“Soft Power” and “Smart Power” of Modern China

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The researcher shows that modern China is actively developing a whole set of humanitarian technologies. For this it integrates the best world conceptions and practices with its own rich and very old social-and-cultural practice. The best Chinese intellects are working at the technologies of strategic thinking, public relations, mass-media, public diplomacy, lobbyism, mass events organization, etc. At the same time much attention is given to “soft power”. The country’s leaders and analysts realize that preservation of integrity and the effective state’s foreign activity require the concord of “soft” and “hard” powers, giving rise to “smart power”.

Keywords: “soft power”, “smart power”, China, humanitarian technologies, molüe, public diplomacy.

According to E. Shostrom, a psychologist, “it’s amazing but in any conflict between a Hooligan and a Nice Fellow it is a Hooligan who loses”1. At that the researcher treats “a Nice Fellow” not as an unselfish romantic but as a calculating manipulator who counts on exaggerated care, love and attentiveness2. E. Shostrom probably absolutized his conclusion, paying little attention to direct physical conflicts that spring up in interpersonal as well as in intergovernmental relations. In our point of view, the importance of military force can be neither under- nor overstated. H. Kissinger believes that “almost all empires were created by force, but none of them can rely on it”3. Modern world is hardly kinder than it was centuries ago. However, as J.S. Nye (J.) argues, nowadays “power comes in many guises, and soft power is not weakness”4.

More than once Chinese leaders have pointed out to a great part they assign to “soft power” in the course of preservation and strengthening of the People’s Republic of China. In this regard Hu Jintao’s call “to raise the state’s cultural soft power” at the XVII congress of the Communist Party of China should be especially mentioned.

Many visitors to China wrote about Chinese élites’ primordial devotion to a “soft” style of political actions. V.I. Ivanenko who worked as a Soviet consul in the city of Hotan in southwestern Xinjiang in the years of 1940-1943 wrote in his memoirs: “In front of us there was not a wall even. It was something as amorphous, enveloping, flexible and light as Chinese silk. You pressed but there was nothing to press: everything flexed, everything backed away. But when your pressure stopped, everything took its initial shape. Cold steel masters say, and not without
reason, that it’s easier to cut a blacksmith’s anvil
than a silk headscarf thrown in the air”.5

Sun Tzu wrote: “The skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting;
he captures their cities without laying siege to
them; he overthrows their kingdom without
lengthy operations in the field”6. Even
“revolutionary operas” of the Maoist period paid
much attention to various ruses and tricks. In
1971, pending the USA President R. Nixon’s visit,
“Hongqi” magazine published the article which
suggested “opposing a revolutionary twofaced
tactics to the enemy’s counter-revolutionary
twofaced tactics” and carrying on an international
struggle “flexibly”.

In M. Leonard’s opinion, the conception
of “soft power” has got a better development
in modern Beijing than in Washington. This
approach “implies the ability to give others
the opportunity to apprehend what you would
like them to”. It doesn’t depend on economical
doles or political tricks, but mainly bases upon
attractiveness of your culture and ideological
views to others, upon your devotion to legal
standards and your abilities to set the tone in
international organizations”8. Liu Jianfei believes
that in the future “in the course of quite a long
period of time China’s international responsibility
will be apparent not on a material level but mainly
on a spiritual one. In other words, sharing the
responsibility for the state of affairs in the world,
China will substantially resort not to hard power
but soft power. China brought forward many
approaches and ideas corresponding to common
interests of peoples of the world and to the
course of history. Their influence will eventually
grow”9.

In Gao Hui’s point of view, it is “China’s
practice in successful promotion of reforms,
transparency and following its independent way
of development” that can be considered to be
China’s soft national power”10.

N.M. Spafarii, who visited China at
the end of the XVII century, mentioned its
residents’ special devotion to “writing and
learning”11. According to I. d’Hooghe, in
modern world China takes the second place
regarding the volume of produced scientific
knowledge12. By the year of 2004 the number
of scientists had reached 926 thousand people,
the number of students was 23 million people13.
By 2020 China should become a state of an
innovative type14. Not long ago Yan Xuetong,
a Chinese outstanding political scientist in the
sphere of international relations, stated that “if
China fails to provide 80% of its youth with
higher education it will not be able to catch up
or excel others in technological innovations.
To become an international center China has
no other choice but to develop education”15.
If only those domestic figures, speaking
about “overproduction” of specialists with the
diplomas of higher education in Russia, could
hear this. Yet, it’s clear that there is a difference
between educations.

N.M. Spafarii also stated that the Chinese
yield to the Europeans in bravery but excel
them in acumen and political pragmatism16. The
Celestial Empire possesses an ancient tradition
of strategic thinking the peculiar features of
which are thorough analysis of long-term trends,
attention to psychological and political factors,
scrupulous study of tactical opportunities, search
for unexpected moves and impartial evaluation
of decision variants17. “Shi”-concept, the art of
understanding things in their development, has a
great importance18.

H. Kissinger explains the difference
between western and eastern types of strategic
thinking dwelling upon the difference between
chess and guo (Chinese: “weiqi”). In chess they
play a decisive battle and the main battle is for
the centre of the chess-board. Guo develops the
flexibility of thinking: a player searches for a
relative advantage, strives to encircle a rival and risks to be unexpectedly encircled himself\textsuperscript{19}.

In Chinese social philosophy there is the “molüe” concept. This word is roughly translated as “super-planning” that means a specific form of wisdom focusing on antagonism in its broader sense. “Молюе” implies work with various conflict situations which includes analysis and evaluation of opportunities\textsuperscript{20}. Thus, it is a specific humanitarian technology\textsuperscript{21} of preparation and making strategic decisions.

Traditional literature glorifies the strategists of the past who were able to benefit from advantageous factors, minimizing opportunities their rivals might use. Long ago, in the legendary epoch of the Three Kingdoms Shu Han actively used non-violent strokes of tactics which were supposed to undermine the enemy’s fighting efficiency\textsuperscript{22}. From time immemorial they valued the skill to summit talks undermining the opponent’s confidence and thus gaining a psychological (if not material) superiority\textsuperscript{23}.

According to X. Liao, the process of decision-making by Chinese leaders evolved from centralized to pluralistic elitism\textsuperscript{24}. From December 2002 the “fourth generation” of Chinese leaders “made it a rule to hold the so called jiti xuexi (collective meetings) for the politburo members to arm the top of the elite with “progressive practice of the whole mankind” (these were Hu Jintao’s words at the first meeting). By July 2004 fifteen “collective meetings” of such a kind had been held. Legal, economical, political, historical, military, technological and cultural issues were considered at these sessions. All the meetings were held by Hu Jintao. Outstanding scientists of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, leading universities and military institutes were invited to participate in the discussions. These meetings equipped supreme leaders with a wide scope of new thoughts and knowledge. They also gave the specialists of “clever tanks” the opportunity to play the role of leaders’ assistants in the formation of a new vision of certain issues of the world importance”\textsuperscript{25}.

The turn to humanitarian technologies of “distributed cognition” takes place on the local level as well. In the course of the experiment, conducted in the city of Tzego, small groups of citizens with the right to vote were chosen by a lot to make important and socially significant decisions. The groups of population were randomly chosen, given consultations by professional experts and then offered to vote for this or that decision\textsuperscript{26}.

In modern world there often occur situations which require the quickest analysis of huge volumes of information as well as taking into account various variants of numerous actors’ actions in a constantly changing “battle field” for making a decision. According to N.V. Abaev, under such circumstances the ability to grasp the situation integrally in its outwardly discrepant unity and development, which was developed by Chinese Chán practitioners, may turn out to be more effective than a standard subject-object thinking limited in speed and efficiency of processing information (especially in a stressful situation)\textsuperscript{27}. One treatise runs: “The arrow goes up from the bow string but it doesn’t fly direct to the target; the target’s place is also not at the same place where it was when the calculations started. The latter turn out to be miscalculations. Thus, shooting comes to nothing”\textsuperscript{28}. Chán psychotherapy focuses on development of intuitive wisdom (jñāna) instead of (or, probably, in addition to) conceptual thinking limited in its potential\textsuperscript{29}. Integrating these practices with modern computer and info-psychological developments, China can get a unique humanitarian technology.

Dwelling upon humanitarian technologies of public relations, it should be noted that traditionally China’s power was devoid of publicity\textsuperscript{30}. This tendency was inherited by communist China as well. For example, in
Sergey A. Podyapolskiy. “Soft Power” and “Smart Power” of Modern China

1970 Mao Zedong made only one political statement, in 1971 there were no statements at all. In the Maoist period a powerful but at the same time very straightforward system of mass information was developed. Its peculiar features were tough distribution of access (public mass media, military newspaper and a special bulletin for executives), idle talk, and formalism. Many events were either not mentioned or informed about with a considerable delay (for example, this or that leader’s dismissal was sometimes announced years later). However, the events that took place on Tiananmen Square in 1989 clearly demonstrated the force of global mass media (and television, in particular) to Chinese leaders. The conclusions were drawn. Chinese thinkers speak of a discursive hegemony of West which makes such countries as China voiceless.

Modern People’s Republic of China is carrying on the policy directed towards overcoming this state of affairs. According to A.V. Shugaev, “if previously the Chinese authorities strove to protect national television against foreign influence, then now they actively involve its opportunities for the formation of favourable internal and external conditions of the country’s development.” Central television has become “one of the most important instruments for the formation of the People’s Republic of China’s cultural identity… Its organizational structure, principles of functioning and making TV programmes, normative and legislative regulation are directed at strengthening of the Chinese nation’s traditional spiritual values, search for and adoption of new strategies of the country’s socio-cultural development.” Broadcasting focusing on foreign audience is also actively developing. As the Chinese authorities plan it, CCTV should grow into a global informational station capable to compete with CNN. By the way, this television station has been broadcasting in Russian since 2009.

At the beginning of 1970-ies the volume of the Xinhua News Agency’s foreign-policy reports, oriented towards foreign audience, was ten thousand words a day on average. In 1997 Xinhua’s number of words was approximately five hundred thousand words a day, now it’s about two million. However, it’s not much in comparison with the Associated Press agency with approximately seventeen million words a day.

The country’s authority would like Xinhua to work at the same quantitative and qualitative levels as the world leading agencies do. CRI (China radio international) produces 1100 programme hours in 38 foreign languages (apart from broadcasting in Chinese dialects) a day.

The journalists definitely face specific difficulties caused by ideological policy of diktat of the Communist Party of China. According to X. Zhang, contradictions between a party logic and a market one as well as between the demands for professionalism and a party line are quite often in the work of Chinese media.

Xu Angang and Zhang Xiaojun suggest working at strengthening of the main state news Internet portals as well, increasing the volume of news and the number of languages. At that it is vitally necessary to carry out structural reforms of Chinese media, contribute to their merging in large intersectoral corporations, keep up their going into the world, and provide Chinese companies, publishing newspapers and journals and establishing broadcasting companies abroad, with financial support and tax benefits. Experts believe that in a 5-10 years’ period of time China could create several media corporations of a world level.

Millions of Chinese bloggers and Internet users are an important instrument of “soft power”. A number of the English language sites broadcasting the digest of a Chinese blogging sphere is growing.
In China humanitarian technologies alternative to the western ones are well developed. It was in Mao Zedong’s lifetime when “hospitality technologies”, the art of charming foreign guests, was perfectly mastered in China. The receiving party used the arsenal typical for this purpose: excursions which were carefully thought over, the accompanying persons’ psychological mastery, skillful organization of “chance meetings”, delicious cuisine (in the country where an average peasant’s consumption level hadn’t grown since the beginning of the XX century) and subtle flattery. According to P. Khollander, “the degree of the intellectuals’ susceptibility” to such frauds is “directly proportional to the degree of their alienation from their own society”\textsuperscript{46}. The representatives of the opposite subculture worry about their society’s shortcoming. That’s why other states’ criticism is not of a great importance for them\textsuperscript{47}. The mechanism worked successfully. O. Topping, an American journalist, wrote: “I felt how China’s charm is penetrating into my body and soul. The whole world was becoming new and more colourful”\textsuperscript{48}. The most significant guests were charmed by the Great Helmsman’s personal image of a “king-philosopher”\textsuperscript{49}. “Hospitality technologies” work nowadays as well. The Chinese willingly invite western intellectuals to their country, though giving priorities to luminaries in western thought but not to marginal revolutionaries as before. With the support of the Chinese leading higher education institutions the Naisbitt China Institute was founded especially for J. Naisbitt, an outstanding American futurologist. Expressing their deep gratitude to the receiving party, the Naisbitt couple enthusiastically describe dinners they were treated to by the distinguished officials of the People’s Republic of China\textsuperscript{50}. The “China’s Megatrends” book by John and Doris Naisbitt became the result of this project. The book is extremely informative. It contains the elements of criticism but is complementary to the Chinese authorities (especially in “Tibet issue”\textsuperscript{51}) in its general development of thoughts. The authors are certainly far from the idea that an outstanding thinker “sold himself for a mess of pottage”. Everything is much more subtle here. However, the potential of “hospitality technologies” must be neither under- nor overstated.

The concept of “guan-xi” takes an important place in Chinese social reality. Its English equivalent is probably “relations”. The “zou-hou-men” expression (“through the backdoor”) is close to this term which means establishment of informal relations making it possible to “settle issues” within the frames of centralized hierarchical structures though unofficially but effectively\textsuperscript{52}. The researchers state that fellow and old friendly relations were very important even in Maoist period\textsuperscript{53}. It was then when the skill to establish informal communications, which was traditional for China, was used for creating a new humanitarian technology. Foreign guests, the Chinese leaders were concerned with for some reason or other, were given an unofficial status of “friends”. Following some conditions (for example, that of non-touching upon “three T-s” and namely the issues of Tibet, Taiwan and the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989) a foreigner keeps up “friendship” and is given honour, respect as well as material wealth. However, this status could be recalled any moment and without explaining the reasons\textsuperscript{54}. Thus, in the period of “cultural revolution” even E. Snow, the first western journalist who wrote about the communist power in China, was refused a Chinese visa\textsuperscript{55}.

Lobbyism is one of China’s humanitarian technologies deeply rooted in ancient times. One of the ministers of the Han Dynasty suggested the following way of treating the Xiongnu: “Give them skillfully dressed clothes and carts to win their eyes; give them delicious food to win their
mounds; give them music and females to win their ears; provide them with magnificent buildings, storehouses and slaves to win their liver... and those who agree to obey will be honoured by the emperor who will invite them to dinner and personally serve them with wine and food, thus winning their brains. These can be called five baits”56. As H. Kissinger states, traditionally the aim of such policy was a compliant scattered periphery rather than a Chinese direct control57.

“Guan-xi” ancient method of organization together with a scientific approach (the China’s Academy of Social Sciences is focusing its studies on the processes of taking decisions in the key countries of the world) made it possible for the People’s Republic of China to organize an effective system of lobbying its interests in legal and executive (and, probably, in judicial58) authorities within the shortest period of time. A bright example of this system’s successful work is blocking the initiative of W. Clinton, a President of the USA, and W. Christopher, a Secretary of State of the USA, to deprive China of the MFN (most favoured nation) status giving the possibility to trade with America on very good terms59. The researchers state that the richest people of the USA, including B. Gates, one of the “Microsoft” founders, are in China’s lobby.

R. Bernstein and R. Munro define a “new China’s lobby” as a multifaceted network structure governed mainly by promises and providing with material wealth60. In our opinion, lobbyism can’t be minimized to bribery as it implies the mastery of psychological analysis as well as the technology of psychological manipulation. A skillful lobbyist develops long-term systems of relations rather than distributes envelopes with cash. The activity of “China’s lobby” is, of course, not isolated. It is enriched by different methods, including PR-technologies61. According to a Hong Kong researcher, the Chinese government hires the most influential American law firms and PR-companies. From 1997 till 2005 not less than 19 million dollars were spent on this activity62.

One of humanitarian technologies closely connected with the conception of “soft power” is gongong waijiao (“social diplomacy”). J. Wang defines it as the country’s interaction and communication with foreign public in the form of a monologue, dialogue, or cooperation63. According to I. d’Hooghe, the subjects of China’s social diplomacy are such non-state actors as non-commercial organizations, business communities, universities, research institutes and individuals. Yet, a greater number of issues and events of public diplomacy are still initiated by public authorities (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular). This partly reduces the target audience’s confidence. However, certain interaction of state authority and civil society is inevitable here as public diplomacy yields no results in case it contradicts the state policy. The Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) and student and youth organizations are among organizational structures working in the sphere of public diplomacy64. In some developing countries (Ethiopia, Laos and Myanmar, in particular) volunteers from the Chinese Young People’s Volunteer Army work65.

Chinese societies abroad play a special role in public diplomacy. According to I. d’Hooghe, they act as both actors and aim of public diplomacy. They are a target group as China’s authorities are eager to win Chinese diasporas, existing in many countries, over to their side. On the other hand, such diasporas enable to popularize Chinese culture and lobby the People’s Republic of China’s political interests66. For example, Krasnoyarsk public organization “Chinese community” was one on the first to help those who suffered damage from the fire in Kazachinskoe village and contributed
to the organization of “Beijing – Moscow” motor race.

One of the fundamental bases of Confucianism is the “li” (ceremony, ritual) principle. According to N.V. Abaev, a ritual has been regarded as an important means of the world organization and integration of the members of society since ancient times. In one of Confucius’s pupil’s point of view, a ritual “leads people to concord”. Music aiming at ennoblement of people, suggestion of the feelings of joy and harmony was attached a great importance in Confucian rituals. A very old mastery of mass holidays organization showed its worth in the course of a 4-hour long ceremony of the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing. One of the spectators gave the following descriptions of his feelings: “Conceptually it seemed a session of mass hypnosis: a sequence of unclear charming pictures to a melodic, subordinating rhythmic music. The pictures were such that a viewer couldn’t hide, abstract away from them even when in front of a TV-set”. According to an Internet publicist, the ceremony’s conceptual base was a new life initiation; and, on the whole, the ritual can be characterized with the “Dragon is conceiving its generation” phrase. The image of a spiral, representing the DNA structure and life, development in general, was actively used. There was a hint of an ambitious and energetic generation of the Chinese of the XXI century. Three thousand “Confucians” reciting the passages from “Selected Sayings” as well as symbolic images of such Chinese inventions as paper and press were slotted in the scenario. It should be noted that in the respect of music the organizers managed to solve a most difficult task of integrating Chinese and European traditions.

Modern China is actively using the charm of Confucian tradition as its “soft power”. According to I. d’Hooghe, it is partly connected with the fact that the Chinese authorities treat the symbols of Chinese culture as apolitical and, thus, less potentially dangerous. We argue the reasons lie deeper: the Chinese authorities realize that Marxism as it is doesn’t provide with the socio-cultural basis, quite strong for preserving the Chinese society’s integrity. However, it is indisputable that the name and image of Confucius is used for purely technological aims.

At the beginning of 2007 there were 123 Confucius Institutes in 49 countries (12 of them functioned in Russia). They were founded in order to popularize the Chinese language and culture abroad. By 2010 the number of foreigners studying Chinese had to reach one hundred million people. The experience of the Goethe-Institute in Germany and the Cervantes Institute in Spain served the examples for the Chinese. Confucius Institutes were established in many countries of the world at an unprecedented speed: in 2006 a new branch of the institute appeared every four days. By 2011 more than five hundred Confucius Institutes and their classrooms functioned in more
than eighty countries. Moreover, there was a project on translation of Confucius’s Pentateuch into nine major languages in Europe and its publishing.

N.V. Abaev points out to Confucianism’s limitedness. In his opinion, this tradition’s rules aiming at suppressing egocentrism and anarchic tendencies are, on the contrary, heighten these negative traits and thus increase entropy. According to L.Z. Eidlin, in China’s life and culture Confucianism formed a dialectic unity with Daoism being as if opposed to it. In connection with this it is quite appropriate to remember the conception of functional interethnic conflict developed by S.V. Lur’e. This conflict enables people to achieve their various aims and purports and thus brings necessary dynamism to culture. The Daoists asserted: “The solid and strong dies, the soft and weak lives.”

According to V.G. Nemirovskii, orientation to the world’s integrity close to modern synergy is peculiar for Daoism. This tendency was also taken in by Chan imbibing many features peculiar to Daoism.

During the civil war many spiritual leaders of Chan had to leave the country. The Chan legendary Shaolin Monastery suffered from the red guards’ raid. In 1970, however, it was restored. The present Chinese leader Xi Jinping reported to go in for traditional martial arts and Qigong respiratory gymnastics. It can be supposed that today’s generation of the Chinese leaders fully involves the opportunities opened by Chan in the sphere of strategic thinking.

Humanitarian and technological success of China is differently appraised by foreign and domestic observers. In J.S. Nye’s (Jr.) opinion, “China hasn’t cultural industry yet that can be compared to Hollywood or Bollywood; its universities yield to the American ones; this country lacks many non-commercial organizations generating soft power in the USA.” In his article published in 2011 I. d’Hooghe argues that after several years of its constant growth the popularity of China in the West has recently gone down. Yet, many African countries and the countries of the Near East are still benevolent to China. It should be noted that modern Chinese political analysts admit that China shouldn’t delude itself and rest on its laurels. True disclosure of China’s humanitarian-and-technological potential requires persistent systemic work.

According to O. Borokh and A. Lomanov, “on the whole Chinese politicians proceed from the assumption that combination of soft and hard powers is needed to increase the state’s “joint power”. After “hard power”, including economical, scientific and technical as well as military components, has reached a certain level, accumulation of “soft power” and cultural attractiveness in particular can lead to the effect of a national power “multiplicator”.

Yang Suetun, a political scientist, notes: “Within the boundaries of Chinese Asia we followed the Wang system. Outside its boundaries we followed the line of “hegemony” in our relations with the “barbarians”.” The political scientist suggests restoring the Wang system in today’s Asia on the basis of justice and observance of the rights of Asian subjects of international law. At that, naturally enough, Yang Suetun doesn’t name the countries to which the Ba system will be applied.

According to Zhai Decyuan, “China’s defense policy is active defense”. However, it should be noted that phraseology can be deceptive: invasion of Vietnam in 1979 was officially called a “self-defensive counter attack against Vietnam” in Chinese press.

One of the issues of modern Chinese military and political analytics is “unlimited techniques of waging a war”. Three main forms of such actions are distinguished. These are military actions (from an atomic bomb to terrorism), non-military...
Thus, modern China is actively developing

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“soft power”. The country’s leaders and analysts
realize that preservation of integrity and the state’s
foreign activity require the concord of “soft” and
“hard” powers, giving rise to “smart power”.


2. Ibid.


16. The full quotation is the following: “The Chinese are as brave in front of Europeans as wives in front of husbands, but they excel them in acumen being resourceful inventors, sly deceivers and quick-witted at any matter. They are always ready to deceive strangers and thus show them that they excel all other peoples in acumen. They always pretend to be very ordinary and truthful to deceive others. Moreover, they are fickle; always try to get their profit. But, frankly speaking, they are incredibly hardworking” (Ibid., p. 196).


19. See: Kissinger H. Op. cit. P. 23-25. V.G. Nemirovskii also thinks that “in the eastern type of thinking the centre is everywhere and nowhere at the same time and thus can appear anywhere, in any point. It is no coincidence that the the Daoists consider the centre to be between the sides, between the opposites: “Dao is the axis of the world”. A single dao pierces through all things. It is a single way of the universe and every item individually” (Nemirovskii, V.G. Sotsiologiya [Sociology]. Moscow, Prospekt, 2010. P. 51).


21. Using the “humanitarian technology” term, the author bases upon P.V. Klachkov’s terminological system in which “technology is a system of methods of some activity directed towards the most effective achievement of a certain result. Social technologies are those aimed at targeted influence on social structures and social processes. Humanitarian technologies are defined as a type of social technologies based on advantageous use of “soft” methods (persuasion and psychological manipulation) but not of the methods of compulsion, orders or encouragement” (Klachkov, P.V. Poniatie gumanitarnykh tehnologii v sisteme sotsial’no-filosofsikh kategorii [The concept of humanitarian technologies in the system of socio-

24 See: Liao, X. Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy Towards Japan. Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. P. 239. It should be noted that in late Soviet epoch similar tendencies were typical for Russia as well. According to A.V. Shubin, politburo in Brezhnev’s time was really a collective body. The Secretary General was rather a moderator (quite effective during the first decade of his governing) than a single leader despotically dictating his opinion on any issue (See: Shubin, A.V. Zolotaia osen’, ili Period zastoia. SSSR v 1976-1985 gg. [Golden autumn, or Stagnation Era. The USSR in 1976-1985]. Moscow, Vechе, 2008. Pp. 174-175). But this practice was supported rather intuitively, without proper theoretical thinking. As a result, nothing similar to the Chinese “system of generations” appeared in the Soviet Union.
28 Cit.: Ibid. P. 143.
29 See: Ibid. P. 147.
37 http://russian.cntv.cn/
47 See: Ibid. P. 42.
48 Cit.: Ibid. P. 415.
57 See: Ibid. P. 22.
59 See: Ibid.
60 See: Ibid. P. 110.
65 See: Ibid. P. 23.


See: Dzheki Chan, Mo Ian’ i liao Min’ vklucheny v sostav vysshego organa v politicheskoi sisteme Kitaia [Jackie Chan, Guan Moye and Yao Ming are allotted to the supreme advisory body in the political system of China], ITAR-TASS, available at: http://www.itar-tass.com/c11/638397.htm

See: Ibid.


See: Ibid. P. 68.


See: Fochkin, O. Shaolin, available at: http://vatany.ru/?an=vs207_mm

Kuda letit Kytay [the place where Chinese dragon flies], available at: http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/1082725/


See: Ibid.


The ability of the Chinese to a military science was differently appreciated by prehistoric authors. N.M. Przheval’skii considered the Chinese army’s fighting efficiency to be extremely low. He stated soldiers’ and officers’ craze for opium (See: Popov, I.M. Op. cit. P. 236). Characterizing the Chinese army, B. Grombchevskii pointed out to general corruption, careless use of arms and infrequent field firing (See: Ibid. Pp. 175-176). However, in 1895 already the General N.I. Grodekov suggested in his analytical report that they shouldn’t exaggerate the defiance of the Chinese to the military science which was truth on two feet then (See: Ibid. P. 182). In 1913 General A.N. Kuropakin stated that the Chinese could make excellent soldiers due to such traits of national character as high working capacity, unpretentiousness, persistence, cruelty, strong nerves and ability to face their death in cold blood (See: Ibid. P. 451).

Исследователь показывает, что современный Китай активно развивает целый комплекс гуманитарных технологий, совмещающая лучшие мировые концепции и практики с собственным богатым и древним социально-культурным опытом. Лучшие умы КНР работают над технологиями стратегического мышления, «связей с общественностью», массмедии, «общественной дипломатии», лоббизма, организации массовых мероприятий и т.д. Вместе с тем, уделяя большое внимание «мягкой силе», руководство и аналитики этой страны понимают, что сохранение целостности и эффективная внешняя деятельность государства требуют сочетания «мягкой» и «жесткой» сил, порождающего «умную силу».