

## EXISTENTIAL AND ARCHETYPICAL ARCHITECTONICS OF SOCIAL (SOCIETAL) ORDER

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**Abstract.** The article deals with the modern order (world order) in the context of modern social reality. This is due to the need to identify and diagnose the current socio-cultural situation in the world. It is suggested that modern social and socio-political orders, as well as world order patterns and mechanisms, are unable to reproduce the value identity of societies. This is partly due to the disruption of the "super doctrines", "pictures of the world", which for many centuries held social identity around a common substantive core, namely, national, religious, or political ideology. The article also discusses the role of individuals in the course of social reproduction, as well as presents general arguments about the increasing role of the human factor and the need for more efficient use of human capital.

**Keywords:** autopoiesis, society, social order, social world, architectonics, existence, eidos.

**Introduction.** Social sciences in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries faced a number of epistemological and ontological problems, which within the framework of traditional classical and nonclassical approaches and discourses cannot be resolved, or leastwise their solution is associated with essential difficulties.

Most contemporary social researchers pay attention to the obvious "tectonic" shifts in the modern world. They are associated, first of all, with the revolution in communication technologies and the constitution of a network society on their basis [8].

Contemporary social and sociopolitical realities in the world give rise to new challenges for social sciences. Questions, which several decades ago were not in the focus of philosophers, sociologists, and historians, exploring the nature and mechanisms of social reproduction and self-reproduction (autopoiesis), are becoming particularly acute.

What issues (challenges) should be addressed by social analysts today in the first place?

First, whether the existence of modern order (world order) is possible in the context where social life and social reality are radically changing? Previously, it was based on eidetic subject matters, "big narratives". Today they are almost gone. Some Western thinkers (J. Baudrillard, A. Touraine) refuse to use at all the concept of society.

The solution to this problem is also important from a practical viewpoint. The matter is that in the context of globalization and network society, the methods, and the algorithms of social reproduction (autopoiesis) are being changed. According to the authors, the concept of autopoiesis is a conceptual lynchpin linking sociological and social philosophical discourses.

Secondly, the age-long problem of dialectical interrelation of individual and social, human and society is particularly relevant in modern conditions. It is reflected in mutually exclusive interpretations of the involvement of individuals in the world order as social actors.

On the one hand, the domination of individualized societies is proclaimed (Z. Bauman), while on the other hand, the "Death of the Author" (postmodernism), and the "Death of Man" (M. Foucault) are declared.

The current socio-political situation in the world and in Russia, as well as the approval of new algorithms of socio-cultural dynamics, requires obviously new approaches, updating the scientific thesaurus of social sciences. Of course, it is not about the need for an epistemological revolution in the social sciences. However, a number of concepts require rethinking. This applies to concepts such as society and social order.

This need is due to the requirement to identify and diagnose the current socio-cultural situation in the world. In particular, it is necessary to find out whether current processes are irreversible, accompanied by a radical breaking of all the previous social codes of reproduction of society, or one can talk just about the transformation, renewal of the unchanging basic principles of human society.

Indeed, does the network society of the 21<sup>st</sup> century reject social institutions such as democracy, market, law, money, etc.? Obviously those epistemological resources, which are possessed today by social analysts, are insufficient.

In any circumstances, it is important to study their own historical experience. For example, problems such as the correlation of planned and market mechanisms of economic

regulation, the implementation of self-financing, and others have always aroused great interest among researchers in the years of new economic policy [11, p. 854].

Under the pretext of overcoming social holism, and social realism, many social theorists question today the very concept of society as a reality. The notion of social structure is also questioned. Instead, concepts, such as structuration, social networks, communities, individuals, etc. are used increasingly often.

It can be assumed that modern social, socio-political orders, world order patterns, and mechanisms are no longer able to reproduce the value identity of societies. Perhaps, this is due to the disruption of the "super doctrines", "pictures of the world", which for many centuries held social identity around a common substantive core, namely, national, religious, or political ideology.

The eventfulness in the discourse of the time, in fact, is what in the individual consciousness can be interpreted as a phenomenon that is presented to a person (individual) in the course of his training (education) as history. Therefore, the historical and information approach is a kind of cultural strategy. In the frameworks of this strategy, one can deploy historical memory in any direction. This is how the manipulation of the individual, group, and social consciousness is carried out today [10, p. 139].

In connection with the above, the issue concerning the involvement of individuals in the social reproduction process is particularly acute. General arguments about the increasing role of the human factor, and the need to make more effective use of the human potential are unlikely to help to understand this issue.

**Methods.** The methodological basis of the study includes philosophical principles of material unity of the world, which allow considering universalism from the perspective of integration of social media, which are based on the idea of unity of diversity; as well as ideas and principles of systemic and synergetic approaches, which contribute to the disclosure of the meanings of the new model of social universalism as a guide to natural integration, based on the idea of diversity of social unity.

The article also used general scientific methods, such as analysis, synthesis, the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, intellectual experiment, and system approach.

**Results.** The organization of the human world cannot be explained solely within the framework of pragmatic, sociological and, especially, naturalistic (realistic) discourses.

The field of attention of many social researchers lacks existential beingness, which despite its inconspicuous is involved somehow in the social world order.

The social world is richer, more diverse than systemically organized (societal) society. There are enclaves of nonsystem existential existence, which form their own (ontical) architectonics, which is included in the autopoietic processes.

"Man lives as it were alternately in two worlds – in general world for all, openly visible to all, as if in the public objective world, in which his own beingness is only a small, insignificant, subordinated private reality, as well as in the intimate world, invisible from the outside – inner world of his dreams, joys, sufferings, and desires, i.e. in the world of all that forms the true essence of human life, its true focus, and in comparison with which, visible to all and recognized, as if intended “for universal use”, the objective world has only a derivative, utilitarian, purely relative value" [5, p. 134].

To understand the nature of individual participation in the social reproduction process, it is important to take into account the strategy of double involvement. Its essence is that a person is involved in the social reproduction processes both as an agent of the social system and as an actor of his own existential world.

Thus, the organization of the human world cannot be explained exclusively within the framework of pragmatic, sociological and, especially, naturalistic (realistic) discourses.

Beingness of people, life meanings, communication, and existential worlds of ordinary people are often beyond the research field. Existential communication definitely was not subjected to gnoseological or epistemological control and was derived neither from the available objective structures of social reality nor from the available subjective consciousness. This inderivability was especially exposed at a time when the objective social structures themselves began to falter, collapse, while subjective freedom turned into complete uncertainty, Sartre's "nothing" or "magma of pure desire" of postmodern theorists [1, p. 77].

The real life of people is not just richer and broader than ideas about the social structure and dynamics of the social order. The beingness of people is always elusive, resisting any formalization, and objectification. But is it possible to understand the social world, the social order without confining them into the Procrustean bed of objectivity? Can world beingness reflected and defined represent social reality as it really is in all the variety of its existential manifestations? For adherents of existentialism, this is a rhetorical question. "Existence is a special dimension of human life, it is irreducibility to any objectification and products of life, it is a constant openness to any possibilities, it is, finally, a direct experience of yourself and at the same time it is not a givenness" [3, p. 7].

Without an existential keen experience, the social world is just an empty abstraction, devoid of inner meaning: how can a house exist without tenants, their moods, and worries about

everyday life? The intangibility of existence is that it is not existent at all. But at the same time, without existence, there is no social world as an entity, as a meaningful reality.

Existence is involved in the institutionalization and reproduction of social worlds, while not being their systemic element. Existence cannot create its own worlds. Existence has no history of its own, it cannot reflect, it cannot be objectified. It has no purposes and no boundaries of its own.

Does all the above mean the hopelessness of attempts to use existential discourse in social studies? Even classics of existential thought, such as M. Heidegger, tried to avoid social topics. And yet, existence is an important component in the structuring of social worlds. But its involvement in the institutionalization and reproduction of social worlds cannot be explained in the frameworks of the traditional deterministic approach.

In modern philosophy, the existential discourse and the associated focuses of thinking aimed at the study of various modes of human existence, and its existential dimensions, are increasingly affirmed. One can, obviously, talk about a new paradigm in social research [9].

The main idea of this paradigm is that existential construct of beingness is a condition of double reproduction: reproduction of individuals as social actors, and reproduction of society (social medium) by social actors. This double reproduction can be called (after N. Luhmann) autopoiesis.

Man belongs to two worlds: existential and societal. The existential world and the societal world cannot intersect and influence each other. The existential world creates its own architectonics, namely, the architectonics of the beingness. The societal world creates architectonics of livelihood. There is no causal or functional relationship between them. Nevertheless, the connection exists. Moreover, such a connection is necessary. But this connection is not direct. It is realized on the "boundary". And it is on the boundary that the individuals create themselves and each other as actors.

In the interiors of the social world, a man carries out a dialogue with those whom he considers as being "his people". Dialogue is not just something that tells, dialogue testifies to the authenticity or, conversely, not the authenticity of the world, thematizing it as its own world. This world allows individuals to acquire their own name, personal code ("face"). Own personal history (biography) is embedded in the general family history, becoming a part of existential communities.

In its own social world, beingness acquires the contours of personal immanent beingness, beingness for itself.

In their own world, individual actors acquire the meaning of beingness. The meaning of beingness is in the loyalty to its roots (sacred events), ontical narratives. This fidelity is made in

ethoses, i.e. ethical practices and primary institutions, governing the behavior of actors equal in social life to each other (initiations, gifts, sacrifices, etc.).

Finally, in his own world, the individual actor acquires ontological security, a sense of confidence and rootedness in his beingness.

Own social world, arising on the boundary between existential beingness and societal (institutional) conditions of human existence, acquires the profile of the personal space of co-existence. Transcendental meanings are embedded in the social perspective. Transcendence is possible only from within the social world, which acquires its own name, its own history, and its own boundaries.

The sociological concept of Luhmann's autopoiesis based on the ideas of Chilean scientists U. Maturana and F. Varela enriches the interpretation of societality offered by the author of T. Parsons's very idea of societal nature.

Societality limits human freedom, puts his existence into the certain framework, but, at the same time, it allows self-actualization through involvement in the joint activity, in the construction of the social world that gives rise to the conceptualization of the problem of personality and its inviolability [13, p. 24]. In turn, participation in joint activities allows a person to build his life plans knowingly, to be a project for himself. Societality overcomes existential egologism by transforming it into various forms of subjectivity (statuses, roles, personalities). The societal ability to be a person, generalized by others, is the most important conquest of humanity.

Thus, the societal world is necessary for several reasons.

First, the societal world is a world of possibilities, of projective future. This is a world that yet does not exist in principle. It must be created, constructed. But this is also a world of the proper present, proper patterns of behavior, and rules of social play.

Secondly, the societal world establishes universal codes and norms of behavior for all and everyone, necessary for creating the societal community, which is described by T. Parsons. The specificity of this community is that it alienates, pulls (not completely, but partially) individuals from the existential world.

The societal world is a world of abstract intermediaries connecting people and society. Such intermediaries are not only impersonal social structures and rules but also knowledge and even meanings and tastes. And the man himself becomes such a mediator as a carrier of social statuses and agent of socialization.

From the system of abstract schematisms, the societal community is transformed into an effective force, a viable social order only subject to the existence of its relationship with the existential world of people.

It should be recalled that man belongs to two worlds: existential and societal. The existential world and the societal world cannot intersect and influence each other. The existential world creates its own architectonics, namely, the architectonics of the beingness. Societal world creates architectonics of livelihood. There is no causal link between them. But nevertheless, the connection exists. Moreover, it is necessary. This relationship is a kind of borderland. And it is on the boundary that the individuals create themselves and each other as actors.

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Certainly, man is an existential being. But existence cannot find support within itself, it cannot but be embodied in something else, which is transcendent. Attempts to find the support of beingness in existence itself are not feasible in essence.

Existence itself does not create anything, does not produce anything. It can be stated that the social world is created by people under the pressure of circumstances, under the influence of the social environment. But the production of the world has its own internal logic, its own life, which is reduced neither to circumstances nor to the notorious human factor. Production (reproduction) of the world (which, in fact, is the essence of the autopoietic order) cannot be performed solely within the world itself, and cannot be performed solely from outside (subjective and objective factors). But the production of the world is the business of the world itself.

The connection between existential beingness and the world of the System (the societal world) is transcendental, rather than causal and functional. Transcendence is the translation of existence into a social and personal plane.

From the authors' viewpoint, existential and societal worlds in social philosophy and sociology are separated artificially. In fact, they cannot exist separately.

Eidoses (social expressions of the world) and archetypes are other important conditions of autopoiesis. Eidos is the transcendental basis for the formation of the societal world, which is significantly different from the existential world, but without which the existential world will always be a world-in-itself (by analogy with the thing-in-itself). At the same time, the societal world outside the transcendental connection with the existential world turns into an empty symbolic shell, into a social form devoid of meaning, which eventually disintegrates and disappears.

Eidoses should not be regarded as purely theoretical constructions, abstract patterns, ideological or religious doctrines. The genesis of the eidetic world is the genesis of the acceptance of the eidetic picture of reality by members of society as the reality itself, or as an analog of such reality.

One's own social world presupposes a standpoint beyond (within) insidedness. Man looks at the world and himself in the world from within the world and from outside. Thus, he acquires a voice having the legislative power to engage in dialogue with the world, being complicit and responsible for it.

Social scientists face another difficult task: how is the personal life program incorporated into the social program (social matrix)? How do a person's private interests, his private life, which are rooted in existential existence, agree with social dynamics?

This is not about a functional relationship. Private worlds are associated with the societal order by means of archetypes, archetypal programs.

Archetypes are transformed into programs that allow individuals to act knowledgeably without prior direct experience within their own social world. Man (as an actor) starts to act autonomously taking a position of outsidedness (the term was coined by M. Bakhtin). Such autonomous self-sufficient person is called by K. Jung sameness. "Personality in general, who, despite his reality, cannot be fully known, is called *Sameness*". [6, p. 8]

The authors call him the actor of autopoiesis. Such an actor is not just a performer, but a social agent. He perceives his actions as his own work, something that comes from him personally. The social world is not just an environment, but an integral part of its living space shared with others.

In this sense, the sameness is not a self-contained monad. In this capacity, a person is not only unable to be a social actor, but in general to exist, to be.

A person can be a social actor only when he is an actor (creator) of himself. The theory of sameness is quite consistent with the idea of M. Heidegger about the co-being essence of man, which is immanent to human existence. "Co-existence is defined as the inherent self-existence of man". [7, p. 121]

It is important to note that human sameness is not self-sufficient. It needs to be finished. The actor at the same time participates in the construction of world order joint with others and coparticipates in this process.

A tense, contradictory unity of the sameness, self-centeredness, on the one hand, and orientation on the others, as complementary finishing component of the holistic human beingness (sameness), creates archetypal programs, which complement each other.

First, this is a corporate program that starts at the moment when a group of people forms a group identity and a feeling that they are "theirs" for each other.

Secondly, this is the program of the pyramid. It is about the program of "collective unconscious, building an image of the social community as a hierarchical system, in which relations between individuals are built based on the principle of domination-subordination. These relationships are ambivalent in nature: this is both the desire to dominate and a willingness to obey, aggression (both to superiors and subordinates), and the desire to protect them, alienation and sympathy" [2, p. 87].

Finally, one can determine the archetype of the conflict. Conflict is an inevitable companion of human existence. Conflict generates a special ontological tension and the associated permanent anxiety of losing one's place in the social world. It is not so much about the fear of losing social status in the hierarchy of societal society, as the fear of falling out of the circle of "their" and own world.

The ontological core of the world, namely, the co-presence, dialogue, and common concern for the world, is formed as a result of the described archetypal programs.

Interaction and mutual addition of archetypal programs results, on the one hand, in formation of hierarchical structure of society (organization) with its inherent impersonal system of social roles, with the formed significant hierarchical characteristics and the associated canon of norms regulating the interaction of members of the organization with each other and with third-party agents. On the other hand, horizontal relations are built on the principle of friend or foe.

**Discussion.** The archetypal program of corporativity is focused on the positive perception of the "co-brothers" in the organization regardless of their behavior, while the archetypal program of the pyramid involves focusing on discipline, following the norms adopted in the organization, and applying sanctions in case of violation of these norms.

The prevalence of the conflict archetype leads to increased competition both within the organization among employees and in interaction with the outside world.

Thus, due to archetypes, the social world represents a living organism, in which relations between social actors, as well as between actors and the social system, are built.

In the context of globalization, increasing mobility of people and their associations, intensification of information exchange and contacts between different socio-cultural communities, still the old archetypal programs continue operating, some of which are aimed at separating the organizational Sameness from external influences, and tense-aggressive attitude to "strangers". Today, the problem of globalization is one of the most discussed topics, both in the scientific community and at the level of everyday communication, because it affects various

spheres of society. At that, the emphasis is made primarily on two aspects of globalization: economic and political [12, p. 623].

For example, the archetype of corporativity, as it was shown, is fundamentally based on the situation expressed as "We and the World", while the division into "our" and "others" is only a consequence. At the same time, as a rule, "We" includes a limited number of people, who are supposedly on approximately the same principle positions, while the "World" covers everything else, including people, whose status seems to be something significantly different.

Thus, the archetype of corporativity can serve a basis for the development of universal identity common to humanity.

Let's return to the issue of the relationship between existential and societal foundations of social reproduction. How does existential experience participate in the social order? It is extremely difficult to find out. The main reason consists in the fundamental "bias" of human existence. It is difficult to look for existence in societal structures. The point is that existence is not the content of societal forms. Or, on the other hand, societal is not a form of existence.

Whether we look at artifacts, ideas, institutions, social values, and other defined elements of the social system, one must recognize that they themselves do not contain the existential experience, and they are not charged with existential energy.

The connection of social structures, institutions, and practices with the existential world can be found by studying the consequences of its loss due to major socio-political crises and catastrophes. The sad experience of the world and Russian history provides convincing evidence of this. World civilizations and empires die not because they establish cruel regimes that lead to human suffering (such regimes can exist for a long time). The main reason is a deep existential crisis, which means the impossibility of the former ways of beingness, for both the elites and the ordinary people.

An existential crisis is manifested in the rupture of ties between generations, the ontological "fatigue", and insensitivity of people to the whole world as the domain of presence (habitable space). The existential crisis also affects societal structures, institutions, and practices. Outside of the existential existence, the societal world resembles an abandoned house, in which everything seems to be in place: walls, table, chairs, wardrobe, but which is silent and empty.

The social world is not a system in the sense, which T. Parsons and N. Luman put into this concept. But it is in the social world, as the primary arrangement of human beingness that the ontological basis of acting is laid in.

Any author is unthinkable without his artwork. Autopoiesis is the double "artwork", produced by the individuals of the social world (home) and the production of themselves by those means and methods that are inherent in the social world.

The home as an artwork is not only the walls, roof, floor, and furniture, not only the living space of its inhabitants, but it is the habitation itself.

Bakhtin M. has brilliantly showed on the example of the Dostoevsky's works of fiction that artwork is something more than the embodiment of the writer's concept. The artwork lives its own life. But this is not a spontaneous life of individual characters (irrational flow of life). This life is characterized by general intentionality, which makes it integral, coherent, and necessary.

In other words, something bigger is produced than the things produced and their social carriers. It is natural to assume that this something is the unpredictable emergent product of joint collective actions. But that's not quite true. The artwork not just simply falls out of context, but it creates and recreates its context.

As an example, one can consider the works of famous masters of the arts.

The artwork is a transcendental conductor between the real and the proper, existence and its social embodiment. The artwork acquires its own life, its own chronotope, space of attention, ontological attractor, involving adepts, participants, and co-authors.

The existential world does not yet make a person an actor, but it creates ontological prerequisites for this. The existential world defines its inner phenomenal boundaries: the boundaries of its self-identity, rather than the outer boundaries of human existence. Outside the world, there is no man as an actor. But the inner world of man, his existential domain is not closed to itself. It has to be opened, revealed, and defined.

That is, the position of insidedness (within its own world) is supplemented by the position of outsidedness (in a certain positioning in relation to the world).

It is about the transcendent position of the universal man, the "generalized other". Feature of any actor is being other but similar to all. "The generalized other" (the term coined by G.H. Mead) cannot appear in a closed world architectonics by itself. His appearance is associated with the exit (real and phenomenal) beyond it.

In addition, the universality of man, his outsidedness allows a person as an actor to represent the world and possess it. "The only man has the world, while the animal has only habitat" [4, p. 125].

## **Conclusion**

1. The 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are marked by a variety of forms and ways of modernization in different countries. But any successful modernization is impossible without its main element – man. Man is the main actor, a key figure of modernization processes.

2. Any modernization is based on autopoiesis, i.e. social reproduction, which is the ability of the society to reproduce and maintain itself due to its basic elements. Such a basic element is a person as an actor.

3. Therefore, the main goal of any modernization is to form a social actor of a new type, who would meet the requirements of modernization. In the Soviet Union, especially in the twenties, thirties of the 20th century the modernization processes were accompanied by the consciousness of a new Soviet man.

4. Failures and misfortunes of modernization processes are caused not only by mistakes in the organization of training of specialists that should meet modern requirements but also by insufficiently effectively used educational and training resources, outdated material, technical and information base, etc. The most important reason for failures and misfortunes of modernization is paying insufficient attention, and sometimes ignoring the existential-ontological needs and moods of ordinary people.

5. The social world is richer and more diverse than any social system. It includes enclaves of people's intimate life, spheres of their private life, saturated with a variety of direct living connections, contacts, and ethoses, which do not coincide directly, do not intersect with the societal world (the world of the "System"). But it is the interrelation, the interpenetration of the existential world and the societal world that creates the conditions for effective autopoiesis and, ultimately, the modernization of society.

6. The synthesis of existential and societal (system based) components results in the creation of a "double inclusion" mode: a person (as an actor) is involved in social, modernization processes, provided that he is involved in the social world, which he perceives as his own world. Thus, he perceives his involvement in the modernization, autopoiesis (social reproduction) not as an exclusive performer, functional element, but as an interested actor, for whom modernization and autopoiesis are his personal business.

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