a shortage of qualified teachers in secondary and high schools ... even among the urban population, especially among the elderly, as well as among unskilled workers, there is a certain portion of people”, who do not know Russian at all or understand it only slightly. Despite this, at least three quarters of the population of the Soviet Union could speak Russian free.

2. Centrifugal political and economic processes

The weakening of the rotation of personnel. According to the culturologist A.S. Akhiezer, Russian society is constantly on the verge of the two abysses – authoritarian and local. The apparent omnipotence of the Russian state is undermined from the inside by localism, “under the blows of which any power in Russia could fall apart like a house of cards”. This reasoning logic, confirmed by many facts from the practice, already in early 1991 forced the author to believe that the late Soviet authoritarianism could not restrain offensive localism.

The elite consensus, whose symbol and moderator was L.I. Brezhnev, was based on the exclusion of a return to intraelite repressions. In this regard, according to a fair remark of G. Hosking, “party secretaries could again assume that their job positions had been given to them in perpetual use”. It stabilized the personnel policy, however, helped to strengthen the clan system, especially in a number of national republics. By 1985, for example, five first secretaries of republican Communist Parties in Central Asia had been in power for 12 years, four of them – for more than 20 years. At the same time V.V. Shcherbitskii (USSR), G.A. Aliev (Azerbaijan SSR) and Sh.R. Rashidov (Uzbek SSR) were twice awarded the title of the Hero of Socialist Labor, while D.A. Kunaev (Kazakh SSR) was awarded even three times. Of course, Republican leaders used such a long stay in power to create powerful networks of influence.

According to G. Hosking, the adaptation of archaic social structures, namely patriarchal families, clans, tribes, to the Soviet nomenclature system, took place. Since the nomenclature was based on the principles of personal dependence and loyalty, such a transition happened without much difficulty. For example, in Kazakhstan, chairmen of collective farms “took the place of the former elders (village elders), and secretaries of regional party committees became new beys, especially since they often came from families that belonged to the old elite”. In Kyrgyzstan, “the issues of appointment to the highest political positions were resolved by negotiation between the three main regional groupings, each of which controlled its land territory of the country: the east was dominated by the Naryn bloc, the Talas bloc controlled the western part, the south territory subordinated to the Osh bloc”. Often these blocs, based on ethnic features, were linked to the shadow economy. For example, in the early 1980s Moscow paid more than one billion rubles a year to Uzbekistan for the supply of non-existent cotton.

The situation was alike in Tajikistan. “Leninabad citizens traditionally dominated in politics in the Soviet period, beginning at least from 1937, and there is an opinion in literature that they started dominating even earlier. Since 1970s Kulob citizens traditionally were Leninabad citizens’ “clients”, and traditionally were responsible for the power ministries. Badakhshan citizens and Pamirs citizens were also involved in this scheme, occupying the middle position in the power structures. Carategin citizens densely settled in the trade and production of consumer goods. The division of responsibilities was...
expressed in this proverb, “Leninabad rules, Kulob guards, Pamir dances and Carategin trades”\textsuperscript{45}. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the balance of the blocs turned to be shaky and their struggle intertwined “with the struggle of Dushanbe with the opposition, painted in Islamic colors” acting in the south of Tajikistan, but mostly based in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{46}.

A.A. Tsutsiev characterizes 1960-80s in the Caucasus as “a carefully controlled slide towards indigenization, where the role of indigenous managerial staff was played by the representatives of the titular groups who passed the selection in the system of Party / Komsomol schools and learned the basic skills of the Party and the Soviet administrative culture”, and who learned to use ethnicity as a tool of political power in particular.

The desire of the Soviet Union to create state-controlled national bureaucracy and intelligentsia happened to increase “the political influence of the representatives of titular ethnic groups and ... the institution of titular privilege – the system of an informal guarantee of the dominance of collective rights of one group over the same rights of others”. According to the author, in the late 1970s – 80s the elites of titular nations began to “consider themselves to be national protopolities”\textsuperscript{47}.

As a kind of political mechanism designed to compensate for the abandonment of mandatory rotation of party cadres, there was a practice existing already in the Stalin era when Russians or any other representatives of “non-indigenous” nationalities were appointed the second secretaries of the Republican Central Committee of the Party. According to the Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1980 this practice was applied in all the “non-Slavic” union republics\textsuperscript{48}. Of course, such an approach to some extent constrained the centripetal processes, but its effectiveness should not be exaggerated. As noted by N. Zen’kovich, not a “messenger of Moscow” for the post of the second secretary of the Central Committee of the National Republic knew the local language at least at the colloquial or everyday level, or tried to learn it. They felt no need for this, believing that they can “be thrown” to another region at any moment. Perhaps, the exception was G.V. Kolbin, who first learnt Georgian, then the Kazakh language\textsuperscript{49}. However, exactly a violation of the “unwritten” rules of the personnel in his appointment as the last First Secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan instead of D.A. Kunaev, who was Kazakh, led to the riots in Alma-Ata\textsuperscript{50}.

A.Kh. Saidov in a pamphlet published in 1989 in Tashkent “to help the lecturer,” noted that in Uzbekistan “the line according to which the composition of the governing party and Soviet cadres, elected bodies, should represent the national structure of the republic, is held”\textsuperscript{51}. At the same time he thought it would be appropriate to set the quota, providing mandates in the Supreme Council of the Republic “for the representatives of different nationalities living in the Uzbek SSR who do not have their national state in the Soviet Union”\textsuperscript{52}.

A.A. Tsutsiev believes that the tactics of the semi-official quota arrangement led to further emphasizing the value of ethnicity as a criterion for negative or positive discrimination. Ethnicity became an increasingly visible feature in the collective and individual competition for prestigious and lucrative positions\textsuperscript{53}.

Party leaders of “national” republics often lobbied the interests of their territories more actively than the leaders of the “ordinary” regions and provinces. The former first secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee F.A. Tabeev recalled his conversation with N.S. Khrushchev, where to the requirement to strengthen the communalization of cows, he replied: “We are not going to deprive the Tartars, as well as other nationalities, of their cows. Our villagers are strong due to their private farms”\textsuperscript{54}. As a result, “Then in a private yard in
the republic almost no cows were reduced.” Later F.A. Tabeev managed to convince L.I. Brezhnev to re-locate the construction of a large automobile plant and the city of Krasnoyarsk Krai to Naberezhnye Chelny55.

N.A. Nazarbaev recalls interesting details: “I happened to catch a time when during the period of protection of national plans in the USSR State Planning Committee building in Karl Marx Prospekt the days of national cuisines were held, namely, the days of Caucasian, Central Asian cuisines... Depending on which republics were protected, plentiful refreshments were accompanied by traditional dances and dances organized on the first floor of that building. <...> This reached such proportions that for some time nobody could even enter the building of State Planning Committee with bags. But people quickly adapted to this restriction: they left offerings and treats in the cells at the entrance, and called the one whom it was meant for. I will never forget how my wise elder predecessors earnestly informed me which Federal Minister likes piglets, which one likes fresh tomatoes56.

The former Estonian President A. Ruutel expertly emphasizes that the national movement in the Estonian SSR mostly developed not through dissident activities but through “daily work” to establish control over the Soviet authorities and management: “If one honest and nationally thinking Estonian managed to occupy a high position in the government of the Estonian SSR at that time, he could do a lot for the benefit of their compatriots, for example, block the adoption of a pernicious bill, push the best solution, promote other national-minded people, and so on”57.

The writer E. Gasanov recalled his experience in KGB of the Azerbaijan SSR: “It was in KGB, where I became a patriot of my nation. I loved my people and my land. I even tried to smoke local cheap cigarettes because they were made in Azerbaijan. I listened to mugham, traveled around the regions of the Republic, became acquainted with our ancient culture. And this all was boosted thanks to the work in KGB. The walls there raised me in a special way, in the spirit of nationalism. <..> For me, the meaning of life was in the safety of my nation. I adored my work, even though the salary in KGB was low”58.

The same tendency was also noticed by ethnically Russian party functionaries. So, one of the senior officials of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1972 wrote in his diary: “The difference of the current nationalism is that its main bearer is the Republican machine and its origins are in the fact that the former “national margins” live a lot better than Russian “metropolis”, they are richer and feel “their opportunities”. Gratitude is not a political concept”59.

Excessive subsidies of the national republics. As stated in the Soviet literature, “In order to achieve de facto equality of nations, it was necessary to ensure first and foremost their economic equality <...> Backed by an international community, the selfless assistance of the Russian people, the Soviet republics, former national margins, made a giant step in the development of their economy and culture”60.

Statistics gives a number of examples of the measures taken for a preferential support of “backward” peoples. In 1975, the RSFSR could leave 42.3% of the turnover tax collected on its territory for itself, Ukraine – 43.3%, Latvia – 45.6%, Moldova – 50%, Estonia – 59.7%, Russia – 68, 2%, Azerbaijan – 69.1%, Georgia – 88.5%, Armenia – 89.9%, Tajikistan – 99.1%, Lithuania – 99.7%, Uzbekistan – 99.8%, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – 100%. In addition, the budgets of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan received 100% personal income tax. The rate of capital investment in the economy of the Union Republics increased the same rate for the RSFSR by 2-4 times61.
During the restructuring years G.I. Litvinova pointed to imbalances in the purchase prices of agricultural products, resulting in the following example: “Production of potatoes and citrus fruits require almost the same labor costs, and therefore their prices all over the world are almost the same or different in two or three times, and only in the USSR this difference is 20-35-time: potatoes cost 20 (in comparison with oranges) or 35 (in comparison with lemons) times cheaper than citrus. The tax policy remains the least favorable for the RSFSR”62.

The growth of the shadow economy. Since 1970s “the shadow capital” began to form actively in a number of republics of the USSR. In Ukraine and Moldova, the sources of that shadow capital were the development of personal commercial rural households, in the Crimea and on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus those were leisure and transport industries, in the South Caucasus the sources were corruption and the development of the “shop” mafia, piggy-backing on the state industrial production, and in the republics of Central Asia and in the Volga region those sources were a combination of the above aspects63.

In April 1983 the operation to root out corruption in Uzbekistan began. The investigation of the fraud with cotton supply revealed the systemic corruption, in which thousands of participants took part64. The scale of the problem was not limited to specific crimes. As pointed out by S.V. Cheshko, the vast additions to the delivery of cotton “fed” the Republican nomenclature and often entire rural areas65.

However, there is a point of view that the investigative team led by T. Gdlian committed numerous violations of the law, and the very “cotton case”, that was only a tool in the fight of various administrative and mafia clans, contributed, eventually, to the country’s disintegration66. Only one thing is certain, namely, the investigation made clear the enormous scale of the informal economic activities in the Soviet Union. Even then, it was logical to assume that the people, who illegally possessed millions of Soviet rubles, will seek to consolidate their position at the cost of the country’s collapse.

Speaking at the “round table” in 1989, held by Iuridicheskaia Literatura Publishing House, Iu.G. Kozlov pointed to the special role of the shadow economy leaders in the events in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Fergana, Abkhazia and in other regions of the country: “Using the mood of frustration, resentment, nationalism outbreak, organized crime skillfully directs those feelings in the right direction for itself. This solves several problems: the attention of law enforcement bodies is distracted; a trust to the restructuring policy conducted by the Party is undermined for a part of the population; the economic life of entire regions is disorganized67. Other researchers also spoke about the role of organized crime in the “national” conflicts of the 1980s68.

Forced preparation of the national intelligentsia. Since the 1990s in the West Russian studies the positions of the researchers who do not operate propaganda clichés of the times of “cold war”, but focus on major cultural and historical studies, new methodological approaches and a thorough study of archival materials, have strengthened69. The works of these authors show that the Soviet Union was not a “prison of peoples”, collapsed because of intolerable conditions for the “prisoners”. In fact, the Soviet system did a lot for the cultivation of ethnic nationalisms, by supporting national languages, cultures and intellectuals. F. Hirsch believes that incentives for nation-building in Central Asia came from the central government, but the process was enthusiastically received and supported at the local level70. A. Edgar and S. Seybol/Sable emphasize the role of the Turkmen and Kazakh intelligentsia71. The historian Iu. Slezkin, who emigrated in 1983 to the United

States, advocates the point of view, according to which the Soviet government encouraged ethnic isolation on a territorial basis. O. Raisner argues that Soviet power, by separating “a pseudo-state in the form of the Georgian SSR” out of TSFSR in 1936, promoting a creation (as a result of rapid urbanization and the introduction of school education in the Georgian language) of the new social stratum of urban Georgians, thereby contributed to the consolidation of this ethnic group.

Turning to the role of ethnic nationalism in the disintegration of the USSR, S.V. Cheshko indicates a significant level of nationalism among non-Russian creative and scientific intelligentsia. According to the researcher, one of the negative social consequences of the policy of “indigenization” was the overproduction of “national staff” in the humanitarian and cultural spheres. These human resources could not apply their knowledge, they lacked the prestigious posts. One consequence of this was forcing the representatives of other ethnic groups out of relevant industries.

The arguments of S.V. Cheshko are not baseless. It is noteworthy that later, during the Georgian-Abkhazian war, Georgia was headed by Z.K. Gamsakhurdia, Doctor of Philology, and Abkhazia was headed by V.G. Ardzinba, Doctor of History and hittitologist. Unfortunately, the high academic achievements of these two scholars (who knew each other well) did not prevent the conflict, and did not even make it less intense.

However, in our view, the problem resided (and still resides) not so much in the “overproduction”, but in the lack of demand for humanitarian intelligentsia building by the state apparatus and statist forces. As a result, there are cases when specialists who did not find a job for themselves go to the service of destructive forces. For example, they become the creators of “national mythologies” which make the history of a “target” ethnic group “ancient” down to the time of Alexander the Great and attributed the ethnocide of this great nation to our country.

Territorial problems. In the programme of the Communist Party, adopted in 1962, it was argued that the boundaries between the Union republics within the Soviet Union were losing their meaning. However, in the work, published in 1967 by “Politizdat”, P.M. Rogachev and M.A. Sverdlin formulated the following thesis: “socialist nations always have statehood. It can be expressed ... in relatively isolated national state, and in the presence of public entities and their representation in federal bodies”. The authors sharply criticized the point of view of P.G. Semenov about the “denationalization” of the Union republics.

In the field of a national-state structure the Constitution of the USSR of 1977 enshrined the status of a union republic as “a sovereign Soviet socialist state that has united with other Soviet Republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (Article 76), the right of every Union republic for free seceding from the Soviet Union (Article 72) and the inability to change the territory of a union republic without its consent (Article 78).

Following the adoption of the Constitution of the USSR, the work on the renovated basic laws of the Union republics began. In particular, the draft of the Constitution of Georgia was developed. It said: “The Georgian SSR provides a free use of the Georgian, as well as the Russian, Abkhazian, Ossetian and other languages of the majority of the population in the area”. However, on April 14, 1978, on the day of the discussion of the project in Tbilisi an unauthorized demonstration of thousands was held, under the pressure of which the deputies preserved the original position of the Georgian language.

As A.V. Shubin notices, in 1970-80s the growth of regionalist tendencies in the ruling class
was dangerously imposed on ethnic tensions in the Soviet Union. The author distinguishes three main groups of ethnic contradictions which were typical of the period: between Russian-speaking and indigenous population, between Russians and “southerners” in the “Slavic” republics and between titular nations and other peoples in the union and autonomous republics. In the 1970s the tension in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was already evident.

According to A. Volsky, Yu.A. Andropov in 1983 offered to turn to the administrative-territorial division that is not based on nationality, but those plans went awry.

3. Socio-cultural crisis

The crisis of the Soviet ideology and semi-official Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

G.A. Pomerants argued that “the creation of the empire is possible only with a high-takeoff of the human spirit”, and the loss of the general idea leads to “the internal decay, which will inevitably become the external disintegration as well”.

A.A. Tsutsiev notes that as long as “the doctrinal power of communist ideology and the relative efficiency of the central government institutions” existed, the Soviet state could prevent a collision between the general Soviet and ethno-national “projects of nation building”. However, the crisis of ideology and the central government caused “the destruction of the unique identification field of the Soviet people”.

Decades later, it is interesting to take a look at how the official Soviet ideology saw the future of the socialist nations. In this regard, I apologize to the reader for rather voluminous quotes in advance.

The statement that national differences would continue to exist after the victory of socialism in all countries, was developed and justified in the second edition of the textbook “Dialectical and historical materialism”, edited by S.M. Kovalev issued by “Politizdat” in 1969. The authors point out that the socialist nations are fundamentally different from bourgeois ones. The most important feature of the first is “social homogeneity, developing on the basis of the socialist mode of production. Of course, it is not fully achieved yet. However, these nations compared to communities under capitalism are monolithic (emphasis added), because there is no antagonism between the classes. The residual effects of heterogeneity ... do not express the basic tendencies of development of nations. As we move toward communism, they decrease, whereas under capitalism heterogeneity increases.” A paradoxical thing is that the closer to communism we move, the more monolithic the nations become.

In addition, “In a developed socialist society the division of nations into advanced and backward is meaningless; they rise to the heights of the contemporary world culture”. The following question arises: what will stimulate so developed and self-sufficient nations to integrate? And then, how will humanity come to the promised “golden age” when, in the words of the poet, “Human speech will merge in one language?”

The authors answer these questions very evasively: “A complete unity of nations is a maximum convergence, but not their integration yet. The rapprochement of the socialist nations goes on all over their existence, whereas their more or less complete fusion can be described as a relatively distant future. Currently, in the life of our country there are some elements of the merging of nations, especially in the economy. But in general, the current stage of national relations still can not be described as a fusion between nations. This is the stage of their maximum convergence. It would also be premature to declare a full merger as soon as communism is basically constructed. Criticizing G.L. Piatakov, who advocated speeding up that
process and the merger of nations immediately after the Revolution, V.I. Lenin wrote that the merging of nations is “certainly ... a great thing, and it will happen, but only at quite a different stage of communist development”.

It should be noted that 1913 V.I. Lenin advocated more radically, but at the same time more clear: “Proletariat can not support consolidation of nationalism, on the contrary it supports everything that helps to obliterate national distinctions and remove national barriers, all leading to the merging of nations. To do otherwise means siding with reactionary nationalist philistinism”.

Half a century later, the official ideologists of Marxism claimed: “A nation is a necessary form of development of society, until all significant and progressive in the history of this ethnic education is revealed and becomes the property of all humanity. When this is reached, the national form of relation gradually becomes outdated and gives way to universal relations, and that is how the merging of nations happens. A complete fusion of the nations will take place only after the consolidation of communism throughout the world”.

“Soviet people” and “friendship of peoples”. Similar statements were expressed in the speeches of the party and state leaders. October 18, 1961 in the report “On the Program of the Soviet Union Communist Party”, N.S. Khrushchev said about two interconnected tendencies in the national question: the first was about the rapid and comprehensive development of every nation, and the second was about an increasing convergence of socialist nations, strengthening their interaction and mutual enrichment. The report said that the economic development of each Soviet republic was the result of fraternal co-operation of all the Soviet peoples.

As a positive example the development of virgin lands in Kazakhstan was cited. It was pointed out that “enterprises and buildings” are friendly multinational groups, the republic's population is becoming more mixed in their national composition, and there is a mutual exchange of qualified personnel between the republics. It supposed to create “some inter-republican zone bodies for a better coordination of the republics’ efforts”.

Besides, according to N.S. Khrushchev, cultural development and ideological work promoted the convergence of nations and peoples, the exchange of spiritual riches among the nations increased. It was said that the development of national languages should lead not to the strengthening of national barriers but to the rapprochement of nations. “A growing desire of the non-Russian peoples to master the Russian language that was actually the second native language for the peoples of the USSR, a means of international communication” was noted. However, the report contained the following remarkable statement: “In the course of the comprehensive building of communism we will reach a complete unity of nations. But after communism is mainly built, it will be premature to declare the merger of nations. Lenin, as is known, pointed out that the state and national differences would continue to exist long after the victory of socialism in all countries”.

On March 30, 1971, reading the report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev pointed to the Leninist national policy, a policy of equality and friendship of peoples, as one of the greatest achievements of socialism. He said that in education, strengthening and development of the USSR “all the nations and nationalities of our country, especially the great Russian people, played a role. Their revolutionary energy, dedication, hard work, deep internationalism rightfully earned them a sincere respect of all
the peoples of our socialist homeland”. Like the report of N.S. Khrushchev, it proclaimed the course “to the flourishing of socialist nations and their gradual convergence”.

The report of L.I. Brezhnev proclaimed another thesis. It was said that during the years of socialist construction in the USSR “a new historical community of people, namely the Soviet people, emerged. In joint labor, in the struggle for socialism, in the battle for their defense the new, harmonious relations between classes and social groups, nations and nationalities, which were the relations of friendship and cooperation, were born. Our people are welded together by common Marxist-Leninist ideology, the lofty goals of building a communist society. The multinational Soviet people demonstrate this monolithic unity through their work, their unanimous approval of the Communist Party’s policy”90. Such a long quotation was cited to show the “Soviet people” were not endowed with any of the features typical of an ethnic community. In 1977 L.I. Brezhnev said: “We would step on a dangerous path if started to force artificially... an objective process of the rapprochement of nations”91. In the book published by “Politizdat” in 1982 E.A. Bagramov referred the point of view of the creation of the Soviet nation to a number of “immature and hasty judgments rejected by the science and practice of building communism”. He argued that the Soviet people were a historical community of a higher level, in the framework of which “more than a hundred socialist nations, nationalities and ethnic groups are successfully developing”92.

S.V. Lourie emphasizes that “the friendship of peoples” was formed and developed as “a lower culture”, almost independent on instructions and actions of the authorities93. (By the way, this point of view is shared by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbaev95.) This “lower culture” was designed to provide a peaceful co-existence of “Soviet nations,” whose officially defined myths did not suppose the “golden age” either in tsarist past, or in the communist nationless future96.

The sociological research conducted by S.V. Lourie, shows that “the friendship of peoples” was, in the language of modern anthropology, a cultural script in the form of a scheme of socio-cultural relations deployed in time97. Similar scenarios are formed in the society to a certain extent spontaneously, i.e. they are not a banal realization of those or other political projects.

“The friendship of peoples” as such a scenario was a kind of game of compromises, the content of which was a mutual manifestation of special “politeness” or gentleness, tact, the ability to understand others, without losing one’s own culture. This game filled some gaps of communication models that were not filled in the national scenarios. A member of that game perceived oneself as a “Soviet man” capable of understanding other people and being understood by them. It is significant that such a “Soviet man” was not just a bearer of the official ideology98.

I.S. Gurvich in 1977 singled out two major trends in the ethnic processes taking place in the USSR: “One of them is manifested in the formation of nations, the consolidation of the socialist nations, the other is in the process of intense inter-ethnic integration, including all the ethnic communities of our country in its flow”99.

S.I. Vainshtein traced the similar phenomena in the socio-economic sphere100. However, L.I. Lavrov, regarding the issues of comparative philology,
pointed to the following circumstance: “Literary languages in the USSR continue to develop freely on a national basis and do not exhibit the tendency to merge with each other”\textsuperscript{101}. K.V. Chistov seriously wondered: “Isn’t the development of the national cultures the process, which is contrary to their convergence?” He noted that “the elements of spiritual culture ... turn out to be closely related to the state of ethnic consciousness” that “sometimes results in the form of idealization of the nationally peculiar”\textsuperscript{102}.

Nevertheless, the Soviet national policy continued to evolve in the same way. On February 26, 1986 M.S. Gorbachev, speaking at the Congress of the CPSU, characterized the Soviet people as a qualitatively new social and international community, welded by the unity of economic interests, ideology and political goals. However, it was noted in the report that national processes went on without problems, the drive to the national isolation and dependency had not been eliminated\textsuperscript{103}.

On March 1, 1986 the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was adopted in the new edition. The document stated that the national question, “left over from the past in the Soviet Union, is successfully resolved”\textsuperscript{104}(!!) (Please note, three years earlier, K.U. Chernenko said that it was still early to remove this issue from the agenda\textsuperscript{105}).

After this absurd thesis three reasonable, although not quite clearly stated national policy objectives, were formulated, namely:

- All-round development and strengthening of a unified multi-ethnic state, which included the fight against parochialism and national narrow-mindedness, combined with the increased role of the republics in addressing nation-wide challenges and the active participation of the working people of all nationalities in the work of governing bodies;

- Increasing material and spiritual potential of each republic within the single economic complex, which also required inter-republican exchange of personnel, training of qualified personnel among all the citizens living in the republics of the nations and nationalities;

- The development of the common culture of the Soviet people that is socialist in content, diverse in national forms, and international in the spirit.

They also talked about the role of the Russian language as a language of international communication\textsuperscript{106}. The above considerations, including those that relate to the development of federal relations, were combined under the heading “A further rise and convergence of socialist nations and peoples”. Thus, the national question and the questions of the federal structure of the state were re-mixed. In general, the events took such a turn that the streamlined formulations of a new party program left their mark only on paper, for the edification of posterity.

The weakening of the “soft power” of Russian culture. As S.V. Lourie pointed out, “For some peoples the Russian high culture filled the missing or too thin layer of their own high culture. For the peoples, who had their own high culture, the Russian one supplemented and enriched it”\textsuperscript{107}. At the same time the task of Russians was “to maintain the core of the construction, to direct the action of others”\textsuperscript{108}. According to one of the interlocutors of the sociologist, in a scenario of “the friendship of peoples” the Russian nation acted as a “fabulous Santa Claus to whom others dance and sing, and he smiles, pats on the head and gives presents”\textsuperscript{109}.

According to a number of the circumstances outlined above, it follows that as we move towards the end of the analyzed period, the Russian identity becomes less and less prestigious and “reasonable” in the career, material, and other
aspects. This was evidenced by the statistics as well. The children born in marriages where one spouse was Russian chose the nationality of that parent who belonged to the “titular” nationality in Cheboksary in 2.2% of cases, in Minsk – in 40%, in Kiev – in 60%, and in Ashgabat in 90% of cases\textsuperscript{110}.

However, in our opinion, this problem is not limited to the material aspect. In this connection it is appropriate to turn to “ethnic connections” concept being developed by S.V. Lourie. According to the researcher, these connections occur when ethnocultural processes of a particular ethnic group are more intense.

“A specific communication uniting peoples” occurs in the course of “empire building and the ordering of a superpower”. In times of weakening and disintegration of imperial structures this phenomenon, on the contrary, disappears\textsuperscript{111}. Of course, many things here depend on the state of culture related to national development and state of the people who develop it themselves.

The interconnection and relationship of the Soviet state and the Russian people were the subject of a close attention of US sovietologists. So, John Rockefeller asserted in 1980: “The relations of the (Soviet) regime with the Russian people resemble the proverbial woman riding a tiger. She can never stop or jump without incurring unacceptable risks. The ideological requirements do not allow the Soviet regime to reject Marxism openly and accept the Russian ethnocentrism explicitly”, but one can not deny the latter, “so that non-Russians could take it as a sign of weakness ... And finally, the regime can not really hope to revive Marxism-Leninism, because this ideology does not provide genuine legitimacy any more”\textsuperscript{112}.

Ethnically non-Russian respondents of S.V. Lourie believed that Russians did not feel a sufficient support in the Soviet society, and did not understand that they were “loved just as a nationality .... Maybe they did not love themselves a lot ... (Armenian, 53)\textsuperscript{113}. According to the opinion of S.V. Lourie, Russians did not love themselves as the bearers of the ideas of Sovietism, and opposite to non-Russians could not abstract themselves from them\textsuperscript{114}.

One of the factors that had a negative impact on the socio-cultural state of the Russian people became, in particular, a large-scale campaign held in 1960-80s to resettle the rural population from small settlements into the central estates and large industrial plots of state farms. As a result of these activities, both Russian “unpromising” villages and many settlements of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North were deserted. The concentration of people in the “advanced” villages put a number of socio-economic problems instead of raising the standard of living\textsuperscript{115}.

The critical state of the Russian culture was most clearly displayed by the writers-“villagers”. So, V.G. Rasputin was able to record the sinister work of the mechanisms of cultural self-destruction, expressed in particular in the spread of alcoholism, which is rather a social or socio-cultural problem but not a medical one\textsuperscript{116}.

**Conclusion**

The temptation to “post-factual rationalization” pushes to declare the disintegration of the Soviet Union as an inevitable consequence of the destructive effects outlined above. However, in our opinion, history is not such a rigidly determined process.

The existence of any large state organized society is always complicated with many external challenges and internal contradictions. The problem lies in available forces which are sufficiently trained and organized to overcome these contradictions and challenges. In the case of the Soviet Union, the role of such forces was failed by the Party, the secret services and the growing civil society together.
We can not say that the “ruling class” of the Soviet Union ignored the reality without noticing the growing crisis processes. Another thing is that due to non-publicity of the Soviet “real politics” it is possible to judge about the responses to the challenges only by indirect evidence.

The political scientist S.E. Kurginian believes that just during the analyzed Soviet period in the elite of the secret services a group of like-minded people, united around the program of Russia’s entering “the civilized Europe”, was formed. The members of this group perceived an increase in the number of ethnically Muslim population of the Union as one of the obstacles to the implementation of the plan. In this connection, they considered the separation of the “Asian margins” and carrying out the accelerated capitalist modernization on the remaining territory to be necessary\(^{117}\).

The activist A.I. Baigushev, who secretly operated in the Soviet and Party structures of the “Russian party”, points to an important role of this movement in the collapse of the Soviet Union: “They separated from all “marginal” adjacent republics, which turned the Russian Republic into the economic donor and drank the blood of the Russian nation. There only four of them – the three Slavic republics, namely Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, plus, Kazakhstan which was more than half Russian in terms of population. That was what we really wanted”\(^{118}\).

This logic had a serious flaw: there was no clear answer to the question why and how the disintegration should stop and not continue in the “cut” borders of “the new Russia”. In this regard, we continue to “reap the fruits” of the centrifugal processes launched in the period under review.

Noting the above, it is necessary, however, to agree with E. Hobsbawn: “Discrimination” and even “depression”, against which the Western advocates of some Soviet nationalities protested, ultimately proved to be much less terrible than the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet regime\(^{119}\). The Soviet state was able to create a pacifying space, contributing to the progressive development of citizens. An undoubted achievement of the Soviet society was the formation of the lower culture of “the friendship of peoples”, which requires further study and could become a specific guide for harmonization of interethnic relations in modern Russia.


\(^{2}\) See ibid.

\(^{3}\) As O.A. Gantskaia notices, coming to study in the city, a boy or a girl from a Caucasian family often settles in the family of their relatives to enjoy the care and protection of the latter and becomes a member of the family”. See ibid., 458.

\(^{4}\) See Kozlov, V.I. Etnicheskie protsessy i dinamika chislennosti narodov SSSR [Ethnic processes and population dynamics of the peoples of the USSR], In Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR [Modern ethno-sociological processes in the USSR], the 2nd ed. Moscow, Nauka, 486.


\(^{7}\) See ibid., 133.

\(^{8}\) See ibid., 137.

\(^{9}\) See Kozlov, V.I. Etnicheskie protsessy i dinamika chislennosti narodov SSSR [Ethnic processes and population dynamics of the peoples of the USSR]. Moscow, Nauka, 494 p.

\(^{10}\) See ibid., 493.

\(^{11}\) See ibid., 495.

\(^{12}\) See ibid., 496.

\(^{13}\) See ibid., 498.

\(^{14}\) See ibid., 499.
In particular, with regard to the peoples of the North, P.V. Sosin mentions the following problems: worsening of the use of...
stumble, can not stand this. Everything starts again. It means you got tired. The body demanded rest. So this is not me who
drinks, this is my body. It needs this together with bread, as such a need arises in it” (emphasis added).


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Советская национальная политика

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Анализируемый период характеризовался сочетанием трех факторов. Первый из них – противоречивая и во многом неблагоприятная динамика социально-демографических и этнокультурных процессов. Речь идет о неравномерном росте численности различных этнических общностей, демографическом кризисе русского этноса (вывозном в том числе «эхом войны»), сохраняющейся неоднородности социальной структуры советских этносов, аграрном перенаселении ряда союзных республик, начале оттока русского населения из последних, а также о замедлении темпов распространения русского языка.

Второй важный фактор – центробежные политические и экономические процессы. В их числе следует назвать ослабление ротации кадров, избыточное дотирование национальных республик, развитие теневой экономики и форсированную подготовку национальных интеллигенций и несбалансированное применение системы территориальных автономий как средство решения национального вопроса.

И, наконец, третий фактор – социокультурный кризис, включавший кризис советской идеологии и официальной марксистско-ленинской философии, концептуальный тупик советской национальной политики и ослабление «мягкой силы» русской культуры.

Политическая, научная и творческая элита Советского Союза не смогла дать удовлетворительного ответа на эти кризисные явления. Более того, по мере усиления негативной динамики в элитных кругах возобладали настроения, связывающие выход из тупика с отказом от «имперской» политики в пользу строительства «национального государства» путем уменьшительного национализма. При этом были недооценены долгосрочные негативные последствия такого подхода, дающие знать о себе и по настоящее время.


Научная специальность: 24.00.00 – культурология, 23.00.00 – политология.