Developmental Subjects and Developmental Institutions of the Russian Economy (Federal and Regional Levels)

Kirill S. Sablin*
Kemerovo State University
6 Krasnaya st., Kemerovo, 650043 Russia

Received 9.04.2010, received in revised form 16.04.2010, accepted 23.04.2010

The article was devoted to the problem of creation of «developmental institutions» multilevel system in the Russian economy. «Developmental institutions'» criteria and objects were defined. Also groups that were interested in their formation were pointed out. It was supposed that groups of interests could be divided into «developmental agents» and «developmental subjects». «Developmental agents» had got resources and instruments that were used to develop Russian economy whereas «developmental subjects» should also have had powerful bargaining positions and political will to produce selective incentives for «developmental agents».

Special attention was paid to the «Federal Center – Regions» relations which predetermined peculiarities of creating «developmental institutions» system. Also it was crucial to take into account the power of bargaining positions of interested groups which interplayed on the political-bureaucratic market.

Keywords: «developmental institutions», institutional innovations, bureaucratic market.

Introduction

The problem of the Russian economy transition to the innovation-led model of economic growth is widely discussed in the Russian government and in the academic establishment. Necessity of such transition is regarded as crucial because there are no any other alternatives. Present model of economic development was based on low inner prices on oil and natural gas whereas world prices were high enough. Also this model included untapped industrial reserves, qualified and relatively inexpensive labor resources. On the other hand, gradual reduction of difference between currency exchange level and Russian ruble purchasing power parity, depletion of untapped industrial reserves and infrastructural limits for further economic growth, labor forces rise in prices and insufficient mobility of qualified personnel, strengthening of competition on inner and outer markets of goods and services had leaded to the situation when further development of the Russian economy based on this economic resources became impossible. Also this problem has special urgency in the context of the world financial-economic crisis which compels less economically effective companies to leave market and gives a chance...
to develop for those economic agents who open up new technologies and use rationally available economic resources.

Obviously more crucial problem is a problem to disclose subjects of the Russian economy modernization who are able to choose a strategy of transition and who are able to realize innovative scenario of economic development. That is why it is supposed to give definitions for such conceptions as «agent» and «subject» of economic development in this article, as well as to define conditions which allow us speaking about groups of interests in this context. Specificity and objects of interested groups will be identified using the example of creating multilevel system of «developmental institutions» of the Russian economy.

«Developmental Institutions» of the Russian Economy: Criteria, Objects and Functions

«Developmental institutions» are organizational-economic structures that have enough capabilities to realize a new potential of economic growth. For instance, they can attract investments in infrastructure, in developing branches and in human capital, as well as they can assist to create new technologies and to heighten competitiveness of home small and medium business. Effect from «developmental institutions» is much higher rather than the size of the state investments because they serve as long-term state commitments to develop national economy and this fact causes stability of expectations in private sector.

The following criteria distinguish «developmental institutions» from other forms of state supporting:

- Developmental institutions» have stable organizational structure and definite rules of their activity.
- «Developmental institutions» do not have object to maximize profits. Classical «developmental institutions» are non-commercial organizations and their creation is connected with production of quasi public goods with localized positive externalities.
- «Developmental institutions» activity is consisting in resources allocation (finances, qualified personnel, information, administrative capital) in the developmental projects.

Deceleration of the growth based on the traditional economic structure causes the necessity to create these organizational-economic structures. «Developmental institutions» are catalyst of innovative activity. To guarantee profits for innovators that are not available in old institutional environment is one of their primary object. It is important to point out that there are «developmental institutions» failures, for instance: inflexibility in changing conditions, lack of clear development strategy, absence of trust in private sector, «lock-in» jeopardy in the frames of existing institutional environment, private business ousting from investment process, risk of costs overstating.

Also a considerable concentration of financial resources that are being attracted during the creation of «developmental institutions» may become one of the failure reasons. For instance, there is danger of political rent extraction by different groups of interests. Political rent extraction may reduce the effectiveness of implantation of institutional innovation. The important moment is to distinct corruption rent and political rent itself.

Corruption is the sale by government officials of government property for personal

---

1 Construction and reconstruction of engineering and social infrastructure units on the bounded territory are examples of localized positive quasi public goods producing during the creation of Kuzbass Technological park.

2 For instance, it is planned to apportion 300 million rubles from federal budget and 413 million rubles from regional budget to create Kuzbass technological park during 2008 – 2010.
It is an illegal activity to search and to extract rent. In other words, politicians and officials on the one hand, and entrepreneurs on the other hand interplay in the frames of the «black» zone. On the contrary, political rent is extracted in the frames of the «white» zone. It is well-known fact that process of lobbying of different groups interests is regulated with the special law, i.e. lobbying is separated from corruption and does not have any connections with State servants and politicians bribery. Its extraction prerequisites arise in the case when separate market participant can limit artificially access to the local market for newcomers. That is why this participant can obtain resources those are not corresponding with his level of economic efficiency. Such domination of the tendency to extract political rent may lead to the common reduction of efficiency on the macro level. Thus this domination can predetermine the inevitability of crisis of the system resources allocation among economic agents. According to this fact, A. Krueger noted: «...in many market-oriented economies, government restrictions upon economic activity are pervasive facts of life. These restrictions give rise to rents of a variety of forms, and people often compete for the rents. Sometimes, such competition is perfectly legal. In other instances, rent seeking takes other forms, such as bribery, corruption, smuggling, and black markets» [Krueger, 1974, p. 291].

Nevertheless, there are successful patterns of «developmental institutions» of economy in the foreign countries. For instance, Chile Fondacion, venture program «Inbal» in Israel, Finnish National Fund for Research and Development (SITRA), Korean Development Institute. Like international experience shows «developmental institutions» are successful when (1) share of the State does not exceed of 40 – 50 %; (2) there is a transparent scheme of «developmental institutions» managing; (3) State is regarded as a subject, who gives only initial impulse for further development. But in many cases successful institutional patterns are unique for this or that country.

To define peculiarities of the Russian «developmental institutions» system it is crucial to disclose agents of economic development who can create such system. Moreover it is very important to find out real «developmental subjects» who are interested indeed in realization of transition to the innovation-led model of economic development.

**Agents and Subjects of Economic Development**

Contents of such categories as «subject», «agent» and «actor» are not equal. Conception of «actor» is meaningful in the context of concrete social action¹, while conception of «subject» reflects rationality of behavior and ability to realize free choice. Subject becomes an actor according to some social action, but actor can be regarded as subject only in the context of definite behavior characteristics. Essential characteristics of subjectiveness are the following (Fig. 1).

1. Presence of own strategic or tactical project that realize own (not external) interests and objects.
2. Presence of political will and powerful bargaining position to realize own project.

These or that individuals and social groups are able to be actors but they are instruments to achieve external, not their own, interests [Gaman-Golutvina, 2007]. Actors who are able to implement activity that leads to definite changes can be regarded as «agents». According to this idea, construct the following scheme of the contemporary modernization process using subjectiveness strengthening:

¹ Also actor plays definite social role, which is considered to be relatively stable pattern of behavior that is realized by individual according to the social status or the social position in society.
Developmental agents are groups of interests whose actions are implemented to create contemporary instruments of structural policy (for instance, «developmental institutions»), as well as they have necessary resources and their economic interests come to the common ground. Also these groups of interests should have wide supporting of society and other groups of interests. Selective incentives have an influence upon participants of these groups to produce collective goods, for instance – economic development based on the led-innovation model.

As we can see not all developmental agents are real «developmental subjects». Groups of interests are characterized with different horizons of planning (short-term, middle-term and long-term), as well as these groups have unequal bargaining positions and they are characterized with presence or absence of political will (political will is regarded as specific resource using to create selective incentives). According to this idea, «developmental subjects» of the national economy are groups with long-term interests, which have objects and resources not only to achieve these objects but also to create selective incentives for other groups of interests (i.e. for developmental agents). The following characteristics of «developmental subjects» are:

1. Object availability;
2. Availability of instruments to achieve this object;
3. Availability of resources (political, administrative and symbolic capitals\(^1\)), those are base for object achieving.

It is crucial to disclose peculiarities of the «developmental institutions» Russian model in the context of «developmental subjects» definition.

**Peculiarities of the Russian Economy «Developmental Institutions» System Creation: Federal and Regional Levels**

Russia is a country with historically formed social and economic differentiation, which predetermines: (1) various possibilities for economic development of the Russian regions; (2) segmented institutional environment, i.e. variation of multitudes of fundamental political, social and juridical rules, which regulate economic and political activity in this or that region; (3) localized institutional agreements, i.e. various agreements between economic agents of this or that region, which regulate methods of its competition [Levin, 2008].

The Russian economic space peculiarities predetermine the fact that creating «developmental agents»

---

\(^1\) Political capital is economic agent ability to mobilize collective actions and to represent interests of other economic agents (groups and/or individuals). Administrative capital is economic agent ability to regulate resources access for other economic agents using special positions of power and authority. Symbolic capital is economic agent ability to manipulate with different methods to evaluate available and potential resources. See: V.V. Radzev Conception of capital, forms of capital and their convertibility, *Economic sociology*, 3 (4) (2002), 20-33, in Russian.
institutions» system must become multilevel because federal, regional and local authorities are interested in its creation. Each level pursues its own object, has its own resources and instruments to achieve these object.

**Federal «Developmental Subjects»**

Federal level of developmental agents is represented with superior political elite, federal bureaucracy, federal large-scale companies, sectoral scientific institutes, expert community (as a rule, these are intellectual elites of both capitals) and net of federal universities. Real «developmental subjects» are superior political elite, federal bureaucracy and federal large-scale companies.

Superior political elite’s object is to solve interconnected problems: social and economic development of the country territory, supporting its defensive capacities, «incorporation» of the Russian economy into global worldwide economy. Superior political elite has strategic resource¹ that allows to raise above other developmental «subjects» and agents [Kryshtanovskaya, 2004].

To solve these problems superior political elite delegates authority to the federal bureaucracy. The latter fulfils some measures that to improve living standards for population, to create comfortable conditions for habitation, to assist for human capital development and to realize large-scale developmental projects with the help of definite structural policy instruments. One of these instruments are federal financial and non-financial «developmental institutions», which are represented with Investment Fund of the Russian Federation, JSC «Russian Venture Company», JSC «Special Economic Zones», JSC «Russian agricultural bank», JSC «Russian investment fund of informational-communicative technologies» and with State Corporations². Main objects of these organizational-economic structures are: modern infrastructure formation, implementation of innovations, development of export of the products with high added value, supporting of small and medium business, reduction of regional disproportions, development of the agricultural sector [Nabiullina, 2007]. To achieve these objects federal bureaucracy has resources – administrative and symbolic capitals (those capitals have superior potential than corresponding capitals of regional authorities), which allow to redistribute funds of federal budget that is formed owing to raw material exporting rent.

It is worth mentioning that bureaucracy aspires to satisfy their own interest during implementation of their functions. This interest is differing from superior political elite’s interest and from private economic agents’ interests. This corporative interest is concluded in economic resources concentration and in financial streams regulation that guarantees the increase of economic and political power of State bureaucratic apparatus [Kurbatova et al., 2005].

Federal large-scale companies’ object is to participate in the wide-scale developmental projects and to receive various State preferences and breaks in the frames of «developmental institutions» formation. In this case there are some risks and effectiveness of federal large-scale business participation is questionable. The following reasons are: opacity of creating State corporations, federal officials' tendency to extract political rent, opportunity to receive economic resources by ineffective economic agents via political and bureaucratic markets, strong dependence from world prices on energy

¹ It is supposed that this resource includes political, administrative and symbolic capitals, which are *incommensurable* with the corresponding capitals of all other «developmental subjects».

² At the present time there are eight State Corporations in the Russian Federation.
resources. Furthermore, certainly unequal positions of business and State on the federal level may cause the situation when the State itself will choose developmental projects and will appoint participants for projects financing. At the same time federal government is not able to select adequate measures to stimulate economic growth because of information asymmetry problem that often predetermines incorrect understanding of motives and incentives of companies that have higher level of adaptation for various innovations.

Federal large-scale companies’ instrument to achieve their object is lobbying of their interests in the frames of wide-scale developmental projects\(^1\). Economic capital in the form of financial funds that are gained because of raw materials (natural gas, oil, wood, metals and others) exporting is the resource of the federal large-scale companies to lobby their interests. Also these companies use cumulative political capital.

**«Federal Center – Regions» Relations in the Process of «Developmental Institutions» Creation**

Regional authorities are situated in more rigid conditions than Federal Center. They experience pressure «vertically» – from federal authorities, and «horizontally» – from neighboring territories (republics, regions, krays). «Federal Center – Regions» relations can be divided into two main phases (Table 1).

Absence of clear formal rules characterized «weak Center – powerful Regions» relations because of social-economic collapse and political disintegration. Redistribution of federal budget funds was the only real key factor for federal government to influence on governors. That is why the process of redistribution of federal budget funds became a center of competition. Interbudget relations became a sphere of bargain between regional leaders and Federal Center that personified various groups of interests in the frames of bureaucratic market. These groups of interests widely used informal norms of personified nature to «beat out» subventions, State subsidies, and transfers. Timeliness of transfers dispatch in the regions was a guarantee of political stability because it had a strong connection with payment of wages for those employees who were working in the budget sphere.

Federal authorities did not have any wide public supporting in the process of the Russian economy reforming. That is why they tried to find common ground with narrow by the membership but politically significant «special groups of interests», including their most influential representatives in the structure of the State apparatus on the different levels. Reforming fixed adoption of political market formal frames whereas real hybrid of bureaucratic and political markets appeared [Kurbatova et al., 2005]. Federal and budget reforms (for instance, creation of the new administrative-territorial formations – federal okrugs, governors’ status changing, changing of the principle of Council of Federation forming, creation of the State council) leaded to the essential limitation of financial opportunities for the regional authorities, but at the same time significant part of their obligations were preserved. Thus costs to get subventions, State subsidies and transfers increased dramatically as well as transformation of process of resources redistribution on political-bureaucratic market happened. Process of institutional changes gradually becomes a center of competition in interregional relations. It is supposed that these changes will assist to develop native small and

---

\(^1\) It is worth mentioning that State companies and State corporations are also lobbying their interests. For instance, State enterprise «Rosoboronexport» is interested in creation of special economic zone «Titanium valley» on the base of corporation VSMPO-AVISMA; State Corporation «Rostechnologies» is interested in getting assets of independent engines building enterprise «Sa-lut».
medium business and to attract investments into regions economy.

**Regional «Developmental Subjects»**

Real regional «developmental subjects» are represented with regional authorities, regional parliament and regional companies that are susceptible to the innovations (i.e. companies of «Schumpeterian» type).

Legislative and executive authorities operate in common in the field of regional «developmental institutions» creation. Their object is to develop territory (region, kray or republic). Also they have political, administrative and symbolic capitals those are rare enough. It is supposed that these kinds of capital have mobilization potential that is non-commensurable with abilities of all other regional developmental agents.

In the context of regional «developmental institutions» creation these resources can be used, for example, in the process of laws adoption, which regulate their creation and functioning.

In the frames of regional «developmental institutions» formation and functioning main functions are fulfilled by the State managers\(^1\). These functions are the following:

- advising: information accordance for companies (potential residents, anchor residents, service companies) about creating «developmental institutions»;
- coordinating: preparation of conception of regional «developmental institutions» creation; regulation of interplay of all possible participants – regional developmental agents (business, institutes of higher education, scientific institutes, expert community and others);
- negotiating: negotiation with potential companies-residents and private investments attraction for project financing; lobbying of regional

---

\(^1\) It is important to point out the fact that similar functions are fulfilled by the State managers in the frames of federal «developmental institutions».

---

Table 1. Comparative characteristics of «Federal Center – Regions» relations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Center bargaining position</td>
<td>Total weakening of bargaining position: dissociation of interests groups of supreme political elite and federal bureaucracy; deficit of political capital.</td>
<td>Total strengthening of bargaining position: consolidation of interests groups around the figure of the President; increasing of political capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions bargaining position</td>
<td>Total strengthening of bargaining position: consolidation of interests groups around the figures of regional leaders (Yu. Lugkov, M. Shaimiev, A. Tuleev); presence of independent political capital.</td>
<td>Total weakening of bargaining position: dissociation of interests groups of governors and deficit of political capital (actual dependence from presidential appointments).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center of competitive relations between regions</td>
<td>Interbudget relations: regions-recipients aspire to get subsidies, subventions, transfers; regions-donors try to preserve profitable items of their regional budgets. «Exclusive» interests of regions lobbying.</td>
<td>Legislative activity: creation of conditions for development of small and medium business. Regional developmental projects lobbying.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is worked up by the author. Chronological frameworks: (1) 1991 – the USSR collapse and the beginning of the modern phase of federative relations; (2) 1998 – adoption of Conception of interbudget relations reforming in the Russian Federation; (3) 2005 – completion of the period of country «recentralization» policy.
«developmental institutions» creation project on the federal level and federal resources attraction;
• administering: regional resources accumulation for project financing and creation of organizational structure of «developmental institutions»; construction and reconstruction of engineering and social units of infrastructure.

It is supposed that advising function is the most important because of the fact that information about possibility or intention to make some changes can be a potential source of private benefit for officials. In other words, it is simple signal that does not demand special co-ordination with higher levels of bureaucratic hierarchy about content and form of rules of regional «developmental institutions» functioning.

One more source of political rent extraction is formulating of rules that have polysemantic interpretation. For instance, initial interpretation of these rules that is unfavorable for entrepreneur, activates the latter for informal interplay with officials to change this interpretation (in this case symbolic capital, that bureaucratic apparatus has, is used in full measure).

It is crucial to note that the more lofty the position in the hierarchy of a particular bureau, and the more prestigious the bureau in the hierarchies of bureaus, the greater the weight on negotiating and advising and the less the weight on administration – the function that can be most readily delegated [Hartle, 1983]. Furthermore, officials aspire to achieve their private objects. This is demonstration of opportunism [Williamson, 1985]. Officials’ resource is the right to sign documents (for instance, to define form and order of keeping of technological park residents register). They can use this right in different degree according to the position in the bureaucratic hierarchy (the right to use so-called «administrative currency»). Form of realization of special function is a benefit that does not have any links with the results of officials’ activity (for instance, status position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, social status in society, prestige, career opportunities, opportunities of raising the level of skill and human capital increment and others).

Direct interplay of the State managers with companies that pretend to get the status of technological park residents causes the necessity to analyze their object and instruments to achieve this object.

Small and medium business is also interested in regional «developmental institutions» creation, especially in getting access to innovative business infrastructure on favorable conditions, as well as in «innovator rent» extraction that is the main object.

«Rent of innovator» is monopolistic surpluses profit of entrepreneur that stimulates new production development, for instance – new goods, services, technologies [Oleynik, 2000, p. 390]. This rent is extracted in competitive environment and has temporary character because monopoly is open and brings surpluses profit only in the initial period of a new product appearing on the market till its imitation realized by competitors. Organizational and managerial innovations are the main resources of «Schumpeterian» entrepreneurs. Such innovations are tightly connected with specific knowledge accumulation and these innovations are possible to introduce in any sector of the national economy.

However, it is crucial to note that not all entrepreneurs take aim at innovations producing of the «Schumpeterian» type. Thus their object is not in «innovative rent» extraction during the functioning of regional «developmental institutions». «Schumpeterian» type of entrepreneur is a rare kind that strives for inertia overcoming and tries to carry out radical changes via new possibilities creation, introducing of
innovations and using means of production differently (according to J. Schumpeter – «creative destruction»). That is why innovative activity of entrepreneurs may take on various forms. For instance, W.J. Baumol showed that entrepreneurs’ activity might have productive, unproductive («rent-seeking») or destructive orientation according to the existing rules of the game [Baumol, 1990]. «Rent-seeking» entrepreneurs’ resource is financial funds that they use to lobby their interests. For these entrepreneurs political rent is realized in the form of adopted laws, decrees or resolutions that limit competition and allow getting monopolistic surpluses profit.

For instance, SWOT-analysis of project of «Kuzbass Technopark» creation, which had been carried out by consulting company «Strategy Partners», disclosed opportunities to extract political and innovative rents. Political rent can be received by officials and private companies that are «rent-seeking innovators» in the process of additional budgets funds attraction for construction and equipping new buildings, as well as in the process of Technological park buildings leasing that can damage innovative activity. On the other hand, disclosed favorable opportunities of the project, for instance private investors’ interests in the sphere of innovative opportunities of Technological park and regional venture fund formation, create opportunity to extract innovative rent by entrepreneurs who are interested in supporting and development of market competition.

Also it is necessary to organize effectively three-sided connection between regional and federal authorities and private-entrepreneurial sector in the frames of regional «developmental institutions» formation.

According to the implemented analysis of federal and regional «developmental subjects» compose the following table 2.

Political and institutional markets can be regarded as complementary mechanisms of «developmental institutions» creation and spreading in the Russian economy. Differences between these markets are the following.

Rules that are introduced via political market can bring benefit only for those players of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>«Developmental subject»</th>
<th>Object*</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superior political elite</td>
<td>Development of the country territory; «incorporation» in the world economy.</td>
<td>Adoption of laws, decrees and resolutions that determine common strategy and directions of development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal bureaucracy</td>
<td>Developmental projects and programs realization.</td>
<td>Federal «developmental institutions».</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal large-scale companies</td>
<td>Participation in wide-scale developmental projects; receiving various preferences.</td>
<td>Special interests lobbying in the frames of federal «developmental institutions».</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional administration</td>
<td>Development of the region territory.</td>
<td>Regional «developmental institutions».</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional parliament</td>
<td>Development of the region territory.</td>
<td>Adoption of laws and decrees that regulate «developmental institutions» creation and functioning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional companies of «Schumpeterian type»</td>
<td>Getting access to business-infrastructure on favorable conditions, «innovator rent» extraction.</td>
<td>Realization of organizational and managerial innovations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* It is crucial to note that there are private objects of «developmental subjects» (for example, corporative interest of federal bureaucracy). But its analysis is not the aim of the article.
political market who follow these rules, whereas rules of economic behavior, which are introduced via institutional market, are considered to be favorable by economic agents themselves. That is why we can single out two absolutely different mechanisms of institutions spreading: (1) State coercion to use this or that institution; new institution introduction is realized via political market mechanism, (2) free-will acceptance of a new institution via institutional market; new institution is introduced by economic agents themselves [Tambovtsev, 1999].

An introduction of institutional innovation via political market mechanism is centralized because of the State (in the person of federal and regional authorities) formulates rules of economic behavior according to its own preferences. On the contrary, institutional market is the «platform» where permanent decentralized process of choice of different institutions (norms and rules of economic behavior) is realized by economic agents.

Resume

During «developmental institutions» formation it is important to take into account (1) its specificity: institutional changes are very prolonged along the time, (2) possible risks: aspiration for rent-seeking may appear instead of effective State stimulation. It is supposed that fundamental factor is correlation of bargaining positions of different special interests groups on political-bureaucratic market. Federal and especially regional authorities are the most consolidated groups with powerful bargaining positions and with its private objectives. That is why they can extract political rent in the process of «developmental institutions» creation and they can formulate the rules those are favorable for groups with narrow private interests.

References


O. Kryshhaltenovskaya, Anatomy of the Russian Elite (Moscow: Zaharov, 2005), in Russian.


A.N. Oleynik, Institutional economics (Moscow: INFRA-M, 2000), in Russian.

Public-contractual mechanisms of social-economic models formation of the market economy, ed. by M. V. Kurbatova et al. (Kemerovo: Kuzbassvuzizdat, 2005), in Russian.


Субъекты развития и институты развития российской экономики
(федеральный и региональный уровни)

К.С. Саблин

ГОУ ВПО «Кемеровский государственный университет»
Россия 650043, г. Кемерово, ул. Красная, 6

В статье рассматривается проблема создания многоуровневой системы «институтов развития» в российской экономике. Выделены критерии и цели «институтов развития», а также выявлены группы, которые заинтересованы в их формировании. Представляется, что группы интересов могут быть разделены на «агентов развития» и «субъектов развития». «Агенты развития» обладают ресурсами и инструментами, которые они используют в целях реализации нового потенциала экономического роста, в то время как у «субъектов развития» также должна быть сильная переговорная позиция и политическая воля, чтобы создавать избирательные стимулы для «агентов развития». Особое внимание уделяется отношениям «Федеральный Центр – Регионы», предопределяющим особенности создания системы «институтов развития» в российской экономике. При этом важно принимать в расчет силу переговорных позиций групп интересов, которые взаимодействуют на региональном политико-бюрократическом рынке.

Ключевые слова: «институты развития», институциональные инновации, политико-бюрократический рынок, символическая и административная формы капитала.