The Principle of Sufficient Reason
as a Correlate of Free Will and Moral Law
in Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s Philosophy

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This article analyses the principle of sufficient reason in the systems of I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer, making the parallels with the Chr. Wolff’s metaphysics. Also the author demonstrates how the principle was being transformed from Wolff, through Kant to Schopenhauer and which kind of usage (dogmatic or critical) of the principle could be fruitful as methodological rule to the construction of philosophical system.

Keywords: the principle of sufficient reason, subject, object, cause, Kant, Wolff, Schopenhauer.

1. Introductory remarks

The problem of the first ground as a metaphysical problem is connected with the “Subject – Object” dichotomy. The subject can be either active (able to start the new chains of causes) or passive (unable to start the new chains of causes in the world determined by the first cause) in the context of understanding this attitude. The metaphysical question arises also about the object: “Is there a first cause in the world?” and “What character does it have?” To answer these questions we return to the two polar points of view:

1. In the relation to the object: Is the world free from the external cause?
2. In the relation to the subject: Can the human act be free or can not?

In all cases the two points of view cannot fully exist without an understanding of the action content, which depends on the principle or law in the field of moral, it is because the subject interacts with the outer world, and this interaction has a moral character (meaning the constant situation of choice and decision making).

That is why the ontological and epistemological questions ought to be considered in close connection with practical philosophy. And if this is so, then the principle of sufficient reason can contain the question of free will (inasmuch as we think about the will’s first cause character), which in turn realizes itself in the moral principles.

2. The principle of sufficient reason in Christian Wolff’s system

There was such a mass of contradictions in the eighteenth century, concerned with a search of the first ground and the problem of free will
these questions had to be resolved and the attempts of resolving were presented in Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophy. We should notice that their source for the interpretation was Wolffian philosophy and his main method, i.e. the principle of sufficient reason.

Academic life in Europe in the eighteenth century was still proceeding under the dominance and authority of Aristotle. But the French enlighteners (Pierre Bayle, Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, Denis Diderot, Jean-Jacques Rousseau) had provoked the revision of the religion and metaphysics. The role of the Wolffian Philosophy was not the last in that situation. Chr. Wolff’s orientation on its universality and general validity had changed the philosophical structure of knowledge and updated the writing style (Zhuchkov, 2001, p. 17).

I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer had also apprehended the Wolffian influence. Wolffian universality had impacted on Kant’s priority of mathematics and logic (Farmann, 2001, p. 115), and the applied character of the Wolffian system paid the Schopenhauer’s attention. But in spite of this, as professor V. A. Zhuchkov supposes, most of aims had not been achieved by Wolff and his followers:

“He could not make a synthesis, to find the unity between the contrary categories of his philosophy <…> and methodological principles (the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason)” (Zhuchkov, 2001, p. 17-18).

And so, I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer had to create new philosophical approaches to the old unresolved problems.

The principle of sufficient reason is a basis and source for all of Wolff’s system. In the preliminary part of Logic Wolff postulates the principle as follows: “Metaphysici docent, nihil esse sine ratione sufficiente atque hunc canonem appelitant principium rationis sufficientis” (Wolff, 1997, S. 1). He analysis this principle in §70 his Ontology:

“Nothing exists without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather than does not exist. That is, if something is posited to exist, something must also be posited that explains why the first thing exists rather than does not exist. For either nothing exists without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather than does not exist, or else something can exist without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather than does not exist (§53). Let us assume that some A exists without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather than does not exist. (§56) Therefore nothing is to be posited that explains why A exists. What is more, A is admitted to exist because nothing is assumed to exist; since this is absurd (§69), nothing exists without a sufficient reason; and if something is posited to exist, something else must be assumed that explains why that thing exists” (Wolfio, 1730, p.47).

The main question in Wolf’s explanation is concerned with understanding: how to define the essence of a thing, given that a thing exists, and if this essence is sufficient reason of this thing? It is difficult to give a quick answer to it, as professor V. A. Zhuchkov also deems:

“These Wolff’s statements are obscure. Where should we find a “sufficient reason”: at the real existence like the ground of cognition of its possibility and essence or, vice verse, at possibility of the essence like the ground of the real existence? <…> Wolff faces up with the undecidable situation, and to find the exit, it is necessary to break the contradiction principle and the principle of sufficient reason by itself” (Zhuchkov, 2001, p. 48).

As we can see, Wolff’s arguments, concerning the principle of sufficient reason
do not look obvious, because of their “being = consciousness” identity. This is a general condition of rationalism. In his rational psychology, as R. J. Richards notices:

“The soul has an essence (Ontol. #143), and this essence contains the sufficient reason for those things beyond itself which constantly occur in the soul or can occur in it” (Richards, 1980, p. 236).

If this so, the soul is represented by being and being is represented in the soul, therefore it must exist according to the sufficient reason, which coordinates and initiates such correlation between soul and being. The postulating of the sufficient reason generates the statement about God, necessity, or absolute Mind. When we insist on the existence of something, this something must have its own source of existence, in turn this source must have its own source and so on, till we will find the prime cause, i.e. absolute Mind, or in other words, God, in this constant regress of meditation. In this situation the term “God” is a convenient means to justify the abstract objects in metaphysics. And it is the usual way of dogmatic rationalism.

3. Immanuel Kant's interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason

In Principiorum primorum cognitions metaphysicae (further – Nova Dilucidatio) Kant thoroughly scrutinizes the logic principles and marks out the principle of sufficient reason among them. Kant critically accepts this principle, which had been formulated by G. W. Leibniz and was spread in philosophical practice by Chr. Wolff.

First of all. Kant analyses this principle from the “subject – predicate” point of view, where the subject, as the basis, defines the predicate. Hence the name “the principle of sufficient reason” was being transformed to the “ratio determinans” (connected with the casual relation) by Kant (Kant AAI, Nova Dilucidatio, S.388).

Secondly, Kant declines the possibility of self-sufficiency of reason, which we can see in Wolff’s system:

“Existentiae suae rationem aliquid habere in se ipso, absonum est.<...> Novi quidem ad notionem ipsam Dei provocari, qua determinatam esse existentiam ipsius postulant, verum hoc idealiter fieri, non realiter, facile perspicitur” (Kant AA I. Nova Dilucidatio. Prop. VI. S. 394).

Such reason cannot exist for Kant because the logical subject, being reason, has to be determined by the exclusion one of the posit predicates, according to the principle of contradiction. But if both predicates are excepted, so it used to be ex-determined reason, having been initiated by the causal chains: by God (Ritzel, 1985, S. 32).

Thirdly, Kant gets over the dogmatically posited metaphysical boundaries, when he debates on the first cause or reason. He applies the smart usage of God-noumenon for justifying the freedom of human acts. Already in this pre-critical work Kant clearly understands the difference between moral and natural worlds, and moral world is characterized by the ability of spontaneous act:

“Spotaneitas est actio a principio interno profecta. Quando haec repraesentationi optimi conformiter determinatur, dicitur libertas. Quo certius huic legi obtemperare quisque dicitur, quo itaque positis omnibus ad volendum motivis est determinatior, eo homo est liberior” (Kant AA I. Nova Dilucidatio, S. 402).

Fourthly, Kant introduces two new principles, which complement the principle of sufficient reason (the principle of succession and the principle of co-existence). The principle of succession [principium succesionis] (temporal
principle) maintains connection among the changeable occurrences that, in Kant’s opinion, justifies the existence of the things and external world (Kant AA I. Nova Dilucidatio. Prop. XIII, S. 412). The principle of co-existence [principium coexistentiae] states that external causality and substances are dependent on each other (Kant AA I. Nova Dilucidatio. Usus 6, S. 415). These two principles were used by Kant for his refutation of the dogmatic idealistic theory and pre-established harmony of Leibniz.

In the fundamental work Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2te Auslage 1787) Kant does not mention the principle of sufficient reason directly, although he uses it as an example of false inquiry (Kant AA III, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, S. 510). The following parts of book (“Die Analytik der Grundsätze”, “Die transscendentale Dialektik”, and “Transscendental Methodenlehre”) contain the problems addressed in the pre-critical work Nova Dilucidatio. The usage of the principle of sufficient reason goes together with the problem of free-will and moral law in the context of Kritik der reinen Vernunft: from instrumental-formal to the substantive sense, when he applies the principle to the resolving of cosmological antinomy and postulating the moral world, that shows the transition to the transccendental idealism.

For instance, in the “Die Analytik der Grundsätze” Kant describes the schema of unity in the table of categories, which is instrumental in the application of the principle of sufficient reason.

In other words, he shows it like a method:


I think that the thought about the co-existence of substances is used here like a ready instrument and its sources can be found at the “Nova Dilucidatio”, where the God is described as a common rule and ground:

“Cum ergo, quatenus substantiarum singulæ independentem ab aliis habent existentiam, nexui earum mutuo locus non sit, in finita vero utique non cadat, substantiarum aliarum causas esse, nihil tamen minus omnia in universo mutuo nexu colligata reperiantur, relationem hanc a communique causeae, nemente Deo, existentium generali principio, pendere confitendum est” (Kant AA I. Nova Dilucidatio. Usus 6, S. 413).

Such an instrumental usage of the principle of sufficient reason is valid only for the field of pure reason but the understanding of causality is expressed in the thought about co-existence of substances.

In the “Die transscendentale Dialektik”, during the resolving of the antinomies of pure reason, Kant formulates his own discipline, i.e. transccendental idealism, which has the basic statement: “Es sind demnach die Gegenstände der Erfahrung niemals an sich selbst, sondern nur in der Erfahrung gegeben und existiren außer derselben gar nicht” (Kant AA III, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, S. 339-340). As a result, reason can function in two ways: constitutively and regulative, which is a difference between Kant and his predecessors, who made an attempt to apply the ideas of pure reason directly to the objects itself. Having explained this complicity of his predecessors, Kant in the subsection “Aufflösung der kosmologischen Idee” goes on to describe freedom, of course in the area of pure reason. The problem of freedom is understood by him in terms of causality, which comes out from the essence of the principle of sufficient reason applied to the infinite chains of pre-determined
grounds. These forms of causality exist outside of the nature:

“Wenn dagegen Erscheinungen für nichts mehr gelten, als sie in der That sind, nämlich nicht für Dinge an sich, sondern bloße Vorstellungen, die nach empirischen Gesetzen zusammenhängen, so müssen sie selbst noch Gründe haben, die nicht Erscheinungen sind. Eine solche intelligibele Ursache aber wird in Ansehung ihrer Causalität nicht durch Erscheinungen bestimmt, obzwar ihre Wirkungen erscheinen und sie durch andere Erscheinungen bestimmt werden können. Sie ist also sammt ihrer Causalität außer der Reihe, dagegen ihre Wirkungen in der Reihe der empirischen Bedingungen angetroffen werden. Die Wirkung kann also in Ansehung ihrer intelligibelen Ursache als frei und doch zugleich in Ansehung der Erscheinungen als Erfolg aus denselben nach der Nothwendigkeit der Natur angesehen werden…” (Kant AA III, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, S. 365).

We find a similar explanation in “Nova Dilucidatio”:

“Verum modus, quo certitudo earum rationibus suis determinatur, omnem paginam facit ad libertatis notam tuendam; nempe nonnisi per motiva intellectus voluntati applicata eliciumtur, cum contra ea in brutis s. physico-mechanicis actionibus omnia sollicitationibus et impulsibus externis conformiter, absque ulla arbitrii spontanea inclinatione, necessitentur”

(Kant AA I. Nova Dilucidatio, S. 400).

Both quotations demonstrate Kant’s intention to realize the transition from the world of nature with the priority of the necessary “cause – effect” relation, to the world of freedom, where intelligible cause determines the maxim of the human act and this determination lies in the subject.

Such transition allows underlining close correlation between ethics and general philosophy that shows insufficiency means to resolve the external question only from the points of epistemology.

Finally, Kant’s section “Transcendentale Methodenlehre” embodies the idea of freedom in the form of moral law, i.e. categorical imperative, the ground of the human behavior. At this moment we can see fundamental difference between Kant’s philosophy and pre-Kantian dogmatic metaphysics, where the principle of sufficient reason had been applied everywhere: to the human, to the nature – what leads up to the postulating of God as the first ground. Kant had realized the transition from the world of nature to the world of freedom and showed their limits. Moreover Kant interprets the principle of sufficient reason as an incomplete argument in the area of pure reason, but believes that it can be useful in the area of practical reason. The main criteria of practical reason is freedom, which has already practical matter:

“Die praktische Freiheit kann durch Erfahrung bewiesen werden. Denn nicht bloß das, wasreizt, d. i. die Sinne unmittelbar affizirt, bestimmt die menschliche Willkür, sondern wir haben ein Vermögen, durch Vorstellungen von dem, was selbst auf entferntere Art nützlich oder schädlich ist, die Eindrücke auf unser sinnliches Begehungsvermögen zu überwinden; diese Überlegungen aber von dem, was in Ansehung unseres ganzen Zustandes begehrenswerth, d. i. gut und nützlich, ist, beruhen auf der Vernunft. Diese giebt daher auch Gesetze, welche Imperativen, d. i. objective Gesetze der Freiheit, sind, und welche sagen, was geschehen soll, ob es gleich vielleicht nie geschieht, und sich
The thought on the necessity of moral laws is expressed by Kant already in *Nova Dilucidatio*. The correlation among the basic terms in Kant philosophy concentrated in the principle of sufficient reason, interpreted in a different way from that of dogmatic metaphysics (for instance, by Wolff).

The principle of sufficient reason was a convenient instrument to justify God’s existence and the world of God’s Kingdom was consequently the only one real and possible world. Kant had brought to bear the idea of the spontaneity of human action (which however does not reduce the strict determinism of the world of nature) to the principle of sufficient reason, and that accomplished the transition from dogmatism to criticism, where a human is described as an autonomous subject with the ability to have a freedom within him. The distinctive moment is precisely described by Professor S. A. Chernov:

“The idea of God is the “load-carrying element” of rationalism, which has to assume anyhow the being of absolute subject and eventually, to connect with the cause and source of true ideas of human mind, eo ipso detracting from its autonomy” (Chernov, 1998, p. 88-89).

4. The principle of sufficient reason by Arthur Schopenhauer, compared with Wolff’s system elements

A. Schopenhauer writes:


The great pessimist (according Patrick Gardiner’s expression) undertakes the historical and philosophical inquisition of the principle of sufficient reason. He begins to analyze it from Plato and Aristotle, eo ipso he builds clear historical parallels and shows, what Kant adopted from Leibniz and Aristotle. In doing so, Schopenhauer pays attention to the manner of philosophical rules. However, he absolutely does not take into consideration Kant’s work *Nova Dilucidatio*. The “Great pessimist” prefers the work *Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reiben Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrllich gemacht werden soll* (1790). This research does not concentrate on investigating of the principle of sufficient reason by itself, but rather it describes a priori synthetic judgments. Schopenhauer gives a high appraisal of Wolff, who, by his opinion, was the first man to define two meanings of the principle of sufficient reason. But Wolff had applied them just for the ontology and such an application could be made out with the strict reconstruction procedure.

Wolff’s rationalist system unites epistemological and ontological principles, making the identification “being=consciousness”. This identity does not provide a way to understand how many varieties the principle of sufficient reason has. Schopenhauer was aware of this lack of clarity and took note of it.
To introduce and scrutinize Schopenhauer’s types of the principle of sufficient reason, let us find and compare similar principles in Wolff’s texts. It will be useful to reconstruct the types of the principle. In the structure of comparison we follow Schopenhauer. He insists on this sequence: 1) princicpium rationis sufficiendi essendi; 2) princicpium rationis sufficiendi fiendi; 3) princicpium rationis sufficiendi agendi; 4) princicpium rationis sufficiendi cognoscendi (Schopenhauer, 1986, S. 184). We will find the similar fragments from Wolff’s texts and correlate them with the Schopenhauer’s division.

A) Principium rationis sufficiendi essendi

Chr. Wolff:

“Was demnach der Raum in denen Dingen ist, die neben einander zugleich sind, das ist die Zeit in denen, die nach einander sind, oder deren eines auf das andere folget (§. 46. 94)” (Wolff, 1733, S.47).

A. Schopenhauer:

„Raum und Zeit haben die Beschaffenheit, dass alle ihre Teile in einem Verhältnis zu einander stehen, in Hinsicht auf welches jeder derselben durch einen andern bestimmt und bedingt ist. Im Raum heißt dies Verhältnis Lage, in der Zeit Folge“ (Schopenhauer, 1986, S. 158).

B) Principium rationis sufficiendi fiendi

Chr. Wolff:

„Wiederum da ein jedes vor sich bestehendes Ding eine Kraft hat, daraus, als au seiner Quelle seine Veränderungen fließen (§. 114. 115); so muss auch die Seele eine vergleichene Kraft haben <…> (Wolff, 1733, S. 464). Indem wir uns aber unserer bewusst sind, so erkennen wir ihrer Unterscheid von uns (§. 730), und daher stellen wir uns die Sachen als außer uns vor (§. 45) (Wolff, 1733, S. 468). Weil demnach diese Kraft der Grund ist von allem demjenigen, was veränderliches in der Seele vorgehet (§. 754); so bestehet in ihr das Wesen der Seele (§. 33)“ (Wolff, 1733, S. 469).

A. Schopenhauer:

„Das Subjekt des Erkennens kann, laut Obigem, nie erkannt, nie Objekt, Vorstellung, werden. Da wir dennoch nicht nur eine äußere (in der Sinnesanschauung), sondern auch eine innere Selbsterkenntniss haben, jede Erkenntniss aber, ihrem Wesen zufolge, ein Erkanntes und ein Erkennendes voraussetzt; so ist das Erkanntes in uns, als solches, nicht das Erkennende, sondern das Wollende, das Subjekt des Wollens, der Wille. Von der Erkenntniss ausgehend kann man sagen »Ich erkenne« sei ein analytischer Satz, dagegen »Ich will« ein synthetischer und zwar a posteriori, nämlich durch Erfahrung, hier durch innere (d.h. allein in der Zeit) gegeben. Insofern wäre also das Subjekt des Wollens für uns
ein Objekt. Wenn wir in unser Inneres blicken, finden wir uns immer als wollend" (Schopenhauer, 1986, S. 171).

D) Principium rationis sufficiendi cognoscendi

Chr. Wolff:

“Weil die Vernunft eine Einsicht in den Zusammenhang der Wahrheit ist (§. 368), die Wahrheit aber erkannt wird wenn man den Grund versteht, warum dieses oder jenes sein kann (§. 145); so zeigt uns die Vernunft, warum dieses oder jenes sein kann“ (Wolff, 1733, S. 234).

A. Schopenhauer


This fragments show us that the Wolff’s thoughts have not very much in common with Schopenhauer’s intentions. For instance, the first type of the principle of sufficient reason (essendi) by Wolff does not contain the term “causality”, because of the sequence of the occurrences does not prove their cause-effect correlation. Schopenhauer had seen this flaw. The third type of the principle of sufficient reason is formally similar with the Schopenhauer’s suggestion; however Wolff uses the term “force” instead “will”, which creates ambiguity.

5. Conclusion

Kant and Schopenhauer restricted the application of the principle of sufficient reason: Kant applied this principle only in his formal logic while the ontological side was analyzed in the principle of causality; Schopenhauer had enriched the principle of sufficient reason and continued to suggest the prime significance and importance it has for science.

But there is a difference between Kant and Schopenhauer’s points of view. The principle of sufficient reason (fourth type) by Schopenhauer is connected with the Will; it essentially substitutes the term “God” with “Will”, which is the thing-in-itself. That is why the Will is both the connective chain and expression of the free will as moral principle also. But such moral principle should be spread across all the world and all living organisms. If we accept it, we have to maintain the ubiquity of the influence of the moral principle, i.e. compassion principle, but here we do not need to discuss the essence of the compassion principle. I would like to underline this point, which clearly describes the difference between Kant and Schopenhauer: they both tried to move in the direction of ethics. But Kant confines the principle of sufficient reason to application to pure reason and also converts the principle to his practical philosophy, where morality is the sufficient reason for the realization of freedom. Schopenhauer also goes that way, however he justifies the external reason (ground), i.e. Will, which is not only sufficient reason for everything but also a condition for the functioning of the compassion principle, which does not limit ontology as a consequence of ethics, in contrast to Kant’s system.

Finally, I would like to conclude that the principle of sufficient reason gives the possibility to find the problem of free will and moral law in indissoluble correlation. But as we have seen, the application and usage of the principle differs between Kant and Schopenhauer in the interpretation of reason and understanding. As a matter of fact, Schopenhauer carries the reason functions to the understanding, having applied the main principle of understanding – causality – to the things as representations. For Kant, the understanding can also be applied to
the transcendental objects, but only through the
reason, which initiates the making of the a priori
synthetic propositions for the possible experience
in general: here the understanding cannot get the
knowledge. There is a difference in epistemology
between Kant and Schopenhauer: Kant ascribes
to the reason regulative status and to the
understanding – the possibility of the interaction
with the reason:

“…Das Bewusstsein, einem solchen
Gedanken zu haben, ist keine Erfahrung;
eben darum, weil der Gedanke keine
Erfahrung, Bewusstsein aber an sich nichts
Empirisches ist. Gleichwohl aber bringt
dieser Gedanke einen Gegenstand der
Erfahrung hervor oder eine Bestimmung
des Gemüths, die beobachtet werden
kann, sofern es nämlich durch das
Denkungsvermögen afficirt wird…” (Kant,
1867, S. 499).

Schopenhauer and Kant both tried to
interpret the principle of sufficient reason in their
own manner, but we see the similar consequence
of this: Kant critically analyses the principle and
restricts its usage only in the field of ontology;
Schopenhauer vice versa widens it and transfers
to the transcendent world of Will. Either way
the principle of sufficient reason opens the
possibilities of the correlation of free will and
moral law for further interpretation in all variants.
And it is important point if we are going to build a
full-fledged philosophical system.

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Закон достаточного основания
как связующее звено «свободы воли»
и «морального закона»
в философии Канта и Шопенгауэра

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Анализируется закон достаточного основания в системах И. Канта и А. Шопенгауэра, проводятся параллели с метафизикой Х. Вольфа. Автор показывает, как закон достаточного основания трансформировался от Вольфа через Канта к Шопенгауэру и в каком виде он был использован (догматическом или критическом) как методологическое правило построения философской системы.

Ключевые слова: закон достаточного основания, субъект, объект, причина.